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v.

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

LCui~I~A

Opinion of the Court

405 u.s.

Charles Stephen Ralston argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Jack Greenberg,
James M. Nabrit III, Margrett Ford, and Charles Finley.
Bertrand DeBlanc argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, Harry H award, Assistant
Attorney General, and Charles R. Sonnier.
Birch Bayh filed a brief for the National Federation
of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc., as
amicus curiae urging reversal.

MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a jury trial in the District Court for the Fifteenth Judicial District of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana,
petitioner, a Negro, was convicted of rape and sentenced
to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on
appeal by the Louisiana Supreme Court/ and this Court
granted certiorari. 2 Prior to trial, petitioner had moved
to quash the indictment because (1) Negro citizens were
included on the grand jury list and venire in only token
numbers, and (2) female citizens were systematically
excluded from the grand jury list, venire, and impaneled
grand jury. 8 Petitioner therefore argued that the indictment against him was invalid because it was returned
by a grand jury impaneled from a venire made up con1
255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970). Petitioner was indicted for
aggravated rape, and a 12-member jury unanimously returned a
verdict of "Guilty without Capital Punishment."

8

Petitioner does not here challenge the composition of the petit
jury that convicted him. The principles that apply to the systematic exclusion of potential jurors on the ground of race are essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries, however.
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 (1939). See generally Neal
v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
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OCTOBER TERM, 1975

NO. _ _ _ __

CLAUDIO CASTANEDA, SHERIFF, Petitioner

v.
RODRIGO PARTIDA, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff of Hidalgo
County, Texas, prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued
to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversing the district court
below, entered in the above entitled case on December
11, 1975.
OPINION BELOW

The opinion delivered by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, is reported at 524 F.2d 481 (1975), and is
appended to this Petition as Appendix "A". The opinion
delivered by the United States District Court for the
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Southern District of Texas as reported at 384 F.Supp. 79
( 197 4), which was reversed by the Court of Appeals, is
attached as Appendix "B".

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Annotated, Article
19.01 (Amended):

Also attached as Appendix "C" is a copy of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. A copy of the order denying the Petition for Rehearing en Bane is attached hereto
as Appendix "D". A copy of the Stay of Mandate is
appended hereto as Appendix "E".
JURISDICTION

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit was entered on December 11, 197 5
(See Appendix "A"). The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is invoked pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether or not the Petitioner rebutted the Respondent's prima facie case of discrimination in grand
jury selection.
II. Whether or not the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is in conflict with
several Supreme Court decisions.

"The district judge, at or during any term of court,
shall appoint not less than three, nor more than five
persons to perform the duties of jury commissioners,
and shall cause the sheriff to notify them of their
appointment, and when and where they are to appear.
The district judge shall, in the order appointing such
commissioners, designate whether such commissioners
shall serve during the term at which selected or for
the next succeeding term. Such commissioners shall
receive as compensation for each day or part thereof
they may serve the sum of Ten Dollars, and they
shall possess the following qualifications:
1. Be intelligent citizens of the county and able
to read and write the English language;
2. Be qualified jurors in the county;
3. Have no suit in said court which requires intervention of a jury;
4. Be residents of different portions of the
county; and
5. The same person shall not act as jury cornmissioner more than once in the same year."
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.03:

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Amendment Fourteen, Sec.
1:

" ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws".

"When the appointees appear before the judge,
he shall administer to them the following oath:
'You do swear faithfully to discharge the duties required of you as jury commissioners; that you will
not knowingly elect any man as juryman whom you
believe to be unfit and not qualified; that you will
not make known to any one the name of any juryman selected by you and reported to the court; that
you will not, directly or indirectly, converse with
any one selected by you as a juryman concerning
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the merits of . any case to be tried at the next term
of this court, until after said cause may be tried or
continued, or the jury discharged'."
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.06, (Amended):
"The jury commissioners shall select not less than
15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of
different portions of the county to be summoned as
grand jurors for the next term of court, or the term
of court for which said commissioners were selected
to serve, as directed in the order of the court selecting the commissioners."
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.08, (Amended):
"No person shall be selected or serve as a grand
juror who does not possess the following qualifications:
1. He must be a citizen of the state, and of the
county in which he is to serve, and be qualified under
the Constitution and laws to vote in said county, provided that his failure to pay a poll tax or register to
vote shall not be held to disqualify him in this
instance;

2. He must be of sound mind and good moral
character.
3. He must be able to read and write;
4. He must not have been convicted of any felony;
5. He must not be under indictment or other legal
accusation for theft or of any felony."
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.21:
"When as many as twelve persons summoned to
serve as grand jurors are in attendance upon the
Court, it shall proceed to test their qualifications as
such."
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Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.22:
"Each person who is presented to serve as a grand
juror shall, before being impaneled, be interrogated
on oath by the court or under his direction, touching
his qualifications."
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.23 (Amended):
"In trying the qualifications of any person to serve
as a grand juror, he shall be asked:
1. Are you a citizen of this state and county, and
qualified to vote in this county, under the Constitution and laws of this state?
2. Are you able to read and write?
3. Have you ever been convicted of a felony?
4. Are you under indictment or other legal accusation for theft or for any felony?"
Texas C.C.P., Annotated, Article 19.26:
"When twelve qualified jurors are found to be
present, the court shall proceed to impanel them as
a grand jury, unless a challenge is made, which may
be to the array or to any particular person presented
to serve as a grand juror."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondent was indicted on March 17, 1972, for
the offense of burglary of a private residence at night with
intent to rape, contained in the first count of the indictment, and burglary, in the second count of the indictment.
Thereafter, on December 19, 1972, the Respondent was
found guilty by a jury of burglary of a private residence
at night with intent to commit rape, after pleading not
guilty.

Ill
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A pre-sentence investigation was ordered, and on February 16, 1973, the Court sentenced Respondent to serve
eight ( 8) years in the Texas Department of Corrections.
From such action, the Respondent appealed. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on
March 6, 1974, in Partida v. The State, 506 S.W.2d 209.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed an application for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, claiming discrimination
in the selection of the grand jury which indicted him.
A hearing was held on his application. Judge Alamia of
the 92nd District Court, the Court which impanelled the
grand jury which indicted the Respondent, testified at the
hearing concerning the manner of selecting grand jury
commissioners and grand jury impanelling. At the request
of the Court, the State filed a transcript of the proceedings
wherein the grand jury which indicted the Respondent
was selected and impanelled. Attached to the transcript
of that proceeding was a list of the grand jurors originally
selected by the grand jury commissioners which ultimately
indicted the Respondent. This list indicates that 50 percent of the names appearing thereon were Spanish. The
record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury commissioners, 5 of
the grand jurors who returned the indictment, 7 of the
petit jurors, the judge presiding at the trial, and the sheriff
who served notice on the grand jurors to appear had
Spanish surnames.

( 2) That the Respondent had established a bare prima
facie case by proving a long continued disproportion in
the composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo County,
but the Court held that it has been rebutted.

On October 26, 1974, the United States District Court
denied the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
held:
( 1 ) That the Respondent had not waived his right to
object by failing to object at an earlier time; and

Attention is directed to Appendix "B". Thereafter, the
Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals, in its
opinion, attached as Appendix "A", found that Respondent's prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury
selection was not rebutted and ordered the case reversed
and remanded.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. Petitioner did effectively rebut Respondent's
prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury
selection.
The Respondent employed the "rule of exclusion" to
establish his prima facie case of grand jury discrimination.
He produced evidence that the total population of Hidalgo
County, Texas, in the year 1970 was 181,535 persons.
Of that number, some 143,611, or approximately 79.2%,
were persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname.
Evidence was then introduced to show the composition
of the grand jury "lists" (the 15-20 persons selected
by the grand jury commissioners from whom a grand jury
panel of 12 is selected) over a ten year period of time,
showing a statistical disparity of some 40.02%. The
Petitioner countered with sworn testimony of District
Judge J. A. Alamia, a Mexican-American, who selected
the grand jury commissioners, who selected the grand jury

Iil
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that indicted the Respondent. He testified that he had
selected three out of five Mexican-Americans as grand
jury commissioners. These five commissioners then selected twenty persons for the grand jury "list". Of this
number, 50% were Mexican-Americans. The sheriff who
summoned them was Mexican-American. Judge Alamia
denied that any sort of discrimination against MexicanAmericans had entered into his selection of the grand jury
commissioners. Mexican-Americans constitute a "governing majority" in Hidalgo County. The Texas system of
selection of grand jurors allows the subjective element
to enter into its jury selection process. Therefore, "If
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against themselves. A broader
range of variation should be tolerated here, because the
Texas selection system allows the governing majority to
favor their group when selecting grand jurors". See
Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F.Supp. 79 (Appendix "B").

position that such instructions from Judge Alamia would
be a violation of the principle that "jurymen should be
selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a race". Cassels v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282. The Supreme Court has recently held in
the case of Taylor v. Louisiana that "Our holding does
not auger or authorize the fashioning of detailed jury
selection codes by federal courts. The fair cross-section
principle must have much leeway in application . . .
Carter v. Jury Commission and other cases recognized
broad discretion in the States in this respect. We do not
depart from the principles enunciated in Carter." (See
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692.) The instant case is
similar to that of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, where
the Court held that "Here the commissioners denied that
racial consideration entered into their selection of either
their contacts in the community or the names of prospective jurors . . . Undoubtedly the selection of prospective
jurors was somewhat haphazard and little effort was made
to ensure that all groups in the community were fully
represented. But an imperfect system is not equivalent to
purposeful discrimination based on race. We do not think
that the burden of proof was carried by petitioner in this
case."

II. Under Supreme Court Rule 19, l(b ), a writ of
certiorari may be granted when a court of appeals
has decided a federal question in a way in conflict
with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. In
the instant case the Fifth Circuit has applied the
equal protection clause of the federal constitution in
a way not entirely consistent with several relevant
Supreme Court decisions.
In the Court of Appeals' opinion, it is stated that
"Judge Alamia offered no explanation for the disparity.
Indeed, he testified that he sought a balance of grand
jury commissioners according to ethnic origin, race, sex
and age, yet he did not instruct the commissioners to do
the same." (Emphasis added.) It is the Petitioner's

If the Court of Appeals is to require that Texas District
Court Judges are to instruct grand jury commissioners
to seek out racial and sexual quotas in filling the grand
jury list, then it would be meaningless to retain such a
system. In effect, the Court of Appeals' decision, by implication, has spelled the doom for the statutory scheme for
selection of grand jurors as enacted by the elected representatives of the people of the State of Texas.

10
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CONCLUSION

APPENDIX "A"

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for Certiorari
should be granted.

Rodrigo PARTIDA,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Respectfully submitted,
B. MciNNIS
Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas
OSCAR

THOMAS PARKER BEERY

Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas
Attorneys for Petitioner
Room 303
Hidalgo County Courthouse
Edinburg, Texas 78539

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, THOMAS PARKER BEERY, a member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby
certify that two ( 2) copies of the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari have been served on Respondent by
depositing same with the United States Postal Service,
Certified Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
David G. Hall, Law Offices of Texas Rural Legal Aid;
Inc., 103 E. Third, Weslaco, Texas 78596, on this the
__ day of April, 197 6.

II
I
I

THOMAS PARKER BEERY

Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Hidalgo County, Texas

v.
Claudio CASTANEDA, Sheriff,
Respondent-Appellee.
No. 74-3966.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 11, 1975.
Habeas corpus relief was denied a state prisoner by
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas at Brownsville, Reynaldo G. Garza, J., 384 F.
Supp. 79, on the ground that, although petitioner had
established a prima facie case of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in the grand jury selection process,
such prima facie case ha~ been rebutted. The prisoner
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Dyer, Circuit Judge, held
that the prisoner's prima facie case of discrimination was
not rebutted by testimony of the state district judge who
selected the grand jury commissioners in view of such
judge's testimony that, although he sought balance of
grand jury commissioners according to ethnic origin, race,
and age, he did not instruct the commissioners to do the
same and in view of his admission that the selection
process had not resulted in ethnically represented panels.
Proof that Mexican-Americans had governing majority
status in the county likewise did not rebut the prima facie
case.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.

therefore, apparently waived, 3 the Texas court iggored
th.sU fact an.sL.uroceede["Jo .reject Partida's grand jyry
contention. Partida v. State of Texas, Tex. Cr. App.,
1974, 506 S.W.2d 209. Thereafter, his petition for the
writ was filed, dismissed, and this appeal taken.

Before GODBOLD, DYER and MORGAN, Circuit
Judges.
DYER, Circuit Judge:
Partida seeks habeas corpus relief contending that he
was denied due process and equal protection of law because the grand jury of Hidalgo County, Texas, which
indicted him, was unconstitutionally underrepresented by
Mexican-Americans. The district courtheld that Partida
haaestablisheda prima facie case of discrimination against
Mexican-Americans in the grand jury selection process,
but that it had been rebutted. Finding that the county's1
evidence was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case,
we reverse.
Partida was indicted on March 17, 1972, and was found
guilty of the charge against him. On motion for a new
trial, Partida presented his Mexican-American exclusion
claim for the first time. His motion was denied and he
appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Although his challenge to the grand jury was untimely 2 aDd,

----...........

--- .._....

,.....,

,__._..

---

1. The writ was directed to the Sheriff of Hildago County who
was holding Partida.
2. Vernon's Ann. C. Cr. P. art. 19.27, provides in pertinent part:
"Before the grand jury has been impaneled, any person may
challenge the array of jurors or any person presented as a grand
juror. In no other way shall objections to the qualifications and
legality of the grand jury be heard."
Art. 27.03 provides:
" [A] motion to set aside an indictment . . . may be based on
the following:
... That the grand jury was illegally impaneled; provided, however, in order to raise such question on motion to set aside the
indictment, the defendant must show that he did not have an
opportunity to challenge the array at the time the grand jury
was impaneled." Cf. F. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (2) and (f).

1

-

[1] Initially, respondent asks us to deny petitioner
federal habeas corpus relief because he waived his challenge to the composition of the grand jury. However, the
waiver argument was made to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals which nevertheless chose to consider the merits
of the claim. Under these circumstances, habeas relief may
lie and the district court was correct in reaching the merits.
Warden v. Hayden, 1967, 387 U.S. 294, 297, fn. 3, 87
S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782; Irvin v. Dowd, 1959, 359
U.S. 394, 406, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900; Hale v.
Henderson, 6 Cir. 1973, 485 F.2d 266, 269.
[2, 3] Every criminal defendant is entitled to be indicted and tried by grand and petit juries whose members
have been selected in a non-discriminatory manner. Jury
discrimination, however, is nt an easy matter of proof.
The "rule of exclusion" is usually utilized. According to
this rule, a prima facie case of discrimination is established
by showing a disparity between ( 1 ) the percentage which
the ethnic or racial group constitutes of the persons from
whom a jury list is drawn and ( 2) the percentage which
that group constitutes of the jury list compiled. Once a
defendant establishes his prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the State to offer a satisfactory explanation--wiiy
the disparity exists. Muniz v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d
697, 700.
3. Wilson v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1974, 504 F.2d 562, 563; Tyson
State, 1943, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 171 S.W.2d 496,497-498.
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artid{
on the rule of exclusion to establish his
prima facie case. First, he demonstrated that MexicanAmericans constituted a separately identifiable ethnic
group in Hidalgo County, Texas. Then, he introduced
evidence that in 1970, the total population of Hidalgo
County was 181,535 persons of which 143,611, or approximately 79.2%, were persons of Spanish language or
Spanish ~arne. 4 Next, petitioner presented evidence
showing the composition of the grand jury Ii§.ts5 over a
period of ten years prior to and including the term of
court in which the indictment against him was returned.
Of the 870 persons selected for grand jury duty, only
39.0% were Mexican-Americans. In the two and one-half
year period previous to tli"e indictment, 45.5% of the
panelists were persons of Mexican descent.
[4] As these figures show, the disparity between Mexican-Americans in the population and those on the grand
jury was significant: over the full ten year period, it was
40.2%; for the shorter two and one-half year period, it was
33.7%. 6 This dis ari
ear establishes a rima facie case.
Black v. Curb, 5 Cir. 1972, 464 F.2d 165; o son v.
Smith, 5 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 1075; Preston v. Mandeville, 5 Cir. 1970, 428 F.2d 1392; Muniz v. Beto, supra.

I.

4. The figures were obtained from the 1970 Census of Population
conducted by the United States Census Bureau, Department of Commerce. Since there was no contrary showing, we accept petitioner's
assertion that the terms "Spanish surname" and "Spanish language"
as used in the census reports are synonymous with persons of Mexican
descent in Hidalgo County.
5. The grand jury "list" refers to the 15-20 persons selected by
the jury commissioners from whom a grand jury panel of 12 is
selected. See fn. 7.

i,,,
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6. The grand jury list prepared in the term Partida was indicted
was 50o/o Mexican-American while the panel itself was 40o/o. The
disparities were 29.2% and 39.2% respectively.
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Respondent then had the burden to rebut petitioner's
statistical presentation. It is at this juncture that we disagree with the district court.
[5] Respondent's rebuttal evidence was limited to the
testimony of -~at~ District J udg_e Alamia, who selected
the grand jury commissioners, who selected the grand jury
who indicted petitioner. 7 Judge Alamia offered no explanation for the disparity. Indeed, he testified that he sought
a balance of grand jury commissioners according to ethnic
origin, race, sex and age, yet did not instruct the commissioners to do the same. In addition, he admitted that
the grand jury selection process has not resulted in
ethnically-representative grand jury panels.
[6] In addition to Judge Alamia's testimony, the district
court based its decision on the "g_overning majorit~" st&s
of Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County. 8 He reasoned
that Mexican-Americans in such a position w9uld not purposefully and intentionally discriminate against themselves.
7. This bit of verbal gymnastics exemplifies the organization of
the Texas grand jury system. A state district judge appoints not less
than three nor more than five jury commissioners, who must be
residents of different portions of the county and must not have served
previously in the same year. Art. 19.01. They, in turn, select not less
than 15 nor more than 20 persons "from the citizens of different
portions of the county" as grand jurors. Art. 19 .06, who, among
other things, must be able to read and write and must be of sound
mind and good moral character. Art. 19.08. The 15-20 persons are
"tested," Art. 19.21, and they are "interrogated," Art. 19.22, by being
asked prescribed questions, Art. 19.23. Then 12 of them are impaneled
by the district judge as the grand jury. Art. 19.26.
8. "Here, 80% of the population is Mexican-American, the majority of the voting population is Mexican-American, the majority of
the elected officials are Mexican-American, the majority of the judges
and jury commissioners are also Mexican-American, and MexicanAmericans in significant percentages have served on every grand jury
in the last ten years." Memorandum Opinion of District Court, p. 18.

II
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Therefore, the discriminatory intent presumed by petitioner's prima facie case was overcome. We cannot agree.
The fact of governing majority status may mollify the
pri.!!Ja 7-ad~ase, but it does not nullify it. This may be
done only by proof to explain the disparity. Without it,
petitioner must prevail.

APPENDIX "B"

[7] While the Texas system of selecting grand jurors
is constitutional, Smith v. Texas, 1940, 311 U.S. 128, 61
S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84; Brooks v. Beta, 5 Cir. 1966, 366
F.2d 1, the unbridled discretion afforded the jury commissioners to prep.ire the grand ]ury list requires close scrutiny
ortii'e disparities and the proof offered to explain them.
Here, the disparities are too great and the proof offered
too paltry.
The district court's judgment is reversed and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. 9
Reversed and remanded.

Rodrigo PARTIDA

v.
Claudio CASTANEDA, Sheriff.
Civ. A. No. 74-B-50.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
S.D. Texas,
Brownsville Division.
Oct. 26, 1974.
Proceeding on petition by Texas prisoner for federal
writ of habeas corpus claiming discrimination in selection
of grand jurors which returned indictment against him.
The District Court, Garza, J., held that while petitioner
had proven a bare prima facie case of discrimination in
selection of grand jurors, the case has been rebutted by
evidence produced by the state.
Petition for writ denied and cause dismissed.

ACLU Foundation-South Texas Project, David G.
Hall, San Juan, Tex., for petitioner.
9. We do not suggest that proportional representation or some
percentage approximating it is required to survive constitutional attack. Cf. Swain 11. Alabama, 1965, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09, 85 S.Ct.
824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. The unexplained disparities here are simply too
great and too long existent for the county system to escape unrectified.
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Oscar Mcinnis, Crim. Dist. Atty. of Hidalgo County,
Edinburg, Tex., for respondent.
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MEMORANDUM
After exhausting all available state remedies, the
Petitioner, Rodrigo Partida, filed this Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus with the United States District Court,
Southern District of Texas, naming Claudio Castaneda,
the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, Texas, as Respondent.
Petitioner alleges he has been denied due process and
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, because Mexican-Americans
were significantly under-represented on the state grand
jury that indicted him, as a result of a long continued
system of underrepresentation in the particular jurisdiction
where he was tried. The District Attorney for Hidalgo
County filed the answer for the Respondent which asserts
that the Petitioner has waived his right to claim racial
discrimination because Petitioner failed to raise his claim
prior to trial. It is further asserted that the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals was correct in holding Petitioner
failed to establish his claim that he had been denied his
constitutional rights because of a long continued racial
underrepresentation on the state grand juries in Hidalgo
County. Two issues are presented for decision by this
Court. The first issue is whether this Court should hold
Petitioner waived his right ~o object to the composition
of the grand jury that indicted him, where the state
courts have ignored any waiver provision and considered
Petitioner's claim on the merits. The .second issue is
whether the Petitioner has proven his claim of a longcontinued racial underrepresentation in the particular
jurisdiction where he was tried and is entitled to relief.

at night with intent to commit rape; on December 19,
1972, the Petitioner was found guilty by a jury and
sentenced to serve not less than five nor more than eight
years in the Texas Department of Corrections. The Petitioner filed a Motion for a New Trial and for the first
time raised the issue of the unconstitutional composition
of the grand jury that indicted him. Petitioner attempted
to prove systematic racial discrimination in the selection
of the grand jurors in Hidalgo County by placing in
evidence data from the U.S. Census of 1970, which shows
that the Mexican-American population of Hidalgo County, as indicated by Mexican-American surnames, was
79.2% of the total population. He further showed that
the grand juries for the ten year period from 1962 to
1972, when he was indicted, were composed of 39%
Mexican-American surnamed jurors. These figures illustrate the existence of a 40.2% disparity between the
percentage Petitioner's ethnic group constituted of the
total population, and the percentage which his ethnic
group constituted of the jury lists actually compiled.
Petitioner's Motion for New Trial was overruled and he
appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the
highest state appellate court on criminal matters. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered the untimely
presented point of error and held that the Petitioner had
failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie
case of jury discrimination and therefore, affirmed his
conviction. Partida v. State of Texas, 506 S.W.2d 209
(Tex. Cr. App. 1974 ). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that even though Petitioner did show a substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on
the grand jury, he failed to show:

The Petitioner, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted on March
17, 1972, for the offense of burglary of a private residence

" . . . that the females who served on grand juries
were not of Mexican-American descent but married

GARZA, District Judge.
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to husbands with Anglo-American surnames. He did
not show how many persons with Mexican-American
surnames or of Mexican-American descent were
summoned for grand jury duty and were excused
for age, health or other legal reasons. . . How many
of those listed in the census figures with MexicanAmerican names were not citizens of the state, but
were so-called 'wet-backs' from the south side of
the Rio Grande; how many were migrant workers
and not residents of Hidalgo County; how many were
illiterate and could not read and write; how many
were not of sound mind and good moral character;
how many had been convicted of a felony or were
under indictment or legal accusation for theft or
a felony; none of these facts appear in the record.
Their absence renders the disparity of the percentages of little force or effect."
As further evidence of the lack of -E.!!!J?Oseful discrimi~
tion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that
the record showed that the Judge who presided at the
trial and summoned the jury commissioners had a Mexican-American surname; that .!£ree of the five jury commissioners that he summoned had Mexican-American
surnames; that ten of the twenty members of the grand
ju"'fYarray had Mexican-American surnames; that five of
the twelve grand jurors that indicted Petitioner had
Mexican-American surnames, probably because four of
the original members of the array who were MexicanAmericans could not be located; that the foreman who
signed the grand jury indictment had a Mexican-American surname; that seven of the twelve petit jurors that
found Petitioner guilty had Mexican-American surnames.

-
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After Petitioner's appeal had been denied, he filed his
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court. Peti-

II.
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tioner alleges he has been denied due process of law and
equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, because of the ethnic underrepresentation in the state grand jury which indicted him,
which defect constitutes a denial of a fundamental right
and may be raised for the first time in a Motion for New
Trial; that he did not knowingly and intentionally waive
his right to challenge the composition of the grand jury
because his court appointed counsel did not inform him
that such right existed; that he was an indigent at the
time of his indictment and was unrepresented by counsel
at this "critical stage", which, according to the Texas
statutory and court fashioned rules, is the stage when
Petitioner must challenge the array or be barred from
asserting his challenge; that the Texas statutes do not
provide for his particular constitutional challenge and,
therefore, he could not have waived it, since it did not
exist; that the highest state appellate court on criminal
matters considered the constitutional challenge and, therefore, he could not have waived it, since it did not exist;
that the highest state appellate court on criminal matters
considered the constitutional challenge and, therefore,
ignored the waiver provisions, if any existed; that the
highest criminal appellate court in the state applied the
wrong burden of proof and completely misunderstood
the requisites of a constitutional attack based on ethnic
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. The
state answers that the Petitioner did waive his challenge
to the ethnic composition of the grand jury and he did
not establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
[1,2] Since the waiver issue is potentially dispositive
of the entire case, it will be considered first. Rule 12 (b)
( 2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

23
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". . . objections based on defects in the institution
of the prosecution or in the indictment . . . may be
raised only by motion before trial . . . failure . . .
constitutes a waiver . . . but the court for cause
shown may grant relief from the waiver." (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 93 S.Ct. 1577,
36 L.Ed.2d 216 (1973), this rule was held to apply to
both procedural and constitutional defects in the institution
of prosecutions which do not affect the Court's jurisdiction. The policy reasons for the rule, as so clearly stated
by the Davis Court, are:
"If its time limits are followed, inquiry into an
alleged defect may be concluded and, if necessary,
cured before the court, the witnesses and the parties
have gone to the burden and expense of a trial. If
defendants were allowed to flout its time limitations,
on the other hand, there would be little incentive to
comply with its terms when a successful attack might
simply result in a new indictment prior to trial. Strong
tactical considerations would militate in favor of
delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an
acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did
not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an
otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult."

Davis clearly establishes the rule that once an objection
to the institution of the prosecution is waived, it cannot
(
later be resurrected, either in direct criminal proceedings
or in federal habeas corpus, unless cause is shown. If
cause is shown, then a new trial will be granted so that
an indictment can be returned by a properly constituted
grand jury. Nothing in the previous trial need be redone;
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the prosecution will be allowed to present its entire case
through the testimony given at the previous trial, if it
is shown that its witnesses are unavailable. Under this
procedure, the state will only lose the enhancement of
credibility that the actual presence of witnesses will lend
to their testimony. Several factors should be considered
in determining whether there is sufficient cause to grant
relief from any waiver suffered by the complainant.
[3] In determining if cause exists, the Court should
consider whether the case against the Petitioner is a strong
one or weak one, if the case is a weak one, then it is
probable a properly composed grand jury would have
found that probable cause did not exist and would not
have bound the defendant over for trial; whether the facts
concerning the selection of the grand jury were notorious
and available to the Petitioner in the exercise of due diligence before trial, if the facts were known it increases the
likelihood of a tacit but intentional waiver or intentional
tactical decision; considerations of credibility require an
examination of how much the state will lose because
certain key witnesses are no longer available; judicial
economy requires examination of the seriousness of clogging dockets by empaneling new grand and petit juries
to re-indict and re-try the defendant; whether upsetting
prior convictions will effect enhancement laws; whether
any actual prejudice resulted to the defendant from the
discriminatory selection of the grand jury, for example,
were the two white accomplices set free but the black man
bound over for trial. Davis v. United States, supra
(strength of evidence of guilt-facts of selection notorious-loss of credibility on retrial); Newman v. Henderson,
496 F.2d 896, 898 (CA 5 1974) (actual prejudice).
Reliance on pre-Davis cases is not "cause" and will not

-~
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excuse Petitioner from his failure to timely assert his claim
in the trial court. Morris v. Sullivan, 497 F.2d 544 (CA
5 1974 ).
Factually the law announced in Davis can be limited
to a Motion to Vacate brought pursuant to § 2255, but the
Fifth Circuit has chosen not to circumscribe the Davis
holding and has held that it applies to state prisoners
bringing habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254. Hairston v.
Cox, 361 F.Supp. 1180 (W.D.Va.1973); Morris v. Sullivan, supra; Newman v. Henderson, supra; Jones v. Henderson, 494 F.2d 47 (CA 5 1974); Rivera v. Wainwright,
488 F.2d 275 (CA 5 1974); Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d
702 (CA 5 1974 ).
[4-8] Pre-Davis, the rule in this Circuit was that a
jury discrimination claim barred by a state procedural
timeliness rule, like the Texas rule, could be presented
for the first time in federal habeas corpus unless the
state proved deliberate bypass or knowing waiver. PostDavis, this Circuit has consistently held that the Davis
rule is applicable to state grand jury claims and it is the
responsibility of the petitioner to show facts and circumstances justifying relief from the waiver. Morris v. Sullivan, supra. In Morris, it was held that a state's courtfashioned procedural waiver rule should be given the same
effect as Rule 12(b)(2). In Valadez v. State, 408 S.W.2d
109 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held that if the defendant did not timely assert
his objection to the grand jury, he would be held to have
waived his claim. Ever since Hendandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954 ), it has been
held that a Texas grand jury can be attacked for purposeful exclusion of Mexican-Americans. The case of Muniz
v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697 (CA 5, 1970), cited by Petitioner,

~~~

can be distinguished because at the time Petitioner was
there indicted, Hernandez had not been decided and Texas
did not recognize this constitutional claim as a ground
for challenge. It now seems apparent that under established
Texas law, a defendant can object to a grand jury because
of purposeful exclusion of Mexican-Americans, and this
objection can be waived if the defendant fails to timely
assert it. It is now equally clear that the federal courts
will give the same effect to the state waiver rule as it
will give to Rule 12(b)(2), Fed.R.Crim.P., waiver rule.
The standard for the application of this rule was expressed
in Rivera v. Wainwright, supra:
"If this waiver meets federal constitutional standards then the petitioner would be precluded from
asserting his present claim in this federal habeas
corpus proceeding."

Similarly, if the state law does not provide for a procedure
to give relief from the waiver, the federal courts will engraft a "cause shown" exception on the state rule and
make an independent determination of whether such
cause exists. Newman v. Henderson, supra. The rationale
for this holding is evident; a state prisoner should not
stand in a better position than a federal prisoner who
would be held to have waived his objection under Rule
12(b )(2). Newman v. Henderson, supra.
[9, 10] This Court, however, does not feel that Davis JA
is dispositive of the factual situation present in this case.
Here, the highest state court on criminal matters has
chosen to ignore its own waiver provisions and consider
the merits of Petitioner's constitutional claim. Where the
state courts have ignored their own waiver provisions and
considered the merits of a constitutional claim, a federal
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court is not constrained from also considering the merits
of the constitutional claim, even though it may have been
waived under the federal rules. In this situation it is well
settled that the federal courts will also reach the merits
in the absence of an intentional waiver or deliberate
bypass. Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 269 (CA 6
1973); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129, 84 S.Ct.
1152, 12 L.Ed.2d 190 ( 1964); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 297 n. 3, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782
(1967); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406, 79 S.Ct.
825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 486, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953); Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 247, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed.
1066 ( 1937); Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822,
9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Having held
that Petitioner did not waive his right to present his claim
of discriminatory jury selection, it is not necessary to
determine at what stage the Texas court-made waiver provision is effective or whether any such provision would
make that state a "critical stage" at which the defendant
must be represented by counsel.

~

This Court turns next to a consideration of Petitioner's
claim that he has been.. 1eJ!ied equal J?rotec_!ion of the
' laws because of the long-contmuedsystematic uii.derrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the grand jury panels
in Hidalgo County.
[ 11] The standard that has evolved under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution
during the ninety years since Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879), is that an indictment
returned against a member of a "distinct group" cannot
stand if members of this "distinct group" have been sys-

I

I

t~matically

and intentionally discriminated against in the
selection of the grand jury. As eloquently expressed by
Chief Justice Warren in Hernandez v. Texas, supra:
"Throughout our history differences in race and
color have defined easily identifiable groups which
have at times required the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community
prejudices are not static, and from time to time other
differences from the community norm may define
other groups which need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a
question of fact. When the existence of a distinct
class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that
the laws, as WDitten or as applied, single out that class
for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classifioation, the guarantees of the Constitution have
been violated. The Fourteenth Amendment is not
directed solely against discrimination due to a 'twoclass theory'-that is, based upon differences between
'white' and 'Negro'." (Emphasis supplied.)

A conviction based upon such a constitutionally defective
indictment will also be set aside regardless of strong evidence of guilt or lack of objection to the composition of
the petit jury that finds the defendant guilty. Pierre v.
State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed.
757 (1939); Hill v. State of Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62
S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 (1942); Labat v. Bennett,
365 F.2d 698 (5 Cir. 1966). This does not mean, however, that the accused will be set free, since the state may
choose to re-indict and re-try him after the constitutional
error has been corrected. Hill v. Texas, supra; Patton v. ·
Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 469, 68 S.Ct. 184, 92 L.Ed.
76 (1947); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 247, 85
S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Whitus v. Georgia,
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385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599
(1967).

compiled by the jury commissioners. Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935);
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 88 S.Ct. 4, 19 L.Ed.2d
25 ( 1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 523,
19 L.Ed.2d 634 ( 1967); Muniz v. Beto, supra; Singleton
v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 671, 677 ( 1974); Gibson v. Blair,
467 F.2d 842, 844 ( 1972).

L12] The person claiming the s stematio and intentional_discrimination in the selection of the grand jury as the
burden of providing a prima facie case, but once it is
proven, tthe burden shifts to the state and it will be held
responsible for any factual vacuum. Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1224 (1953).
Patton v. Mississiprpi, supra; Muniz v. Beto, supra. The
reason for this rule is:
"It is designed to operate in jury cases so that once
the defendant has made a showing of total exclusion,
the burden of going foPWard with the eVIdence' is
rplaced upon the State, the party in the better position to develop the facts as to how the exclusion
came about. The defendant is a party to one proceeding only, and his access to relevant evidence is
obviously limited. The State is a party to all criminal
cases and has greater access to ~he evidence, if any,
which would tend to negative the State's involvement
in discriminatory jury selection." Swain v. Alabama,
supra, at 240, 85 S.Ct. at 846.

~

"Had there been evidence obtainable to contradict
and disrprove the testimony offered by petitioner, it
cannot be assumed that the State would have refr.ained from introducing it." Pierre v. Louisiana,
supra, at 362, 59 S.Ct. at 540.

[13] To establish a prima facie case of invidious dis) crimination, the Petitioner must first show a discriminatory result by proving a marked disparity between the
percentage which the "distri.ct group" constitutes among
the potentially eligible jurors and the percentages which
the "district group" constitutes among the jury list actually

/v
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After proving a discriminatory result, the Petitioner
must further rove this result was accompanied b some
{ p~rticular discrimmatory ac or a1 ure to act; or accompanied by token inclUsion or total exclusion; or accompanied by a jury selection system containing a significant
danger of abuse; or by proving that the discriminatory
result was representative of the results obtained in a history of cases in the particular jurisdiction in which the
trial occurred, this being strong circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory jury selection. Singleton v. Estelle,
supra; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 61 S.Ct. 164,
85 L.Ed. 84 (1940) (failure to act-conscious ignorance); Hill v. Texas, supra (failure to act-conscious ignorance); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630, 92
S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (racial designation
on questionnaire-significant danger of abuse); Avery v.
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244
(1953) (racial designation on jury cards-significant danger of abuse); Whitus v. Georgia, supra (racial designation on tax list-significant danger of abuse); Norris v.
Alabama, supra, (total exclusion of Negroes from grand
juries and petit juries); Brown v. Allen, supra (token
inclusion of Negroes on grand and petit juries); Patton v.
Mississiprpi, supra (history of discriminatory results); Muniz v. Beto, supra (history of discriminatory results);
Gibson v. Blair, supra (history of discriminatory results).

~
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The "Rule of Exolusion" is an evidentiary rule to facil~tate the Petitioner in establishing his prima facie case of
intentional discrimination f here ev,idence of intent is
otherwise wanting. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (CA 5
1966). Under this rule a prima facie case can be established, as done in the case before the Court, by showing
a long-continued and unexplained disparity.

were not a governing majority and were significantly un~government of the county. In
derrepresented
Pullum v. Greene, 396 F.2d 251 (CA 5 1968), 55.5%
of the total population was Negro, yet only 17.9% of the
jury list were Negro, causing a 37.6% diSiparity. The
Court indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from
the fact that the selection system contained an inherent
danger of abuse, since the jury lists were drawn from
segregated t~lists and there was evidence that the jury
commissioners failed to familiarize themselves with the
community, especially with the previously excluded minority
group. In this county in Georgia, there was a long history of
total exclusion of Negroes from the jury lists and they clearly
were a non-governing majority. Salary v. Wilson, 415 F.2d
467 ( CA 5 1969), is another case cited by Petitioner
where Negroes were a majority of the population. There,
Negroes constituted 55% of the total population, yet only
12.9% of the jurors on the jury list were Negro. The Court
indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from the
fact the jury commissioners failed to familiarize themselves
with the Negro population, which again was a non-governing majority. Even though Negroes constituted a majority of the population and were significantly included in
the grand jury lists, they were still underrepresented on
the grand jury list, and it was held they had established
their prima facie case. In all of these cases, the excluded
group was not a governing majority, and the Court found
some evidence that discrimination had occurred besides
circumstantially through evidence of a long continued dispadty. The Court found either total exclusion, token inclusion, some discriminatory 'act, failure of jury commissioners to inform themselves of qualified members of the
community, or found some defect in the selection system.

A

dispani~

great enough to establish a prima facie case
of discrimin~ry jury selection will depend on the facts
of each case, but an examination of a few recent cases will
g1ve an indication of the outer perimeters. In Black v.
Curb, 464 F.2d 165 (CA 5 1972), 69% of the total
population was Negro, 60% were potentially eligible, yet
only 35% of the potential jurors on the jury List were
Negro, causing a 25% disparity. The Court indicated this
discriminatory result flowed from the fact that the jury
commissioners disqualified large numbers of Negroes because they were unknown to the jury commissioners. Failure of jury commissioners to inform themselves of the
qualifications of members of minority groups has long
,been held to be a form of discriminatory jury selection.
It should be noted that NegroeS' constituted a majority of
the population, but they were not a governing majority
even though there was significant inclusion on both grand
and petit juries. In Tyrner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359,
90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2ct567 (M70), 60% of the total
population was Negro, yet only 37% of the jurors on the
jury list were Negro, causing a 23% disparity. The Court
indicated that this discriminatory result flowed from the
fact that the jury commissioners purged a great number
of Negroes from the voter lists because they "lacked intel:ligence" or "uprightness" and were, therefore, disquali,fied. While Negroes again constituted a majority, they
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In S~ain v. Alabama, supra, 26% of the potentially eligible population w""as Negro, yet only 10%-15% of the
jurors on the jury list were Negroes. The Court held:

When this disproportion was considered with the evidence
of the failure of the jury commissioners to famaliarize
themselves with qualified members of the excluded group,
it was held sufficient to establish a prima facie case.

"We cannot say that purposeful discrimination
based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a community is
underrepresented by as much as 10%. (Citations
omitted). Here the commissioners denied that racial
considerations entered into their selections of either
their contacts in the community or the names of
prospective jurors. There is no evidence that the
commissioners applied different standards of qualifications to the Negro community than they did to
the white community. Nor was ·there any meaningful
attempt to demonstrate that the same proportion of
Negroes qualified under the standards being administered by the commissioners. It is not clear from the
record that the commissioners even knew how many
Negroes were in their respective areas, or on the
jury roll or on the venires drawn from the jury box.
The overall percentage disparity has been small, and
reflects no studied attempt to include or exclude a
specified number of Negroes. Undoubtedly the selection of prospective jurors was somewhat haphazard
and little effort was made to ensure that aY groups
in the community were fully represented. But an imperfect system is not equivalent to purposeful discrimination based on race. We do not think that the
burden of proof was carried by petitioner in this
case."

I

In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed.
839 (1950), 15.5% of the total population was Negro,
yet only 6.7% of the jurors on the jury list were Negro.
The Court said this disproportion was not enough to estoablish a prima facie case, since it appeared from the
record that not all Negroes in the county were eligible.

'r
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[14, 15] These cases are illustrative because they show )
that tpe percentage disparity required to establish a prima
facie case will vary accordmg to a great immber . of
f~rs. For example, a greater percentage of disproportioiils permissible when Petitioner bases his disproportion
on t2Jal population instead of eligible o ulation. The
reason is that it will
presumed that a substantial number of the distinct group are eligible, but it will not be
presumed that all members of the group are eligible. It
would seem that a greater percentage of deviation is
permitted where there is no evidence of a discliminatory
act or failure to act, token inclusion, total exclusion,
inherently dangerous jury selection system, or a long history of discriminatory results. The reason this should be
is that the Court must presume that some defect in the
system caused the discriminatory result, but where a defect is shown, then it is only necessary to presume the
"nexus" between the defect and the discriminatory result.
The amount of inclusion is also to be considered, as well
as whether the selection process used reflected a studied
attempt at discrimination or was merely haphazard or
inadvertent in its failure to ensure all groups in the community were fully represented and also whether the group
i
excluded was a majority or governing majority. In determining whether a prima facie case of discriminatory jury
select'
established, the Court must examine
th entire record a
take into account all possible
pl atlons. As cl ly state~ Alexander v. Louisia'la,

a- ~
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"This Court has never announced mathematical
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized that a
factual inquiry is necessary in eaoh case that takes
into account all possible explanatory factors." (Emphasis supplied. ) _

:

[ 16] This Court is aware that the state has the burden
of rebutting the P~ner's prima facie case once it has
been established, but bias and prejudice are not easily
inferred and he must present clear evidence of discrimiii'atO[y jury selection. Mere art'egations alone are not
enough. The Court cannot presume a case without some
ev:idence that it, in fact, exists; therefore, the prima facie
case must depend on the basic correctness of the percentages aided by certain allowable presumptions; the Court
is not bound b percentages which are on their fac ·ncorrect.
e state appe a e court mcorrec y p aced the
burden of proof on the Petitioner, but the basic accuracy
of his percentages must be considered before this Court
can determine if his prima facie case has been rebutted
by the evidence that the state has presented. The Petitioner's disproportion in the present case is not as great
as it seemed at first blush.
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He has compared the jury lists with the total population
instead of with jury eligibles whicb. inflates the disproportion. While it can be presumed that a substantial portion
of the total Mexican-American population is eligible, it
must be remembered that tips area is unique in that it has
a larger ineligible migrant and illegal alien population
than other areas. From Petitioner's own evidence, it appears that the percentage of drop-outs before the fifth
grade .is greater among the Hidalgo County MexicanAmerican population than is the state-wide percentage

among the Mexican-American population. This further indicates that the percentage variation between jury eligibles
and total population may be greater in Hidalgo County
area than in other areas of the state, because Hidalgo
County would have a larger percentage of illiterates. Hunt
v. United States, 400 F.2d 306 ( CA 5 1968); United
States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (CA 5 1971).
It is clear that in a rapidly changing area a disproportion can be inflated by including too many prior years
when representation was even more disparate. ~he evidence shows that the di~ro,g9rtion was on the .decrease
in the two years prior to Petitioner's indictmen( and the
grand jury array was composed of about 45.5% MexicanAmericans, reducing the disparity to 33:7% instead of
the alleged 39% disparity. Due to the rapid growth in
this area, a percentage comparison should not be carried
back t0_9 many years, because it will distort the disproportion.
/

[ 17] It is true that some disproportion exists, but the
Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed the doctrine that the Constitution only requires a jury represent a fair cross section
of the community; it does not require that the jury mirror
the percentage composition of the community. Grech v.
Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747 (CA 5 1974). This Court
must, therefore, determine whether the disproportion is
marked enough to indicate that discrimination has occurred. As aptly stated in Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
at 403, 65 S.Ct. 1276 at 1279, 89 L.Ed. 1692 (1945):
"Our directions that indictments be quashed when
Negroes, although numerous in the community, were
excluded from grand jury lists have been based on
the theory that their continual exclusion indicated

~w-&L ~;
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[18] The Fifth Circuit has held that when the su~
tive element enters into the selection process, the percentage variation allowable in Swain, supra, could be disregarded and an even narrower range might be required.
ompson v. Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830 (CA 5 1974).
ee out of five
.__
.._., jury
...., commissioners in the present case
were Mexican-Anlencans":""' anC'rl:he Texas system allows
the subjective element to enter into its jury selection process; therefore, it would seem that a broader range of
variation should be allowed where the "distinct group"
allegedly underrepresented is Mexican..,American. If peogle
in charge can choose whom the~ wan;_, it.._ is unlikely they
will discriminate agai nst themselves/ A... broa~r range of · ~
variation should be tolerated here, 'because the Texas selection system allows the govern1ng majority to favor t heir
.....
group when-seiecting gralliffurors.

[ ~itional guidelines set out by the
_ / courts for proving racial discrimination in the selection
of the grand jury, the ~etitioner has. established a bare
l'
prima facie case by proving a long continued disp~
u • ...)L:::A tion in the composition o
grana JUnes in Hidalgo
~~ C~~/but this Court holds that it has been rebutted.

~

'-?I

[20rf ..)fhe Petitioner's. percentages appear somewhat
inaccurate and the circumstautial evidence of lag oLQ!§.criminatory intent is strong, yet thfs Court fs asked to
presume that llie judge a"iid jury commisisoners intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans in their selection for the grand jury. The Petitioner did show a long
continued history of an alleged disproportion, but there is
no evidence of tokenism, total exclusion, discriminatory

--

-

---

~

<v":

~

\L---n

. ----

trj

'

37

~ ~~36-z;..,.~~~~~

discrimination and not on
groups must be recognized."

y

13~~~

~

acts or failure to act or of an inherently dangerous selecTIOn system. It cannot be argued that the jury commissioners failed to inform themselves of the qualifications of
Mexican-Americans, because the three Mexican-American
commissioners were aware of the qualification of the members of the Mexican-American community, indeed, the
other members of the commission also must know these
qualifications since they live and work in~a community .
which is almost 80% Mexican-American' t cannot beg_
argued that the judge who selected the c mmissioners
discriminated in his selection. The j~d,E who selected the J
jury commissioners is a Mexican-Amencan, and he testified he based his selection primarily on geographic considerations, trying to select one commissioner from each
precinct in Hidalgo County. While it is clearly established
law that the uncorroborated testimony of the judge or the
jury commissioners as to their good intentions will not
alone rebut a prima facie case, it is some evidence of
lack of discriminatory intent. It is possible that the judge
chose his commissioners from among the outstanding
members of the community and that they then chose
members of the array from people they knew who were
probably on the same socio-economic level. Petitioner's
evidence shows that Mexican-Americans are underrepresented at the higher socio-economic level, and this social
anomaly could result in an inadvertent disproportion in
the grand jury. The jury commissioners, however, chose
from the higher socio-economic level because of the natural tendency to prefer their friends and business associates,
not because they were unaware of the racial composition
of the community, and this is not an act of intentional
discrimination.

39

38
The Court must also consider the demographic composition of the community. Percentages not tolerated in a
more rarified atmosphere may be acceptable in other
areas. The demographic composition of the community
involved in the pr~enf caseis markedly different from
that usually considered; therefore, those cases on which
Petitioner relies are factually distinguishable from the
present case.

f: /

Generally the ________ j ;up" excluded in the cited
cases was not a W erning jllajoriiY> as it is here. Here,
80% of the population is Mexican-American, the majority
of the voting population is Mexican-American, the majorill. of the elected offiQals are Mexican-American, the majority _2f the j.!!.dges and j urx commissioners areaiSo
Mexican-American, and Mexican-Americans in significant
percentages Iiave served on every grand jury in the last
ten years. At the time of Petitioner's indictment, there
were three district courts in Hidalgo County, and two of
these had Mexican-American judges. The record in the
present case reveals that the judge that appointed the
jury commissioners is a Mexican-American, that 60% of
the jury commissioners he appointed in the last two years
are Mexican-Americans, that 45% of the grand jurors
summoned by these commissioners are Mexican-Americans, that 50% of the jurors summoned to serve on the
array were Mexican-American, and the foreman that
signed the indictment that indicted the Petitioner was a
Mexican-American. Since four Mexican-American members of the jury panel could not be served and one that
had been served was absent, only 40% of the grand jury
that indicted the Petitioner were Mexican-Americans, but
this Court refuses to believe that Claudio Castaneda, the
elected Mexican-American sheriff of a county where the

I~

majority of the voters are Mexican-American, would purposefully refuse to serve four of the Mexican-American
members of the jury panel with the intention of causing
a disproportion on the grand jury that indicted the Petitioner. Here, the Mexican-Americans are a governing majority, and it cannot be presumed they would purposefully "
and intentionally discriminate against themselves.,
It is true that the Texas selection system is archaic and

inefficient in a day that calls for well-oiled judicial machinery. Its potential for abuse is great and it should be
replaced by a I?Ore expedient process, but it has been upheld by the Supreme Court against repeated Constitutional
attack, so its demise must depend upon legislative wisdom
and not judicial decree.
By Order of Dismissal entered this date, Petitioner
Rodrigo Partida's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will
be denied and this cause dismissed.

40
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APPENDIX "C"

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, reversed; and that this cause be, and the same is
hereby remanded to the said District Court in accordance
with the opinion of this Court.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Fifth Circuit
October Term, 197 5

December 11, 197 5
No. 74-3966
D. C. Docket No. CA-74.,B-50
RODRIGO PARTIDA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
OLAUDIO CASTANEDA, Sheriff,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas

Before GODBOLD, DYER and MORGAN, Circuit
Judges.
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, and was argued by counsel;

Issued as Mandate:
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APPENDIX "D"

APPENDIX "E"

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Fifth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
January 28, 1976
Edward W. Wadsworth
Clerk

600 Camp Street
New Orleans, La. 70130
Telephone 504-589-6514

TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD
No. 74-3966- Rodrigo Partida v.
Claudio Castaneda
Dear Counsel:
RE:

This is to advise that an order has this day been entered
denying the petition ( ) for rehearing, and no member
of the panel nor Judge in regular active on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing
en bane (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure;
Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12) the petition ( ) for rehearing en bane has also been denied.
See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
issuance and stay of the mandate.
Very truly yours,
EDWARD W. WADSWORTH,
Clerk
by SUSAN M. GROVERS
Deputy Clerk
/smg
cc: Mr. David G. Hall
Mr. Thomas P. Beery
Mr. Oscar B. Mcinnis

NO. 74-3966
RODRIGO PARTIDA,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
CLAUDIO CASTANEDA, Sheriff,
Respondent-Appellee.
(Filed March 12, 197 6
ON CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION
of the appellee in the above numbered and entitled cause
for a further stay of the mandate of this Court therein,
to enable appellee to apply for and to obtain a writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
IT IS ORDERED that the issuance of the mandate of
this Court in said cause be, and the same is further stayed
to and including April 12, 1976, the stay to continue in
force until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme
Court, provided that within the period above mentioned
there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the certificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certiorari
petition has been filed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

44
that the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of
a copy of an order of the Supreme Court denying the writ,
or upon the expiration of the stay granted herein, unless
the above mentioned certificate shall be filed with the
Clerk of this Court within that time.
DAVID W. DYER
United States Circuit Judge

Preliminary Memo
June 3, 1976 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 75-1552
CASTANEDA
[Sheriff]
v.

PARTIDA
1.

Timely

Cert to CA 5
(Godbold, D}er
and Morgan
Federal/Civil
[Habeas]
SUMMARY:

The question in this case is whether

petr sheriff rebutted resp's case of prima facie discrimination in grand jury selection.
2.

CA 5 held petr had not.

FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Resp was indicted

for burglary with intent to rape and for burglary and
convicted in state court.
(

\..._.·

On
appeal, he raised for the first
,

time the claim that Mexican-Americans had been improperly

~

- 2 excluded from the grand jury; Texas Crim. App. reviewed
that claim on the merits and affirmed.
Resp' s habeas petition was denied by the DC (SD Texas)
(Garza)o

The DC and CA 5 agreed that resp's statistical

evidence of exclusion obligated petr to rebut:

roughly 80%

of the total population of Hidalgo County is Mexican-American.
Over the ten years prior to and including the year including
the term of the grand jury which indicted resp, grand jury
lists (the roster from which the grand jury panel is chosen)
were but 39% Mexican-American, the panels themselves in the
last 2.5 years having been but 45% Mexican-American.

The DC

held this rebutted in the testimony of the state district court
judge . (a Mexican-American) who selected the grand jury commissioners, who selected the grand jury which indicted resp.
No explanation for the statistical disparity was offered; the
judge testified he sought to balance the composition of grand
jury commissioners by ethnic origin, race, sex, and age, but
did not instruct them to do so in selecting grand jury panels.
Nonetheless, on the theory that Mexican-Americans were a
-..

...........

-----....---.

"governing majority" in the county and would notp urpo ?efully
.....

and intentionally discriminate against themselves, the DC held

the'discriminat~ent

presumed from the resp's prima facie

1/

case to have been overcome. -

1/

-

~

/

1

CA 5 disagreed and reversed:

The DC also thought the statistics were no~ too reliable
beJ;ause based 0~ total, no adult population; t he ru -year-period
was t 'tr6 ! ong, - since t h e area was changing; and there was a large
ineligible migrant alien populati on in the county.
~

........

..,

...

- 3 -

"The fact of governing majority status may mollify the
prima facie case, but does not nullify it.

This may be

done only by proof to explain the disparity.
petitioner must prevaiL .

. . The unexplained

Without it
disparities

here are simply too great and too long existent for the
Petri. 16 & n. 9.

county system to escape unrectified."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The sheriff touts the "governing

majority" rationale of the DC.

Petr also tries to fashion

a claim that CA 5 impliedly called upon the state judge
selecting jury commissioners to instruct them to balance the
grand jury panels on various criteria, something petr regards
as impermissible under this Court's decisions.
such thing:

[CA 5 did no

in noting that the judge had tried to balance the

grand jury commissioners, but did not instruct them to do the
same for the panels, it could have been disapproving balancing
the jury commissioners or approving what the judge had done and
that he had gone no further in instructing the commissioners.]

l

Petr says CA 5's decision spells the end of the jury commissioner
system in Texas.
Resp says there is nothing to petr's claim:

-

-

ruled on a question of evidence.

CA 5 properly

The finding of a prima facie

case is well within the confines of such decision in previous
cases.

If

'\

The only novel question of law is the governing majority

status of Mexican-Americans, which resp says is not only without
precedent, but also would be cumbersome and mischievous.

It

would be very difficult to identify the indicia of participation

.•

,.

- 4 -

(

in government, etc., necessary to make such a test meaningful.
[Moreover, this theory seems to harken back to a requirement
of "actual prejudice" in the selection process, something this
Court does not require.]

Finally, resp says that though he would

applaud the end of the jury commissioner system, it remains
capable of producing fair results, if properly admitted.
4.

DISCUSSION:

CA 5 has reached a correct result,

consistent with this Court's decisions, although it is not clear
what the court meant by "nullifying" a prima facie case.

Petr

offers nothing to demonstrate that the "governing majority"
status of Mexican-Americans is such a recent development that it

~regard

of the past statistical evidence of

.

Mexican-American exclusion from grand jury lists and panels.
There is a response.
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No. 75-1552 Casteneda v. Partida
Respondent, convicted of burglary and intent to commit
rape, claims that the grand jury that indicted him was
unconstitutionally constituted in that Mexican-Americans were
unrepresented.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

respondent's conviction, and he thereafter initiated this
habeas corpus case.
Respondent was indicted and tried in Hidalgo County,
Texas, where - according to the 1970 census, about 80% of
the population (total population, not merely adults) are
Mexican-Americans.

Respondent's evidence showed that, for

the 10-year period preceding his indictment, the grand

j~ry

lists (or panels) included only 39% Mexican-Americans; and for
the two-and-a half years preceding the indictment, 45.5%.
Thus, the disparity between Mexican-Americans in the population
and those on the grand jury panels was 40.2% for the 10-year,
and 33.7% for the two-and-a-half-year period.
Applying the "rule of exclusion" (i.e., a significant
percentage of the ethnic or racial group is excluded from the
jury list), both the DC and CAS found that respondent had made
out a prima facie case.

The DC concluded that petitioner, by

the testimony of the judge who impaneled the grand jury and
from facts of which judicial notice could be taken, had

2.
rebutted the prima facie case.

CAS, taking a different view,

reversed.
I was quite content to leave this fact specific case
with the courts below, as the relevant principles are well
settled.

But since it is here, my tentative view is that the

opinion of the District Court is far more persuasive than that
of CAS.

The district judge (Garza) himself is a Mexican-American,

who comes - as I recall - from this county.

Some of the facts

relied upon by him for concluding that the county (respondent)
had rebutted the prima facie case based solely on statistics,
are the following:
The DC noted, first, that the statistics themselves require
discounting.

They are based on census population figures which

include the "total population" instead of the eligible population:
He has compared the jury lists with the total
population instead of with jury eligibles which
inflates the disproportion. While it can be presumed
that a substantial portion of the total MexicanAmerican population is eligible, it must be remembered
that this area is unique in that it has a larger
ineligible migrant and illegal alien population than
other areas. From Petitioner's own evidence, it
appears that the percentage of drop-outs from the
fifth grade is greater among the Hidalgo County
Mexican-American population than is the state-wide
percentage among the Mexica-American population.
This further indicates that the percentage variation
between jury eligibles and total population may be
greater in Hidalgo County area than in other areas
of the state, because Hidalgo County would have a
larger percentage of illiterates. Hunt v. United
States, 440 F.2d 306 (CAS 1968); UnrteO-states v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 81S (CAS 1971).

l

;,

It is clear that in a ~apidl¥ ~han~ing area a
disproportion can be inflated 5y ~nc!ud~ng too many
prior years when representation was even more disparate.
The evidence shows that the disproportion was on the

-

3.

decrease in the two years prior to Petitioner's
indictment, and the grand jury array was composed
of about 45.5% Mexican-Americans, reducing the
disparity to 33.7% instead of the alleged 39%
disparity. Due to the rapid growth in this area,
a percentage comparison should not be carried back
too many years, because it will distort the
disproportion.
The District Court then emphasized the extent to which

...

Mexican-Americans actually control the situation in the county,
---

~._a

_ _ ,_,~-~-

-

contrasting that majority position with the minority position
usually occupied by racial and ethnic groups:
Three out of five jury commissioners in the present
system allows the subjective element to enter into
its jury selection process; therefore, it would seem
that a broader range of variation should be allowed
where the "distinct group" allegedly underrepresented
is Mexican-American. If people in charge can choose
whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate
against themselves.
rGenerally the "distinct group'' excluded in the cited
cases was not a governing majority as it is here. Here,
80% of the population is Mexican-American, the majority
of the voting population is Mexican-American, the majori.!Y_ of the elected offisjals a~ Mexice.£1-Ameri~an, t~
j~rity Ji_ thu~ges _ill.ld j~omm!ssion~rs _ar~ also
Mexican-American, and Mexican-Amencans m s1gmficant
percentages have_ served on every grand jury in the last
ten years. At the time of Petitioner's indictment, there
were three district courts in Hidalgo County, and two of
these had Mexican-American judges. The record in the
present case -reveals that the judge that appointed the
jury commissioners is a Mexican-American, that 60% of
the jury commissioners he appointed in the last two years
are Mexican-Americans, that 45% of the grand jurors
summoned by these commissioners are Mexican-Americans, that 50% of the jurors summoned to serve on the
array were Mexican-American, and the foreman that
signed the indictment that indicted the Petitioner was a
Mexican-American. Since four Mexican-American members of the jury panel could not be served and one that
had been served was absent, only 40% of the grand jury
that indicted the Petitioner were Mexican-Americans, but
this Court refuses to believe that Claudio Castaneda, the
elected Mexican-American sheriff of a county where the

4.

ajority of the voters are Mexican-America.n, would ?urosefully refuse to serve four of the Mex1can-Amencan
p
.
.
f
.
embers of the jury panel with the mtentwn o causmg•
Jl )
, disproportion on the grand jnry
that indicted the
Petl.t
.
.
tioner. Here, the Mexican-Amencans are a governzng ma·ority, and it cannot be presumed they would pull(os~fully
;nd intentionally discriminate against themselves. '\'C:1-(-J-

111

I have considered that Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.

625, written by Byron, is the case which most clearly
enunciates the governing principles.

It makes clear that

"statistical improbability alone" is not sufficient; that
a detailed "factual inquiry is necessary in each case that
takes into account all possible explanatory factors"; and
that the ultimate test is whether or not

th ~

state l

"deliberately and systematically [denied] to members of
[a minority race or group] the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice."
I perceive no evidence in this case of an intent,
deliberately and systematically, to discriminate against the
80% of the population composed of Mexican-Americans.

While

I would not subscribe a view that no such discrimination
,..,.... ~ .l,.cc_.., • ~
is possible ~ the racial or ethnic group happens to be in

"

the majority, the size of the majority in this county and the
clear evidence that the majority dominates the "politics" of
the county, make this case quite unique among those previously
before this Court.

ss

·'

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 29, 1976

Re:

75-1552

Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff v. Rodrigo Partida

Dear Lewis:
Will you undertake a dissent in this case?
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell

M~

ovember 30, 1976

No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida
uear \.hie£:
I will be glad to undertake a dissent in this case.

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:
be:

Mr.

Justice R.ebnquist

Charlie

The Chief has requested that we do the dissent. We
can defer work on this until the Court opinion is circulated
unless, meanwhile, you complete a first draft of Ingraham.

L.F.P., Jr .

.•.

:§ttprtmt <qourt of t!tt ~titd1 :§hrlts

11Taslyinghrn. tJJ.

<q.

2llgiJt..;t

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

February 7, 197 7

No. 7 5-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida

Dear Harry:
Please join me .
Sincerely,

(/1t1 ·
T.M .

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

Qfattrl 4tf tJrt 'Jllttitt~ ,§hrlt.«
~a,s-Jrtnghttt, tfl. (!f. 2.0~)1,~

,§u:prtltU

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 7, 1977

Re :

75-1552 - Castaneda v . Partida

Dear Harry :
Please join me .

Mr . Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB E RS O F

JusT i cE

w"' . J .

February 8, 1977

BRENNA N . JR .

RE: No. 75-1552

Castan eda v. Partida

Dear Harry:
I agree.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Bl ackmun
cc: The Conference

February
8,
,.,.

No. 75-1552

Castaneda v. Partida

Harry:
In due time I will circulate a dissent.
Sincerely,
t,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
lfp/sa
The Conference

,,

..

,ju:pl"ttttt ~ourt of tqt ~tb ,jtatts

._as!p:nghm. ~. <!f. 2!J~Jl.~
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

February 15, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida

Dear Harry:
I shall await the dissent in this case.

I

am doubtful about the constitutional basis for
the fair cross section requirement as applied to
grand juries.

Taylor v. Louisiana rested on the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the grand jury
clause has not been held binding on the States.

Nor

have prior cases rested on the fair cross section
ground.

In any event, I want to consider the case

at greater length.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

February 22, l977

Re:

75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I agree generally with Lewis Powell's dissent.
In addition to the views he expresses, I see one other
flaw in respondent's case. As I see it, respondent's
process of establishing what the proposed opinion
characterizes as a prima facie case of discrimination
will not "wash". Our decisions suggest, and common
sense demands, that only eligible population figures,
not gross population statistics, must provide the
relevant sta+ting point.
In Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 ' (1972), for example, Byron's opinion
looked to the "population of blacks in the eligible
population .••• " Id., at 630 (Emphasis supplied).
A total population figure in the Southwest would
include vast numbers of illegal aliens and many others
not eligible and hence not to be counted.
Respondent offered no evidence whatever in this
respect and therefore could not have established any
meaningful case of discrimination, prima facie or
otherwise.
In contrast to respondent's "shotgun"
approach, which it is proposed we accept without any
analysis whatever, Census Bureau statistics demonstrate that of the adults in Hidalgo County, 72%,
not 79.1% as respondent implies, are Mexican-American.
(More than 7% of respondent's would-be disparity happen
to be children.)
At the outset, therefore, respondent's population figures are manifestly over-inclusive.
But that is only the beginning.
Respondent
offered no statistical evidence with respect . to

- 2 -

!I

other basic qualifications for grand jury service.
The Court's own statistics suggest that 22.9% of
Spanish-surnamed persons over age 25 in Hidalgo County
have had no schooling at all. Ante, at 6 n.8. Since
one requirement for grand jury service is literacy
in the English language, some 20% of adult-age MexicanAmericans are likely to be ineligible on that single
ground. This probability is further suggested by
nationwide literacy rates among adult MexicanAmericans, which as of November 1964, was only 71.5%.
If Hidalgo County Mexican-Americans had in 1972 the
same literacy rates as those prevailing nationwide in
1964, then literate Mexican-Americans constitute
approximately 52% of the total adult population of the
county. Yet, as the Court observes, no less than 50%
of the persons on respondent's grand jury list were
Mexican-American.
But respondent's use of overbroad statistics
is not the only defect in his approach. As noted,
one-half of the members of respondent's grand jury
list were Mexican-American. Other grand jury lists
at about the same time as respondent's indictment in
March 1972 were predominantly Mexican-American. Thus,
in the September 1971 grand jury list, 70% of the
prospective grand jurors were Mexican-American.
In
the January 1972 term, 55% were Mexican-American.
Since respondent was indicted in 1972, by what appears
to have been an ethnically balanced grand jury, the
mechanical use of Hidalgo County's practices some
ten years earlier (beginning in 1962) is wholly indefensible. We do not know, and on this record cannot know,
whether respondent's 1970 gross population figures,
which served as the basis for establishing the "disparity"
complained of in this case, had any applicability at
all to the period prior to 1970. For all we know,
the 1970 figures may be totally inaccurate as to

1/ The burden of establishing a prima facie case
obviously rested on respondent.
It will not do to
produce patently overinclusive figures and thereby
seek to shift the burden to the State. Rather, a
prima facie case is established only when the challenger
shows a disparity between the percentage of minority
persons in the eligible population and the percentage
of minority individuals on the grand jury.

-

3 -

2/
prior years;- if so, the apparent disparity would
improperly be increased.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and
for the reasons set forth in Lewis' dissenting
opinion, I will join him and add some observations
along these lines.

2/ Indeed, Judge Garza in this case referred
to Hidalgo County as "rapidly changing" and as
experiencing "rapid growth." This alone should give
us pause in a case of this kind.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 1, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1552 - Castaneda v. Partida

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

if/"- ]1A/"'-/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~o:
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.a

l

No. 75-1552

The Chief Jus "1 c .
Mr . Justice Brenn ·u1
Nr. Justice White
Mr . Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr . Justice Rehnquist
Kr. Justioe Stevens

._

lrom: Mr. Justioe Stewart

Circulated : MAR 1
1977
Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff,
Petitioner,
OnU 'Yrit Sof CertCoiorari to~tJo1.roulated:
mted tates
urt of "'.Ap":
----v.
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
Rodrigo Partida.
[~arch

--, 1977]

~R.

Jus·riCE STEWART, dissenting.
In my view, the findings of the District Court iu this cas~
cannot be said to be "clearly erroneous." Fed. Rule Civ,
Proc. 52 (a); United States v. Un·ited States GypS'IJ,m Co., 333
U. S. 364, 394-395. * Given those findings, there was no
constitutional violation in the selection of the grand jury that
indicted the respondent. Upon that basis I would rever&e
the judgment of the Court of ApPfilals,

;'"ThP "rlrarl ~· Prroneous" sta ndard applies to the review of facts found
a cti~1rict cou rt . in a habra~; corpus proceeding . Wade v. Mayo, 334

b~ ·

lL 8. 672. 683-6 4.

<!Jourl cf flrt 'J!lnittb ~hdt.e
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

No. 75-1552

March 1, 1977

Castaneda v. Partida

:MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I have deleted Part I from the recirculation of my
dissent that accompanies this memorandum.

Although I adhere strongly to the view that federal
habeas corpus review is not warranted, we can address this
issue another day when it has been presented properly.

£.1~.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

March 1, 1977

No. 75-1552

Castaneda v. Partida

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

1 have deleted Part 1 from the recirculation of my
dissent that accompanies this memorandum.
l
Although 1 adhere strongly to the view that federal
habeas corpus review is not warranted, we can address this
issue another day when it has been presented properly.

L.F.P., Jr.
~:
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

w~

v

Claudio Castaneda, Sheriff,) 0 n W nt
· of C ertwran
·
· to t h e
Petitioner,
United States Court of Ap.
v.
peals for the Fifth Circuit.
Rodrigo Partida.
[February - , 1977]
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opmwn of the
<Court.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the State
of Texas, in the person of petitioner, the Sheriff of HidalgQ
County, successfully rebutted respondent-prisoner's prima
facie showing of discrimination against Mexican-Americans
in the state grand jury selection process. In his brief, peti..
tioner, in claiming effective rebuttal, asserts :
"This list [of the grand jurors that indicted respondent]
indicates that 50 percent of the names appearing thereon
were Spanish. ThP record indicates that 3 of the 5 jury
commissioners, 5 of the grand jurors who returned the
indictment, 7 of the petit jurors, the judge presiding at
the trial, and the Sheriff who served notice on the grand
jurors to appear had Spanish surnames." Brief for
Petitioner 6.

I
This Court on prior occasions has considered the workings
'Of the Texas system of grand jury selection. See Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 ( 1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
('1950); Aki!],§ v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas.
316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v .. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940).
Texas employs the "key man" system, which relies on jury

~r--.~~~-*11(~~
~~ -/<J Jf/t-~~ ''.£.£~~) c~\'_ 1~
~~cJ.~ -~o~ s.w.~cL'-CCf

75-1552-0PINION

2

CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

com1msswners to select prospective grand jurors from the
community at large. 1 The procedure begins with the state
district judge's appointment of from three to five persons to
serve as jury commissioners. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art.
19.01 ( 1966) .2 The commissioners then "shall select not less
than 15 nor more than 20 persons from the citizens of different portions of the county" to comprise the list from which
the actual grand jury will be dra.wn. Art. 19.06." When at
least 12 of the persons on the list appear in court pursuant to
summons, the district judge proceeds to "test their qualifications." Art. 19.21. The qualifications themselves are set
out in Art. 19.08: a grand juror must be a citizen of TexM
and of the county, be a qualified voter in the county, be "of
sound mind and good moral character," be literate, have no
prior felony conviction, and be under no pending indictment "or other legal accusation for theft or of any felony."
Interrogation under oath is the method specified for testing
the prospective juror's qualifications. Art. 19.22. The precise questions to be asked are set out in Art. 19.23, which, for
the most part, tracks the language of Art. 19.08. After the
court finds 12 jurors who meet the statutory qualifications,
they are impaneled as the grand jury. Art. 19.26.
1 The other principal state mode of juror selection is a random method
similar to that used in the federal system. See 28 U. S. C. § 1864. See
generally Sperlich and Jaspovice., Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the
Constitution, 1 Hastings Const. L. Q. 63, 68 (1974).
I! During the time period covered by this case, the statute was amended
to omit the requirement that the commissioners be freeholders in the
county. Acts 1971, 62d Leg., c. 131, § 1. That change has no bearing on
the issues before us.
8 Prior to 1965, the law directed the commissionf'rs to select "sixteen
men." The Legislat;ure am€111ded the statute that year to substitute the
words "twenty persons" for "sixteen men ." Acts 1965, 59th Leg., c. 722,
p. 392. In 1967, the law was amended again to provide the present range
of from 15 to 20 per,;ons. ActH 1967 , 60th L<'g., c. .515, § 1. These changes
in t.he number of persons required to be on the list account for the jump
from 16 to 20 in the grand jury list ~tatistics set forth in n . 7, infra.

75-1552-0PINION
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

3

II

Respondent, Rodrigo Partida, was indicted in March 1972
by the grand jury of the 92d District Court of Hidalgo County
for the crime of burglary of a private residence at night
with intent to rape. H...klalgo is one of the border counties
of southern Texas. After a trial before a. petit jury, respondent was convicted and sentenced to eight years in the custody
of the Texas Department of Corrections. He first raised his
claim of discrimination in the grand jury selection process
on a motion for new trial in the state district court. 4 In support of his motion. re~ testified about the general
existence of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in
that area of Texas and introduced statistics from the 1970
Census and the Hidalgo c-;;untY grallil jury records. The
cen'SUS gu~
~s o~ t a in 1970, the popufat!on of Hidalgo
County w 181,535~ 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the
p-ull:dion, vol. 1, pt. 45, § 1, Table 119, p. 914.
Persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname totaled
143,611. Ibid., and id., Table 129, p. 1092. 5 On the assump4 In the state courts and in the federal courts on habeas, the State
argued that respondent.'s challenge was not timely raised as a matter of
state procedure, and therefore that he waived any complaint of this kind
that he might have. Since the Texas courts considered the claim on its
merits, however, we are free to do so here. See Coleman v. Alabama,
377 U. S. 129 ( 1964) ; cf. Fmncis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 ( 1976).
Furthermore, petitioner abandoned the waiver point in his petition for
certiorari.
5 For our purposes, t.he terms "Spanish-surnamed" and "MexicanAmerican" are used as synonyms for the census designation "Persons of
Spanish Language or Spanish Surname." Persons of Spanish language
include both those whose mother tongue is Spanish and all other persons
in families in which the hood of the household or spouse reportffi Spanish
as the mother tongue. Person,s of Spanish surname, as the Census uses
that term, are determined by reference to a list of 8,000 Spanish surnames
compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. For Texas,
social and economic characteristics are presented for persons of Spanislt
language combined with all other persons of Spanish surname in the census

•
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tion that all the persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans, these figures show that
79.1
of the county's population was Mexican-American. 0
Respondent's data compiled from the Hidalgo County
grand jury records from 1962 to 1972 showed that over that
period, the average percentage of Spanish-surnamed grand
jurors was 39.0%. 7 In the two and one-half year period
during which the district judge who impanelled the jury that
indicted respondent was in charge, the average percentage
was 45.5%. On the list from which the grand jury that indieted respondent was selecied, 50% were Spanish-surnamed.
The last set of data that respondent introduced, again from
the 1970 Census, illustrated a number of ways in which Mexican-Americans tend to be underprivileged, including poverty
level incomes, less desirable jobs, substandard housing and·

7

ro

reports. 1970 Census of Population, Characteristics of the Population, vol.
1, pt. 45, § 2, App. B.
6 At oral argument, counsel for petitioner appears to have suggested that
the presence of illegal aliens who have Spanish surnames might inflate the
percent.a.ge of Mexican-Americans in the county's population. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 10-12. We cannot agree that the presence of noncitizens makes
any practical difference.. Table 119 of the Censu~ brea.ks down the 181,535
people who comprised the total county population into three groups:
native of native parentage, native of foreign parPnta.ge, and foreign born.
The only persorn as to whom the assumption of noncitizernhip would be
logically sustainable are thE' foreign born. Even for thPm, it is probable
that some were naturalizrd eitizens. Furt.hermore, only 22,845 persons
were in the "foreign born" ca.tegory. If thosE' persons are excluded from
the population of t.he county, the total becomes 158,690. Assuming that
every foreign-born person wa::; counted as a Spanish-surnamed person (an
assumption that favors the State), the total number of Mexican-Americans
is reduced from 143,611 to 120,766. Using these adjusted figures,
Mexican-Americans constitute 76.1% of thE' county's population, a figure
only 3%, and thus negligibly, smaller than the one used throughout this
litigation. For consistency, wr ~hall continue to refer to the population
figures for the entire county, particularly since the State has not shown
why those figures are unreliable.

[Footuote 7 is on p. 5]
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lower levels of education. 8 The State offered no evidence at
a!! either attacking respondent's allegations of discrimination
or demonstrating that his statistics were unreliable in any way.
7

The statistics for grand jury composition can be organized as follows:
Year
~~n----- ~:No. Spanish
Percentage
grand jury list
surnamed per list
Spanish surnamed
1002
16
6
37.5%
1963
16
5.75
35.9%
1004
16
4.75
29.7%
1965
16.2
5
30.9%
1966
20
7.5
37.5%
1007
20.25
7.25
35.8%
"20
6.6
33%
1968
1969
W
10
W%
1970
W
8
W%
1971
20
9.4
47%
1972
20
10.5
52.5%
Of the 870 persons who were summoned to serve as grand jurors over
the 11 year period, 339, or 39%, were Spanish surnamed. See Table
showing Hidalgo County grand jury panels from
to 1972, App. 17-18.
8 At oral argument, counsel for petitioner suggested tha.t the dat.a rega.rd.ing educat.ional background explained the discrepancy betwe,en the percent.age of Mexican-American!> in the total populat.ion and the percentage
on the grand jury lists. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. For a variety of reasons, we
cannot accept tha.t E>uggestion. First, under the Texas method of selecting
grand jurors, qualifications are not te!>t.ed until the persons on the list
appear in the District Court. Prior to that time, assumiqg an unbiased
select.ion procedure, per~ns of a:ll educational chara.cteriE>iics should appea.r
on the list. If the jury commissioners actually exercised some means of
winnowing out those who lacked the abi!it.y to read and write, it was
incumbent on the State to call tl1e commissioners and to have them explain
how this was done, In the absence of any evidence in the record to this
effect, we shall not. assume that the only people excluded from grand jury
service were the illitera t.e.
Second, it is difficult to draw valid inferences from the raw census data.,
sincE> the data are incomplete in ;;orne places and the definition of "literacy''
would undoubt.edly be the subject of some dispute in any event. The
State's failure to discus::; the literacy problem at any point prior to oral
· argument compounds the difficulties. One gap in the data occurs with
respect to tho younger per~>ons in the jury pool. The census reports for
,

75-1552-QPINION'
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The state district court, nevertheless, denied the motion for·
a new trial.
On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the conviction. Partida v. State, 506 S. W. 2d 209 (1974).
Reaching the merits of the claim of grand jury discrimination, the court held that respondent had failed to make out a
educational background cover only t.hose who are 25 years of age and'
above. Yet the only age limitation on eligibility for grand jury service is
qualification to vot~. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 19.08 (1966). During
the period to which the census figures a.pply, a person became qualified to
vote at age 21. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. Art. 5.01 (1967). (In 1975, Art.
5.01 was amended to give the franchise to all rx-r:sons 18 and over. Acts
1975, 64th Leg., c. 682, § 3.) It i:,; not improbable that the educational
characteristics of persons in t.he younger age group would prove to be
favorable to Mexican-Americans.
Finally, even assuming that the statistics for persons age 25 and over
are sufficiently representative to br u::;eful, a significant discrepancy still
e.xists between the m.1mber of Spanish-surnamed people. and the level of
representation on grand jury lists. Table 83 of the 1970 Census shows
that of a totru of 80,049 persons in that age group, 13,205 have no schooling.
(Data for McAllen-Pharr-Edinburg Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
This SMSA is identical to Hidalgo County.) Table 97 shows that of the
55,949 Spanish-surnamed persons in the group, 12,817 have no schooling.
This means that of the 24,100 rx-rsoru; of a.ll other races and ethnic groups,
'388 have 110 schooling. Translated into percentages, 22.9% of the
Spanish-surnamed person;; have no schooling, a.nd 1.6% of the ot.hers have
no schooling. This mean::; that 43,132 of the Spanish-surnamed persons
have oome schooling and 23,712 of t.hp other::; have some schooling. The
Spanish-surnamed rx-rsons thus reprPsent 65% of the 66,844 with some
schooling, and tJ1e others 35%. Thr 65% figurr ::;till crea.tes a significant
disparity whrn compa.red to the 39% representation on grand juries shown
over the 10-year rx-riod involvffi hrro.
We prefer not to rely 011 thr 65% to 39% disparity, however, sincethere are so many implicit a;;::;umption::; in this analysis, and we consider it
inappropriate for us, as an appellatP tribunal, to undertake this kind of
inquiry without. a record bPlow in whic11 thosr assumptions were t-ested.
We rest, instl:'ad, on fhr fact tha.t the record does not show any way by
which t.he rducational charact.eristirH arfl t~1ken into account in the compila.tion of thr grand jury lists, since· t.lw procedure established by the Stat~
-provide;; that litemcy lli tested omly after the group of 20 are summoned.
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prima facie case. In the court's view, he should have shown.
how many of the females who served on the grand juries were
Mexican-Americans married to men with Anglo-American
surnames, how many Mexican-Americans were excused for
reasons of age, health, or other legal reasons, and how many
of those listed by the Census would not have met the statutory
qualifications of citizenship, literacy, sound mind, mora.l character, and lack of criminal record or accusation. !d., at 210211. Quite ~ond the uncertainties in the statistics, the
court four1d it impossible tooel!eVe tnat discnmination could
have been directed against a Mexican-American, in light of
the many elective positions held by Mexican-Americans in the
county and .the substantial representation of MexicanAmericans on recent grand juries. 0 !d., at 211. In essence,
the court refused to presume tbat Mexican-Americans would
discrimma1e against t eir own kind.
After exhaustmg fi1s State remedies, respondent filed his
petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, alleging a denial of due process and equal protection, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, because of gross underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on the Hidalgo County
grand juries. At a heaTing at which the state transcript was·
introduced, petitio~sentea the testimony of the state
ju ge w o seie~ ~ury_ cmmnission~rs~o_2iaa compiled
-~~(
the list from which respondent's grana Jury was taken. The
judge first reviewed the State's grand jury selection process. .trjz.~~,(
.~-~~
He testified that he did not instruct the commissioners to t-u
strive for a representative cross-section of the community 4~
when they selected prospective grand jurors. App. 79. He

~~~~
-t.o

9 The court noted that t.he for!'man of the grand jury that indicted
respondent. was MPxican-American, nnd that 10 of the 20 summoned to
serve had Spanish surnames. S!'wn of the 12 members of the petit jury
that convicted him were Mexican-American. In addition, the state judge·who presided over the trial was Mexican-American, as were a number oi:
other elected officials in the county.
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admitted that the actual res
process m
fact had not produced gran jury lists that were "representative of the ethnic balanc in the community." 10 !d., at 84.
Again, the State did- not call the jury commissioners, who
did the actual selPcting, and who might have been able to
provide information on how the process actually worked.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the court concluded ~c's
that respondent had made out a "bq,re prima facie case" of
i~yidious discrimination with his proof of "a- long continued
dis~ composition of the grand juries in Hidalgo
County." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90 (SD Tex. 1974) (emphasis in
original). Based on an examination of the reliability of the
statistics ofl'ered by respondent, however, despite the lack of
evidence in the record justifying such an inquiry, the court
stated that the prima facie case was weak. The court believed
that the census statistics did not reflect the true situation
accurately, because of recent changes in the Hidalgo County
area and the court's own impression of the demographic characteristics of the Mexica.n-American community. On the
other hand, the court recognized that the Texas key man
system of grand jury selection was highly subjective, and was
"archaic and inefficient," id., at 91, and that this was a factor
arguing for less tolerance in the percentage difl'erences. On
balance, the court's doubts about the reliability of the statistics, coupled with its opinion that Mexican-Americans
constituted a "governing majority" in the county, caused it to
conclude that the prima facie case was rebutted. The "govThe Federal District. Judge observed, during the state judge's testimony, t.hat the S('}ection proc('Ss for grand jurofi:i in Hidalgo County
typically r('sultro in a progr(':::sive reduction of th(' number of Mell:icanAmericans involvro at e>ach stage. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S.
625 ( 1972). For example, snid the> court, if 60% of the jury commissioners were Mexicall-Amcrican, the jury panel might be only 55%, and
the actual grand jury only 43 %. The court ·peculate>d that the reason for
this might be cultural. App . 84-85. No testimony, however, wa.s offered'
on this point, and we do not. rely on it.
10
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erning majority" theory distinguished respondent's case from
all preceding cases involving similar disparities. On the basis
of those findings, the court dismissed the petition.u
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. 524 F. 2d 481 (1975). It agreed with the District
Court that respondent had succeeded in making out a prima
facie case. It found, however, that the State had failed to
rebut that showing. The "governing majority" theory contributed little to the State's case in the absence of specific
proof to explain the disparity. In light of the State's abdication of its responsibility to introduce controverting evidence, the court held that respondent was entitled to prevail. We granted certiorari to consider whether the existence (
of a "governing majority" in itself can rebut a prima facie
case of discrimination in g~jury selection, and, if not,
whether the State otherwise met its burden of proof. 426
u.s. 934 (1976).

III
A. This Court has long recognized that "it is a denial of
the equal protection of the laws t,o try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand
jury ... from which ~ persons of his race or color have,
solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the
State. . . ." 12 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 477. See
11

The court suggest£d that the actual discrimination operating might
be economic. The jury commi~~ioner~ were from the higher socio-economic
cla~cs, and thry trnded to select prospect.ive jurors from among their
peers. Consequently, the number of Mexican-Americans was disproportionately low, ~ince they were concentrated at. thE' lower rnd of the
economic scalE'. We find it. unneCE'8Sary to decide whether a showing of
simple economic discriminat.ion would ~ E>nough to make out a. primn,
facie case in the absence of other evidence, since that case is not before us.
Cf. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co ., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
12 Ca;;es in this Court holding uncon;;titutional discriminatory selection
procedures in the grand jury contrxt includ,e Alexander v. Louisiana, 405.
U. S. 625 (1972); Arnold v. North Carolina,376 U. S. 773 (1964);

I

7~./yt...;V
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Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628 ( 1972); Carter v.
Jury C!omm'n, 396 U. S. 320, 330 ( 1970). See also Peters v. a---6~~_.)
Kifj, 407 U. S. 493, 497 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 507 ~~~j,
(dissenting opinion). While the earlier cases involved ab- ~~-~~
solute exclusion of the disfavored, later cases established the ~ /u-vt-<....__.1
pr~at ~bstantTal ;nder~presentation of the group
~
constitutes a constitutional violation as well, if i.t results from
p.!_.lrposeful discrimination. See Turner v. Fouche, "396 U. S. ~~;
346 (1910); tarler if.' Jury Comm'n, supra; Whitus v. Geor- U,.,-~....
gia, 385 U. S. 545, 552 ( 1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S.
202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, supra. Although no right to
strict proportionalit h ever been reco nize by this Court,
(b-o~?
t e grand jury must be selected in a manner untainted by
bias against any identifiable group, in order to insure that -~
a body truly representative of the community exercises the ~L6/~
grand jury's serious responsibilities. See Carter v. Jury
~"'
Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 330. Implicit in this principle is the
goal that the grand jury, over time, should reflect a fair
cross-section of the community.l 3
In order to prove a case of unconstitutional discrimination

/J~j~~~

7

\

Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S.
85 (1955); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,.
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); :Uld Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110
(1883).
13 'I'~or. v. Lov:isiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), held in tho context of petit
jurie:; th~st be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The samep'rinciple applies to grancfjury seiection. See- Carter v.
iuii/"tJomm'n, supra; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S., at 358. See also
United States v. Mandu 'an.,o, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality opinion)'
(referring to the importance of bringing serious criminal accusations "only
upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens"
(emphasis added)). At least for defendants who are member~ of the
'<disfavored cla&S; the right to a fair cross-section rests in pa1im t e Equal
ProtectJon Clause, and, for tho~e persons, there is no difference betweea
the principles governing a grand jury and those governing a petit jury.
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in grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the
procedure employed resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the identifiable group to which he belongs.
T~ dothis,-he ~st first estab11Sh that the gr;up is one tha
is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. H ernandez v.
Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-479. Next, the degree of underrepresenta.tion must be proved, by comparing the proportion
of the group in the total population to the proportion called to
serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. I d.,
at 480. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935). This
method of proof, sometimes called the "rule of excl..!:l§i.Qn," has
been held to be available as a method of proving discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class.1 ' Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U. S. 480. Fu1al1y, the Court has noted that a
selection procedure t~rt is susceptible to abuse or not racially
neutral ~u~ports th~ p~umption of discrimination raise by / tc:.... ~
the __!tatistiCal sh,2.fmg.
exan er v. ou1.81ana, 405 U. S.,
attrutr." 6nce the defendant has shown substantial un
lJ. •
~
representation of his group, the ur en shifts to the State to
A:A--.wf
rel],u t tiiiip faciecase.
--....
~
B. In this case, it is no longer open to dispute that Mexi~
can-Americans are a clearly identifiable class. See, e. g.,
I
a
•
4 Ill"\..
Hernandez v. Texas, supra. The statistics introduced by re~
spondent from the 1970 Census illustrate disadvantages to
which the group has been sub,ject. Additionally, as in
Alexander v. Louisiana, the selection procedure is not racially
neutral with respect to '"""MexiCall- mericansT Spamsh sur~
names-are .JustiS ~ti'fiableas race was from the

1-o

v

14 Th0 idea behind the tt1le of exc lu ~ iou is not at all complex.
If a
dispn rity is sufficiPnt.ly large, then it i:; unlikely that it is due solely t()
chance or acridrnt, and , in t.he absence of evidence to the con~rary, one
must concludr that racial or "other cla::;s-re)atea factors entered into thP
;;election prores;;. S~gton v. Davis,, 426 U. S. 229, 241 (1976);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. ., at 587, Smith v . T exas, 311 U. S., at 131.
Cf. n . 17, infra .
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questionnaires in Alexander or the notations and card colors
in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, and in Avery v. Georgia, 345
U. S. 559 (1953).
The disparity proved by the 1970 Census statistics showed
that the population of the county was 79.1% Mexican-Amer·
ican, but that, over an 11-year period, only 39% of the
persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican. American. 1 ~ This difference of 40%- is greater than that
found significant in Turner v. Fouche, supra (60% Negroes
in the general population, 37% on the grand jury lists).
Since the State presented no evidence showing why the__!_!~
year period was not reliable, we take it as the relevant base
for comparison. 16 The mathematical dispantfes tnat have
b~d by this Court as adequate for a prima facie
case have all been within the range presented here. For
example, in Whitus v. Georgia, supra, the number of Negroes
listed on the tax digest amounted to 27.1% of the population,
but only 9.1% of those on the grand jury venire. The dis...
parity was held to be sufficient to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. See Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404
(1967) (24.4% on tax lists, 4.7% on grand jury lists); Jonesv. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967) (19.4% on tax lists, 5.0% on
jury list). We agree with the District Court and the Court
~_____......_~

~

1
~ Since the 1960 Cen~us did not compile separate statistics for Spanishsurnamed persons, it is impost;ible to a~;certain whf'ther the pE'rcentage of
Mexican-Americans in the county changed nppreciably over tho period or
time at issue. We are therefore forced to rely on the assumption that the79.1% figure remained constant.
w Statistical analysis of the grand jur~· lists during the 2Y2-ycar tenure. of the sta.te dist.rict judge who ~elect.ed the commissioners in respondent.1i·
case reveals that a significant di~parity Pxisted over thi~ time period a&
well. See n. 17, infra. Thus, the District Court's assumption that ref-.
erence t,o a shorter time period would ~;how that the prima facie ca:;c of'
discrimination could not be proved wn::; unwarranted. Nevetheless, sincf.\
the longer time period provides a larger :sample, and is therefore pre-.
:SUmpt.ivE'ly more reliable, we prefer not. to limit our analysis to the suggested 2ljz-y!:'ar period.
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of Appeals that the proof in this case was enough to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination against the MexicanAmericans in the Hidalgo County grand jury selection. 17
Supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Texas system of selecting grand jurors is highly subjective. The facial
~--·

If the jurors were drawn raJ1clomly from the general population, then
the number of Mexican-Americans in the sample could be modeled by a
binomial distribution. See Finkelstein, The Applica.tion of Statistic~d Decision Theory to Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 353-356
(1966). See generally F. Mosteller, R. Rourke, & G. Thomas, Probability
with Statjstical Applica.tions 13~146, 27~291 (2d eel. 1970). Given that
79.1% of the population is Mexican-American, the t>xpectecl numbE'r of
Mexican-Americans among the 870 persons summoned to serve as grand
jurors over the 11-year period is approximately 688. The observed
number is 339. Of course, in any given drawing some fluctuation from
the expected number is predicted. The important, point, however, is that
the statistical model shows that the results of a random dra.wing are likely
to fall in the vicinity of the expect.ed value. See F. Mosteller, R.
Rourke, & G. Thomas, supra, at 270-290. The measure of the predicted
fluctuat.ions from the expected value is the standa.rd deviation, defined for
t.he binomial distribution as the square root of the product of the total
number in the sample (here 870) times the probability of selecting a
Mexican-American (0.791) times the probability of selected a. non-MexicanAmerican (0.209). !d., at 21:3. Thus, in this case the standard deviation
is a.pproximBt,<:>ly 12. If the difference between the expected value and the
observed number is greater than two standard deviations, then the
hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be susp<:>ct. to a social
scientist. The 11-yea.r data here reflect. a diffE'rence between the expected
and observed number of Mexican-Am orica.ns of a.pproximately 29 standard
deviations. The likelihood that such a substantial departure from the
expected value would orrur by chanre is less than 1 in 10' ·"'. The data for
the 2%-year period during which the state district judge supervised the
selection process similarly support t.he inferencE' that the exclusion of
Mexican-Americans did not orcur by chance. Of 220 persons called to
serve as grand jurors, only 100 were Mexican-Americans. The expect~
Mexican-American representation is approximate!~' 174 and the standard
deviation, as calculat,ed from the binomial model, is approximately 6. The
discrepancy between the expected and observed values is more than 12
standard deviations. Agajn, the likelihood that such a substantial depa.r..
ture could occur by chance i~:> negligible, being less tha.n 1 in 1025 •
17
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constitutionality of the key man system, of course, has been
accepted by this Court. S~rter v. Jury Comm'n,
supra; Akins v. Texas, supra; Smith v. Texas, supra. Nevertheless, the Court has noted that the system is susceptible to
abuse as applied. 18 See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., a:t
479. Additionally, as noted, persons with Spanish surnames
are readily identifiable.
The showing made by respondent therefore shifted the
burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination. Inexplicably, the State introduced
practically no evidence. The testimony of the state district
judge dealt principally with the selection of the jury commissioners and the instructions given to them. The commissioners themselves were not called to testify. A case such
as Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S., at 207 n. 4, 209, illustrates
the potential usefulness of such testimony, when it sets out
in detail the procedures followed by the commissioners. 19
The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is particularly revealing as to the lack of rebuttal evidence in the
record:
"How many of those listed in the census figures with
Mexican-American names were not citizens of the state,
but were so-called 'wet-backs' from the south side of the
Rio Grande; how mauy were migrant workers and not
residents of Hidalgo County; how many were illiterate
It. has been said t.ha.t random ~election methods similar to the fC?deral
systf.'rn would probably avoid most of the potential for abuse found in
the key man syst<'m. See Sperlirh and .Taspovice, supm, n. 1.
HJ This is not to say, of cour::;c, that a simple prote ·ta.tion from a
commis:;ioner t.ha.t. nwial consideration.~ played no part in the selection
would be enough. This kind of testimony has been found insufficient on
several occasions. E. g., Alexandn v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632;
Hernandez v. Texas, 847 U.S., a.t 481; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S., a.t
598. NC?ither is the State entitled to rely on a presumptjon that the
officials discharged their ::.worn duti<':> t.o rebut the case of discrimination,
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967).
18

l
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and could not read and write; how many were not of
sound mind and good moral character; how many had
been convicted of a felony or were under indictment or
legal accusation for theft or a felony; none of these facts
appear in the record." 506 S. W. 2d, at 211 (emphasis
added).
In fact, the census figures showed that only a small part of
the population reported for Hidalgo County was not native
born. See n. 6, supra. Without some testimony from the
grand jury commissioners about the method by which they
determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to
the statutory time for testing qualifications. it is impossible
to draw any inference about literacy, sound mind and moral
character, and criminal record from the statistics about the
. population as a whole. See n. 8, supra. These are questions
of disputed fact that present problems not amenable to resolution by an appellate court. We emphasize, however, that
we are not saying that the statistical disparities proved here
could never be explained in another case; we are simply saying that the State did not do so in this case. See Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S., at 361.
C. In light of our holdillg that respondent proved a prima
facie case of discrimination, and that none of the evidence
presently in the record rebutted his case, we have only to
consider whether the District Court's "governmg majority"
theory lied the evidentiary gap:--In our view, it dia n ot
dispel the!Jr~Ur'nption OfPurposeful discrimination. Because of the many facets of human motivation, we are_®.,.willing to presume as a matter of law that human beings of
one definable groupwilfnot discrim~te against tlleir own
kind. Thi; is"a complex question, aBout wh.ich widely differing views can be held, and, a,s such, it would be inappropriate
to take judicial notice of one view over another. 20 The rele·20 This is not :1 case where a ma.jorit.y is pract icing benevolent · cliscrimi·nution in f~.vo r of ~ tradit.ionally disfavored minority, alt-hough t.hat

J
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vance of a "governing majority" of elected officials is questionable, as well. The fact that certain elected officials are
Mexican-American tells us nothing about the motivations
and methods of grand jury commissioners who select persons
for the grand jury lists. Finally, the record does not indicate
the length of time that the Mexican-Americans have enjoyed
''governing majority" status, assuming that the term has
some easily ascertainable meaning. For the list from which
respondent's gra.nd jul'y was selected, Mexican-Americans
constituted only 50%· of those called, in comparison to their
strength of nearly 80% in the county. Thus, even for the
most recent time period·, when presumably the political power
of the Mexican-Americans was at its greatest, a large disqrepancy persisted. 21

V(

IV
Rather than adopt any approach to the jury discrimination
question that would· be as subjective and faintly defined as
the "governing ma-jority" theol'y, we prefer to look at all the
facts that bear on the issue, such as the statistical disparities,
the method of selection, and any other relevant testimony as
to ~hich the selection process was implemented. Under this standard; the proof offered by responde,nt was sufficient to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination in gFand jury selection. Since the State failed )
to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination by
---~
____.;::::·;.. \.. ""\..
\. ,.,.

l/

-

shuation illustrates that motivations not immediately obviou;; might enter
into discrimination against "one's own kind."
~ 1 The result in Reters v. Kifj, 407 U. S. 493 (1972), suggests yet
anot.her reason why a "governing majority" should make no difference.
If one has a right to a grand jury t.hat. is fairly represPnt.ative of the
c<;>mmunity, and even a member of the majority has the right. to challenge
the absence of members of minorities on juries, t.hen the fact of a "governing majovit.y" would seem to be irrelevant to t.he underlying right. The
real disagreement in Peters was over standing to enforc<' the right , a
problem we do not face here, since respondent is a member of the underrepresented group ..

75-1552-0PINION
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

17

·competent testimony, despite two opportunities to do so, we
affirm the Court of Appeals' holding of a denial of equal
protection of the law in the grand jury selection process in
respondent's case.
It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice St~wart
Mr. Justice Whlte
Mr. Justicee Marsball
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In adclitioH to the views expressed in MR. JuS1'ICE PowELL's
diss(•n t, J idcn tify one other flaw i11 the Court's opinion.
What the majority characterizes as a prima faci<' ease of <.liscrimination simply will not wash. The decisions of this
Court. suggest. and common sense demands. that eliyible population statistics, not gross population figures, provitle the
rrlPvant starti11g point. In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S.
02•'>. 6~0 ( 1972). for example, the Court in an opinion by MH.
Jt ' STlCE WHl'l'E looked to the "population of blacks in the
eligible population . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure to producr rvidence rela.ting to the eligible
population in Hidalgo C'ounty undermines respondent's claim
that any statistical "disparity" existed in the first instance.
Particularly where, as here , substantial numbers of members
of tlH• identifiable class actually served on grand jury panels,
tlw burden rightly rests upon the challenger to show a meanillgful statistical disparity. After all , the presumption of constitutionality attaching to all state procedures has even
grPatcr force under tlw circumstances presented here, where
c·xact.ly Ollc-half the 111embers of the grand jury list now
thnll('nged hy respondc•ttt were members of the allegedly exf'ltHif1d class of Mexica11-Americans.
Tlw Court has not prrviously bren called upon to deal at
)(•IIJ.dlt with tlw sort of statistics required of persons chaJleng-

.
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ing a grand jury selection system. TIHl reason is that in our
prior cases there was little doubt that members of identifiable
minority groups had been excluded in large numbers. In
Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, the challenger's venire included
only one member of the identifiable class and the grand jury
that indicted him had none. ln Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S.
346 (1970). Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967). Sims v.
Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 (1967). and Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U. S. 545 (1967). there was at best only token inclusion of
Negroes on grand jury lists. The case before us, in contrast,
involves neither tokeni:::m nor absolute exclusion; r·athe•·. the
State has used a selection system resulting in the inclusion
of large numbers of Spanish-surnamed citizens on grand jury
lists. In this situation. it is particularly incumbent on respondent to adduce precise statistics demonstrating a significant disparity. To do that, respondent was obligated to
demonstrate that disproportionately large numbers of eligible
individuals were excluded systematically from grand jury
ser·vice.
Respondent offered no evidence whatever in this respect.
He therefore could uot have established any meaningful case
of discrimination. prima facie or otherwise. In contrast to
respondent's approach , which the Court's opinion accepts
without analysis, the Census Bureau's statistics for 1970
demonstrate that of the adults in Hidalgo County. 72%. not
79.1 cy, as respondent implies. are Spanish-surnamed. At the
outset, therefore, respondent's gross population figures are
manifestly overinclusive.
But that is only the beginning. Respondent ofl'ered no
evidence whatever with respect to other basic qualifications
for grand jury service. 1 The stati~tics relied on in thf' Court's
Th(' burden of p:;fnbli~;hing a prima facie c:t:>e obviou~;l~· re~;ted on
respondt'nt. It will not do to produce patt'ntl~· ovPrinclusive figurr1<
nnd thert'b~· ·et'k to shift the burden to the Statt'. Comparr. a11te, at 4
Jl , 1j, 5 n . < . Uathrr, n. prim:1 fncic rn~c is e:;tabli~hcd only when the
1
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opinion suggest that 22.9% of Spanish-suruamPd persons over
age 25 in Hidalgo County ha.ve had no schooling at all. Ante,
at G n. 8. Since one requirement of grand jurors in Texas is
literacy in the English language, approximately 20~ of adultage Mexican-Americans are very likely disqualified on tha.t
ground alone.
The Court's reliance on respondent's overbroad statistics
is not the sole defect. As previously noted. one-half of the
memb<>rs of respondent's grand jury list bore Mexican-American surnames. Other grand jury lists at about the same time
as respondent's indictment in March 1972 were predominantly
Mexican-American. Thus, with respect to the September·
1971 grand jury list, 70cy,, of the prospective grand jurors were
Mexican-American. In the .January 1972 Term. 5.57c were
Mexican-American. Siuce respondent was indicted in 1972,
by what appears to have been truly representative grand jury,
the mechanical use of Hidalgo County's practices some 10
years P-arlier seems to me entirely indefensible. We do not
know. and on this record we cannot know, whether respondent's 1970 gross population figures, which served as the basis
for establishing the "disparity" complained of in this case.
had any applicability at all to the period prior to 1970. Accordingly, for all we know, the 1970 figures may be totally
inaccurate as to prior years; ~ if so, the apparent disparity
alleged by respondent would be increased improperly.
Therefore. I disagree both with the Court's assumption that
respondent established a prima facie case and with the Court's
implicit approval of respondent's method for showing 'an
allegedly disproportiona.t e impact of Hidalgo County's selection system upou Mexican-Americans.
l'halkng1·r Hhow:-< a disparit~· between the percentage of minority perlSOn!l
in 11H· rligible population nnd the percentage of minority individtl!lls on
t lw g;raud jm~·.
~ lndr('(.f, ,Judge Reyna.ldo Garza in thi~ ca;;e r<>ferred to Hidalgo County
11 ~ '·rapidly rhanging" and ns experiencing " rapid growth."
·
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Dear Chief:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely, /

v-1
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

March 17, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1552 -

Castaneda v. Partida

Dear Lewis:
With several dissents now written, I find it necessary
to make a slight change on page 16 of the Court's opinion. In
the full paragraph on that page, 11th line, I am inserting after
the word 11 dissent 11 the words 11 of Mr. Justice Powell. 11 I feel
that the reference to 11 dissenters 11 in the first line of my footnote 14 on page 12 may remain as it is.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference

·March 18, 1977
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

In light of the change made today in Thurgood's
concurring opinion, it has been necessary for me to
make a change in footnote 7, page 10, of my dissent.
My new footnote 7, which I have today sent to
the printer, reads as follows:

7/
- I agree with Mr. Justice Marshall,
ante, at 4, that stereotypes conclrning
identifiable classes in our society have
no place in the decisions of this Court.
For that reason, I consider it inappropriate
to characterize the Mexican-American majority
in Hidalgo County as a "minority group" and
on that basis to suftgest that these MexicanAmericans may have adopt[ed] the majority's
negative attitudes towards the minority."
Ante, at 3. This type of speculation
liiUstrates the lengths to which one must
go to buttress a holding of purposeful discrimination that otherwise is based solely
on a lack of proportional representation.

L.F .P., Jr.
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Before today a criminal defendant had no right to
proportional representation of his class on the grand jury
which presented his indictment.

He had only the right to

insist that the state not deliberately and systematically
exclude members of his class from serving as grand jurors.
Every previous grand jury/ discrimination case,~reaching
this Court, has involved a situation where the governing
majority in the community,/ and the re~er over the

selecti~

of grand jurors,j was held by

J\

electorate/

and~ officials.
In theP.~:~e

have sustained claims of grand jury

discriminatio~;'gainst

politically powerless

.

where they were totally excluded from - or
-token participatio/' ~n - grand juries.

minorities, ;~
A.~
limited to
A

The facts of this case are altogether different.

---

Here we have a Mexican-American defendant -

~ulz

convicted by a petit jury - who claimed discrimination~
in the selection of the grand jury/ that indicted him.
But the defendant was not a mem~ ~f a minority group.
He was indicted and convicted in
a community in which 80% of the
of the elected

official~lso

l~t.41!J

Hidalg~

County, Texas,

population~nd a majority

are Mexican-American.

2.
The key actors in this drama were not Anglo; they
were Mexican-Americans:
(a)

-

The judge who appointed the jury commissioners;'

...

and later presided over the trial; (b) three
of the five
..,
jury commissioners; (c) five of the 12 grand urors who

- -

returned the indictment; (d) seven of the 12 petit jurors

-

who found the respondent guilty; and (e) a majority of the
persons on the grand
indictment

- .. ~c-~

~ury !}~t

.

·-

in the year of respondent's

were Mexican-American.

;e erh aps west
1\

{~-:~·~.

S. l g....
lil;!>la84tla

~

maJOr~ty

0f

t he

-

grand jury commissioners - who, under Texas law, select
the grand jurors - were Mexican-American.
.

Thus, Mexican-Americans controlled both the selection

1/.A. .lf,;~~sfnd

the entire political process.

In these

circumstances,) rational inferences/from the most basic

./,

( ~"'4~

facts in a democratic society/ render improbible respondent's
claim of purposeful

1

discrimination~A2~~<~ ~

There is for mej a sense of extraordinary unreality/
when Justices here in Washington)decide that the MexicanAmericans - who control the levers of powerj(n this remote
border community/- are manip~lating themJto discriminate
against their fellow Mexican-Americans.

ol

-1

3.

~
~those

In contrast, the

judges~ot

in Washington" ••eher

on the scene,)bhe state judge who appointed the

jury commissioners/and who presided over respondent's
trial,,and the United States District Judge - both
Mexican-Americansfond familiar with the communityperceived no basis for respondent's claim/of invidious
discrimination.

I•~

The Court's decision releases a Mexican-American
~

defendant whose guilt - determined by a jury that included
seven Mexican-Americans - is not questioned.
But I am more concerned/by the holding that statistical
disproportionalityJ'is ~ne sufficient to invalidate
indictments and consequent convictions.

The implications

of this unprecedented holdingJ'may be far-reaching indeed.

. I p7 ss
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Before today a criminal defendant had no right to
proportional representation of his class on the grand jury
which presented his indictment.

He had only the right to

insist that the state not deliberately and systematically
exclude members of his class from serving as grand jurors.
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j~~J-~~.!£>Eers;
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grand jury commissioners - who, under Texas law, select
the grand jurors - were Mexican-American.

Thus-, Mexican-Americans controlled both the selection
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.

o~ jurorsfnd the entire political process.
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circumstances,jrational inferences/from the most basic

facts in a democratic societyJ'render
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respondent's
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There is for

meja sense of extraordinary unreality/

when Justices here in Washington}decide that the MexicanAmericans- who control · the levers of power;{n this remote
border community/- are manipulating them/to discriminate
against their fellow Mexican-Americans.
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In contrast, the
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in

Washington;!~

Athose on the scene,)bhe state judge who appointed the
jury commissioners/and who presid~d over respondent''s
trial,jand the United States District Judge - both
Mexican-Americansfond familiar with the communityperceived no basis for respondent's claimJ'of invidious
discrimination.
The Court's decision releases a Mexican-American
~

defendant whose guilt - determined by a jury that included
seven Mexican-Americans - is not questioned.
.

But I am more concernedl'by the holding that statistical

disproportionalityJ'is ~ne sufficient to invalidate
indictments and consequent convictions.

The implications

of this unprecedented holdingJ'may be far-reaching indeed.
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peals for the Fifth Circui~:
Rodrigo Partida.
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J\'[a, JusTICE PowELL, dissenting,
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on
federal habeas corpus a~though it finds no fault with the
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest.
The Court reaches this result by hoiding that the prisoner, a
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the Mexican•
Americans who controlled the jury selection process in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Ameri.;..
cans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the
proper scope of federai habeas corpus relief and established
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination.

I
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary·
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although
·Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingfy,.
he was brought to trial _before a petit jury. This jury, whose·
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respondent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt.
Afte~ respondent was convicted· and sentenced he raised for
the first till11:) the cfuim that is. nCIM' before us: that the grand'
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure
infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. By
accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State to
release respondent-and to indict and try him again if the
witnesses are still available-although there is no question
that a properly constituted petit jury found him guilty.
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to overturn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly unconstitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time
limits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and cannot show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he contends that
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the
state appellate court considered its merits in affirming his
conviction.
In Francis we left open the question whether the general
rule applicable to consideration of claims of unconstitutional
grand jury discrimination in federal habeas proceedings should
bar relief where the state courts consider the merits of an
untimely claim. We said that in such a case "different considerations would ... be applicable." 425 U. S., at 542 n. 5.
It does not follow that. as the Court today summarily concludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered the claim on the
merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante, at 3 n. 4. In
my view, consideration of the merits by a state court a.ffords
no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,U.S.- (1976).
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the

...
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way of conviction, if factual guilt is est~blished." Menna v,
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question,
accordingly, is whether the alleged grand jury discrimination
is the sort of defect that wilf "stand in the way of conviction,
if factual guilt is validly established:"
The function ot the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere,
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the
accused and for requiring him to- stand · trial. But there is
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 ( 1884).
In many States the gra.nd juryjs function is served by an information and, if the defendant is to be detained for any signific~nt period before triai, by a. judicial determination of
probfl.ble cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect
in the probable cause determination will not void a subsequent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently
detained may challenge the probabie cause for that confinement, a conviction wiU not be vacated on the ground that the
defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." id., at 119.
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is true tha.t this
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after convic ..
tion. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972),
on certiora.ri to a state appellate court, we set aside a. conviction on the ground that members of the defendant's race had
heen deliberately excluded from the grand jury which returned
his indictment. This broader scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the convicted defendant, whose guilt
is no longer merely probable, but for the rights of others. Cf.
Peters v. Niff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972). We have, in essence,
given the criminal defendant standing on appeal to assert the
rights of those who ma.y yet be unfairly indicted, or improperly excluded from jury service, as a result of the alleged
discrl.mination.
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But allowing standing to assert the rights of others i~
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individuaP Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his
convictiou, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited
to the integrity of the determination of guilt in the particular
case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold, therefore.
that the State's decision on direct appeal to consider the claim
of grand jury discrimjnation does not present a case for federal
habeas relief where-as here-the state prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt in his O\vn case. The decision of
the Court today. snb silentio, appears to extend the availability of habeas corpus relief well beyond its present ample
frontiers. t
Although I think it was error to entertain respondent's
claim. this issue was not briefed or argued in this case. In
view of its importance to the federal system, the question
should not be resolved in the absence of plenary consideration,
It would be appropriate, rather. to set the case for reargu~
ment or to remand it for reconsideration of the question
whether federal habeas corpus relief is available.
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' ho1d..,
ing that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina:.
tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the
merits.
''It is clear, not on!~· from thf' lauguage of [42 U.S. C.] §§ 224i (c)('3)
and 2254 (a), but al:so from thf' common law histor~· of thf' writ, that the
essence of habeas corpn:s i:< an attack b~· a per:scm in custody upon. the
legality of that. custody, nnd that. the trnditiona.l function of th<.> writ is
to ::;(>Cure releasf' from ill<.>gal custody . . . . " Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475, 484 (1973).
2
In no case cited in the Courf's opinion did the Court havf' before it a
federa.l habeas corpus p<'titioner who, likP thf' respondent here , complained only of discrimination in thf' sf'l<.>ction of the grand jur~· which
Indicted him. Indf'Cd, the onl~· habf'ws ca::;r cit.Pd by the Court is Peters v.
Kif!. supra, 407 U. S. 493, which involvf'd claim::; of di;;rrimination in th\)
~~electioJ1 of the petit. 11s well .ili:i the .gran.(! )t~ry .
1

..
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II
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the sta.t e and federal
proceedings which shows underrepresentation of MexicanAmericans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second,
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and
third, the facts judicially 11oticed by the District Court with
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination.

A
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a.
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand
jury "drawn from a fait cross-section of the community.))
Ante, at 10, and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S. 299 ( 1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,- U. S . - (1977).
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead
through prosecutorial information , as many States prefer to
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119.
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a

"/5-i552-DISSENT

6.

CASTANEDA v. :PAJ.tTIPA

line of cases beginning wilih Stra,uder v, West Viryina, 100
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend~
p,nt is denied equ~:tl protection of the Jaw if. as a result of
purposeful discrimination. members of his own race are ex ..
eluded from jury service, See. e. (!., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 ( 1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 3:25 U. S. 398, 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out. this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial
under-representation rather than total exclusion of membere
of the defendant's class, see, e. (!., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S.
346 (1970).
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community."
Ante, at 10, and n. 13.a The right to a "representative" grand
jury is a federal right that derives not from the requirement
of equal protection but from the Fifth Amendment's explicit
requirement of a grand jury. That right is similar to the
right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representa.tive
petit jury under the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). To the extent that the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only
show substantial under-representation of his own race or class
3 It nwr be, as the Court ~ugge:sts, thnt nondiscriminatory methods o(
selection will, over time, result in a rrpresentntive grand jury. See
Cm·ter v. Jut-y C'omm'n, supra, 396 U. S .. at 530. But the Fourteenth
Amendment does not mandate thnt re~:;ult . Nothing would prevent. a State
for example, from seeking to :u:::;ure informed decisionma.)<ing by requiring
that all grand jurors be lnw~·er~ familiar with the criminal law; and if
that requirement should re:,mlt in sub~tantial underrepresentntion on grnnd
,iuries of some srgmpnts of t.he community in somr areas of the State,
the Fourteenth Amendment would 110t render the ~election proces$
uncon><t itu tiona!.

·"
'•

..

75-1552-DISSENT
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

7

to demonstrate a constitutional violation. But in a sta.te case
in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies. and the defendant has the burden
of proving that the under-representation is the result of
systematic and purposeful discrimination.
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated in
our recent decisions in Wash£ngton v. Davis and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolita;n Housing Development Corp. In
Arlington Heights we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportio11ate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." U.S., at-.
'Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate
impact is enough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group. the burden shifts to the state to
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-.
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arlington Heights in the circumsta.nces of this case.
B
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards
for cases of this sort:
"Determining whether invidious disc'riminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may pro'-':ide an
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important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must. look to other evidence." U. S., at (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury. 4 This is
Although Davis and Arlington Heights makP clear that. proof of discriminatory intent is required and that proof of impact or effect nlone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Becausf• of the
nature of the jury selection task . .. we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern doe,; not appronch
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at. n. 13. As one illustration, we cited Turne1· v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Court found that the dispn.r ity betwePn those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. I d.,
at 350. But the Court did not view the statii:;tics in isolation. T·urner
was not a criminal ca~e; it involved insteaJ Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed
jury commissionPrs, who in turn selected the grand jur~· · The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of educa.t.ion. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the student:; in
the county schools were NPgro. ewr~· white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as
were all of the members of the jury comrnis:;ion. The District Court.
hnd fotmd that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes hnd been systemntically excluded from the grand jurirs through token inclusion." ' !d., at
352. It was again~St this background of pervasive discrimination that the
4

..
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illustrated by the recent 9©cisiQI1 in Alexander v. Louisianq,
.405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we st11ted;
"The Court has never announced mathematical standard§
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conciusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themseives were not racially neutral." 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 o/o of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white." appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire inciuded 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro (5o/c); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden
should shift to the State. lbid.fi
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
Court. found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Kegro repre~enta
tion was the product. of continued, purpo~eful di~crimination.
~The Court'::; rPiiance on "thr opportunit.y for discrimination" noted
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, i~ clearly misplaced. The "::;ubjectivity" of
the selection sy~tem cuts in f<tvor of the State where, as hPre, tho.,;e who
control the selection procc::;s are member::; of the ~ame class as the person
claiming discrimination. SPe text infra.
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should be considered in light of usuch [ o~her] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
Heights, supra, U. S., at - .

c
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
,presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials.6
6 I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact that Mexican.
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to
control or significant.ly influpnc<' political dPci~ions or the way the system
operat~s. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no on<' can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The cla:;sic situation in which
a "minority group" may suffer di~>crimination in a community is where
it is "relegated to . . . a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican~
Americans are pot politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian

..
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
,vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors,
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
,ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against hi111.
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "I£
people in charge can choose whom they want. it is unlikely
they will discriminate agaiust themselves.'' 384 F. Supp.
79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 "C. S .. at 309. Were
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni·
tion in the community. there would be no reason tD suppose
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the
politica,l element of thr community, with drmon~tratrd c11pability to elec~
and protect their own.
Nor do I suggPst that prr:,;o11~ in po;;ition~ of power C'an never be
shown to have discriminated ngainst other membrrs of the Harne ethnic
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's ::;tati;;tical rYidence .
·without more, is insufficient to prove a clnim of discrimiHatjon in this case.
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
pght to complain. 7
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where appar~
ently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of
16 was on the jury panel,' the Court emphasized the high
threshold of proof required "to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal~
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the court disre~
gard this accepted standard 'of justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to
Mexican..Americans.

D
It matters little in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's priina facie case at the
7 The likelihood that. the Mexican-Americ:m controlled jury commis-sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans doe::; not, in itself,
explain the statistical dispa rity shown b)· respondent.. The record is
essentially silent as -to the manner in which the commission made its
selections and its motivation in srlccting m; it did. But the composition
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude-correctly, I think-that the stat istics wrrc instlfficient. to show the
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broadrr range of va.riation should be
tolerated herr becau~>e the Texas selection syst{'m allows the governing
majority [of grand jury commissioner:;] to favor their group when'
@electing grand h\ro~.:s." ~84 F , Supp. 1 n,t 00,

,,
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys~
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical showing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed
~he grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production- even assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the
right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice."
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S., at 628. In my view the District Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination
insufficient.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases. would have
thought that respondent's statistics, under tlie circumstances
of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, were even
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic
discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
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Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statistics that Mexican-Americans in this remote border
county who control the levers of power are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the Dietrict
Court.

..
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE joins,
dissenting.
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest.
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a
Mexican-American, has adequateiy shown that the MexicanAmericans who controlled the jury selection process in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Americans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives the proper
scope of federal habeas corpus relief and misapplies established principles governing grand jury discrimination.
I
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do
so-respondent offered no timely objection to the indictment or
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly,
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respondent guilty of the crime charged beyond a11y reasonable doubt.
After respondent was convicted and sente11ced he raised for
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand
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jury which indicted him . had been selected by a procedure .
infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans. By
accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State to
release respondent-and to indict and try him again if the
witnesses are still available-although there is no question
that a properly constituted petit jury found him guilty.
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the
way of conviction , if factual guilt is established/' Menna v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question,
accordingly, is whether alleged grand jury discrimination
is the sort of defect that will ·"stand in the way of conviction,
if factual guilt is validly established."
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere,
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an information and, if the defendant is to be detained for any significant period before trial, by a. judicial determination of
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118- 119
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect
in the probable cause determination will not void a subsequent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement. a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the
defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." !d., at 119.
In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972). on certiorari to a. state appellate court, the Court set aside a conviction
on the ground that memb0rs of the defendant's race had
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been deliberately excluded from the grand jury which returned
his indictment. The decision reflected a concern not for the
rights of the convicted defendant, whose guilt was unquestioned, but for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407
U. S. 493 (1972). The Court has, in essence, given the
criminal defendant standing on direct appeal to assert the
rights of those who may yet be unfairly indicted. or improperly excluded from jury service, as a result of the alleged
discrimination .
But I find no justification for a rule that would permit a
federal habeas corpus petitioner to assert the rights of others
who may be injured by alleged grand jury discrimination.
Permitting the prisoner to assert the rights of third parties is
inconsistent with the overriding function of habeas corpus,
which is to remedy injustice to the individuaP The inquiry
on habeas corpus historically has focused on the integrity
of the determination of guilt in the individual case. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 (1973)
(PowELL, J., concurring).
In Stone v. Powell, U. S. (1976) , we held that
"where t.he State has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial." !d., at-. Unlike ~he
prisoner in Stone, who could at least complain that his con1 " It is clear, not only from the language of [42 U.S . C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3)
and 2254 (a ) , but also from thr common law history of the writ, that the
essence of hab eas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the
legality of that. custody, and that the traditional fun ction of the writ is
to secure release from illega l custody . . . ." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475, 484 (1973) .
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viction rested on evidence tainted by Fourth Amendmen~
violations and could ask for a new trial with that evidenec
excluded, the prisoner in this case challenges only the 110w
moot determination tha.t there was probable cause to proce<'cl
to trial. He points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Stoue,
the incremental benefit of extending habeas corpus as a means
of correcting unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures
" would be outweighed by the a.cknowledged costs to othPr
va!ut• vital to a rational system of criminal justice.'' /d., at
f would hold , therefore. that a state prisoner's claim of
grand jury discrimination is not cognizable on federal habeas
corpus.~

As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' holrling that respondent established unconstitutional discrimina~ ln no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court biP'@ !;te~ete it a
fcdr rnl habr11s corpus pctit.ioner who, like the respondrnt lwrc. eom-.
plained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jur~ · whi"h
indicted him . lfleeed, the (')III.) habeiiS Cll~ eitce e, tke Ct:lMPt io; Pete1'S V,
Ki/J , ~Oi U.S .493, ~involved claim~ of discriminntion in thr ~rleetion
of thr petit as well as thP grand jury.
Thr availability of fedrrnl h ahea ~ corpu:s as a rrmedy for claim ed gmnd
jur~· discrimination wa:s not ron,;idert>d in Francis v. H en der.~on. 4:!5 LT. S.
!i>l6 ( Hli6). In Francis. dPridrd lwfon· Stone v. Putre/1 . WI' mrn· l~ · hPld
lhnl n HtMe pri:soner who fnilrd to n1:1ke a timPiy ol.Jjr!'tion. uncl<·r ~tate•
rui P~ of procPdurc , to thP composition of the grand jm~ · lwd waived an~ ·
right to havr ,:uch :1 C'laim ronsidPn•d in frdPml bnbl'a" c·orpus pro<'P<·din~"· '
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tion in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the
merits.
II
As I read the Court's opuuon, it writes new law on tlw
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding the reach ofand in some instances misapplying-our prior authorities.
Given the unique factual situation before us, the Court's
sweeping resolution of this issue seems wholly unnecessary.
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately representee! on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts .iucJicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominance and control by the Mexican-American ma.]ority iu
Hidalgo County. I agree with the District Court that in light
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination.
A

In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It
holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause merely by showing that the
procedure for selecting grand jurors "resulted in substantial
under-representation of his race or the identifiable group to
which he belongs.'' Ante, at 11. By so holding, the Court
ignores the traditional constitutional distinctions between the
grand and petit juries, and misapplies the equal protection
analysis mandated by our most recent decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not;
apply to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra_
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A state

defendant cannot complain if t.he fita~ foregoes th~
institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him in~tead through prosecutorial information. as many State~
prefer to do., See Gerstein v. Pu(lh, 4;20 P. 8 .. at 116-119;
Nevertheless, if a State chooses tO proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the conl?~raints i!flp9sed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
Jine of cases beginning with Stra?J,der v. West l'irgina, 100
U. S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend~
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as. a r·esult of
purposeful discrimination. members of his own r·ace are ex~
eluded from jury service. See, e. y., Ale~ander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Cormn'n, 39~
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282. 287-2~)0 (1950); Akins v. 'l'exas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendanrs
class. see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community." The right
to a "representative" grand jury is a federa.I right tha.t derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state pro,.,
ceediugs--to a representative petit jury under the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisia.na, 419 U. S. 522 (1975),
ma~·

be that nondi:scriminatory methods qf selection will, over time,
in a l't>prt>sentative grand jury. See Carter v. lury Comm'n , 396
U. S., at :3:30. But the Foul't•Penth Amendment docs not mandate that
result. Xothing would prevent a St.ate for example, from seeking to assure
informed decisionmaking by rrquiring that all grand juror:s be lf)w~·ers
familiar with tlw nriminal l11.w; and if that requiremrnt ;.;hould result in
subst.nnt.ial undrr-repn">rnt~tiou on grand jurie.rs of ~onw ~cgment s of i he
communli~ · in -"Olll<' arPilH of t.he Stil.te, the FourtC<'nth Amm1drrlent wotllg
flOt rendr.r the ,;('lt'ttion procP~:< unconstitljtion111 ~
nIt

rr~ult.
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To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli~
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection
procedure "systematically exclucle[s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail is] to be reasonably representative
thereof.'' !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the challenge is to the grand jury. only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies. and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal ProtRction Clause.
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 299 ( 1976). and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
U. S. (1977). Iu ArHousing Developrnent Corp., lington Heights wf' said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426
F. R. 229 ( 1976). made it clear that official action wili
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant. but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious 1·acial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof
of raciaJiy discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to sho'vr a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." - ·
r. 8 .. at - .
Today the CoUJ·t holds that a showing of disproportionate
impact is !:'nough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underreprcsentation of his group. he has made out a prima facie case
of discriminatory purpose. and the burden shifts to the
state to rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at 12.
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and A rlingto-n Heights in the circumstances of this case.

B
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards
for resolving issues of discriminatory intent or purpose:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory

pur~
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pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial" and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson , 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as sta.rk as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence." U. S. , at (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.,4 This is
Although Davis and Al lington Heights make clear that. proof of discrimina tory intent is required a.nd that proof of impact or effect alone
Is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. " Because of the
nature of the jury selection task . .. we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approa ch
n . 13. As one illust he extremes of Y ick W o or Gomillion." !d ., at tration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) .
In Turner the statisti ca l evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general popul ation and 37% of those included in the grand jury list .
The Court found that the disparity between those figure:; wa::; no t i"O
"insubstantial" as t o foreclo:se corrective action by a federal court. ld .,
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the stati:sti cs in isolation. Turner
was not a criminal c a ~e; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the count y board of educa tion. The circuit judge appointed
jury commission er:;, who in turn ;;elec ted the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn , selected the board of educa tion . At every laye r of thi:s systrm
white citizens were in total control. E ven though aJI of the student · in
4
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual iuquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone. for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, ouly one
of whom was a Negro (5o/c); and none of the 12 persous on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
the county schools were Negro, every white' pupil having t mn~frrred
elsewhere, all of the mrmbers of thr board of education wrrr whit.r , as
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District. Comt
'had found that., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes hnd Jx.en Hystrma.tically excluded from the grand jurif' · through token inclusion." !d., at
352. It was agai11st this background of JX'rvasive di~crimination that the
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro rPprr~rntn
tion was the product. of continued, purposeful di~crimination.
B~· contrast, in Ca.rter v. Jury Comm'n, :396 U. S .. at :338-3:~9, iHoiHtrd
proof that for 12 years no Negro had brrn nppointrd to the jur~· commi~
sion of a predominantly Negro county W<l~ found insufficirnt, standing
alone, to E'StnbJish discriminatory intrnt.

75-1552-DISSENT
10

CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden
should shift to the State. lbid.r.
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
Heights,- U.S., at - .6

c

In this case, the following critical facts a.re beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
,presided over respondent's trial was Mexican:..American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were
Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent was
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the grand jury list were
5 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for di::;crimination" noted
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the St.ate where, as here, those who
control tl1e selection process are members of the same class as the person
claiming discrimination. See text infra.
0 The Court 's opinion makes selective usc of language in Arlington
Heights, while largely ignoring the basic rationale of this most recent
relevant decision. The Court quotes only one sentence from that case
("Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of state action . . . ."), ante, at 10, lifting the
sentence from the middle of a paragraph. -U.S., at-. It. is rvident
from the full paragraph, quoted at pp. 7-8, supra, and even more evident
from the full opinion, that the language taken out of context by the
Court. does not fairly reflect the rationale of Arlington Heights or the cases
it follows. Indeed, the same paragraph from which the single sentence
was selected mnkes clear that "[a]b ·ent a pattern as stark that in
Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the CoUl:t
must look to other evidence." Seen. 9, irtfra.
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Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials. 7
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
. were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from
7 I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact that Mexican~
Americans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of the population may not be able at a pa.rticular time to
control or significa.nt.Jy influence political decisions or the way the system
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a. community is where
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the MexiranAmericans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian
political element of the community, with demonstrated capabilit.y to elect
and protect their own.
Nor do I suggest that persons in positions of powrr en n 1wver be
shown to have discriminated against other members of thr snmr ethnic
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's statistical evidence,
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case,
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the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable.
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "If
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. upp,
79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S., at 309. Were it
not for that natural inclination, a.nd for its general recognition in the community, there would be no reason to suppose
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the
individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain. 8
In Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 400, where apparently no
Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was on
The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commission would not, discriminate agninst Mexican-Americans does not, in itself,
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is
essentially silent as to t.he manner in which the commis~ion made its
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the compositiott
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county
by Mexica.n-America.ns, prompted the District Judge to conclude-correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of variation should be
tolerated here because the Texas selection syst.em allows the governing
majority [of grand jury commis~;ioner:s] to favor their group when
selecting grand j·urors." 284 F . Supp., at 90.
8
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the jury panel, the Court emphasied the high threshold of
proof required to brand officecrs of the court with discriminatory
intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selectiug a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the court disregard this accepted standard of justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners

of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to
Mexican-Americans.
D
It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice~
r:tble facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebutting it after it. was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-th e only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys"
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican""
Americans- while substantially represented on the grand jury
lists- were not represented in numbers proportionate to their
share of the total population .9 The State responded by prein this ca!>c remotely re~embl c:; the stark discrimination in
N or do the ~tati:;ti c~ in this case a pproa ch th~
degree of exrlusion t ha t has cha racterized the cases in which we ha ve
u Nothing

Oomillion and Y ick W o.
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senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commiSSIOners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court,
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the cvidcncc,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that tho
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied -1 to members of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, supra, 405 U.S.,
at 628. In my view the District Court correctly found that
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally dis.
criminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90.
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not clea.rly
erroneous.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state intro. duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not presenting more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases.
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago County,
previously found grand jury discrimination. Ser n. 4, supm. In thi~ rasr.
in thr year in which the rei:ipondrnt was indicted, 52.5% of the pcrsonl:i on·
the grand jury lists were Mrxican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupation with thf' disparity of representation of Mexican-Amrrirans
in the total popula.tion and on the grand-jury lists, the Court Josf'l:i sight of
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional
n•prcspnta,tion" of Mexican-Americans, Carter"· Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.,
at. 3~9. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately
and systematically deny to !Mexican-Americans] the right to participate
as jurors in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S., at
628-629,
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were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate a11d systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on tlw basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in this remote border county are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast. the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge- both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District
Court .

..
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MR. JPSTICE PowELL, with whom TliE CHIEF Jus'l'rcg joins,
dissenting.
/ ~
As 1 read the Court's opinion, it writes new law on the
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding thr reach ofand in some instances misapplying-our prior authorities.
Given the unique factual situation before us, the Court,'~
sweeping resolution of this issue seems wholly un1wcessary.'
The evidence relevant t.o the issue of discrimination iu t,h is
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidP.ncc
1 A strong ca!>r might be made that claims of grand jur~· dil'(('riminat ion
arr not cognizablr on federal habeas rorpu~ under thP rationaiP of :)tolle \' ,
l'ou•ell,- P. S . - (1976). In Stone wr held that •·wlll'rP tlw State has
prO\ridrd nn opportuuity for full and fair litigation of a Fourl"h Amrudmrnt
claim, a state• prisotwr ma.\· not br grantl'd J frd!'ral hah:>as rorJHI~ rPlid on
tlw ground that rYidrtH'l' obtainrd in ar1 uncon~titutional ~rarrh or HE'izure
w;t~ introducrd at hi~ trial." /d .. at.--. Unlikr the prisotH'l' in Stmw.
who could complain that his l'otwiction rrstl'cl on evidence taitltPd br
Fourth Anwndment violation,; and could :t~k for a nc•w trial with that
evidencP exchrdrd, thr pri~onrr in this rn~e cba ll engr~ on I~· t hp now moot
dPtPrmination by the grand jury that thrrc wa~; suflirient causr to proc·eC'd
to trial. · HP point,; to no'! Haw in thl' trial itself. A.,; in 8to11e, tlw itH'rc·mrntnl benefit of Pxtrnding habra;; c'orpus flH a means of corrPrting UJH'On::;titutiona l grand jury ~elrction procedure,; might bP virwed as ''outwrighed
b~· thl' acknowledged coRt~ to other values vital to a rational ~y;;tc>m of
crimina l ju::;tirP." /d., at-.
But a,..: thi,; i,;~ur was not addrC'f'.-ed below and wa,; not briefrd or argued
in thi~ Court , it II'O\IId br lll:l)l]li'Oj)l'i:t!P to fl'>'olvc' i1 in thi~ <'ase.
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introduced by respondent in both the state and federal
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represented on the grand jury lists; secoud, the testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority iu
Hida.Igo County. I agree with the District Court that in light
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination.

A
In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. Jt
holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause merely by showing that the
procedure for selecting grand jurors "resulted in substantial
under-representation of his race or the identifiable group to
which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so holding, the Court
ignores the traditional constitutional distinctions betwe<'n the
grand and petit juries. and misapplies the equal prot<-diott
analysis mandated by our most recent decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply
to a state prosecution . Hurtado v. California, 110 r. S. 516f
(1884). A state defendant, cattnot complaint if the State forPgoes the institutio11 of the grand jury and proceeds against him
instead through prosecu to rial information. as many States pr<'fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S., 103, 116- 119 (Hl75).f
Nevertheless. if a State chooses to procred by grand jury it
must procrecl within the constraints imposed hy the Equal
Protrction Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100
LT ..... 303 ( 1880) , this Court has held that a criminal defendant is denird equal prot0ction of the law if, as a result of
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purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex·
eluded from jury service. See, e. (!., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 ( 1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S,
282, 287- 290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community.t The right
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representa.tive petit jury under the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S . 522 ( 1975) .
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive g'roups .in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chafIenge is to the grand jury, only the Fou teenth Amendment
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitiy
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426
ft may be that nondiscrimi-natory· methocfs of select.ion will , over tin'l'e',
res ult in a representa.tive grand jury. See Carter v . Jury Com.rn'n, 39fj'
U. S., at 33D. But the FotrrteenU1 Amend'ment does not manilit.te tlia.t'
result. Nothing· would' prevent a State for example , from seeking to assu·re
fnformed decisionmaking by requiring that a ll grand jurors he lawyers
familiar with the criminal law ; and if that requirement should result in
substa ntia.! under-representa tion on grand juries of some segments of the
community in some a reas of the Sta.t e, the Fourteentli Arroom:fme nt woaicl
nmt mmcdhr the selecti'on process un.co.ustitt1utii:mrnL
2

.:
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U. S. 299 (1976) , and Arlington Heights v . . Metropolitan
U. S. (1977). In ArHo·using Development Corp. , lington Heights we said:
"Our decision last Term in ·w ashington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 ( 1976). made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' f'd., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatot·y intent or purpose is required
to sho"v a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." U.S., at - .
Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate
impact is enough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case
of disct·iminatory purpose. and the burden shifts to the
state to rebut the prima facie case." A.nte, at 12.
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arlington Heights in the circumstances of this case.
B
T.n Arlington Heights we identified the following standards
for resolving issues of discriminatory intent or purpose:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Dav·is, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the rffect of tlw state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 ( T. • •. 35G (1886); Gu-iun v. United States, 238
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U.S. :347 (1915); La:ne v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Oomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
an• ran•. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence." U. S., at (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis'b'rimination is in the selection of a state grand jury. 8 This is
~Although Davis :U1d Al'lington Heights make clear that proof of discriminator:-· intent is required and that proof of impact or effect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden
rn11y be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the
nature of the jury selection task ... we 'have permitted a finding of con~
stitutiona.l violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." /d., a t - n. 13. As one illustra.tion, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. '340 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed t11at Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Cou,rt found that the dispa.r ity between those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. /d.,
at 350. But. the Court, did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner
was not a criminal rase; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the C'ounty board of education. The circuit judge appointttl
jur~r commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of t.he students in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, 11ll of the members of the board of educa.t.ion were white, as
were a.Jl of t.he members of the jury commission. The District Court
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been systematically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." /d., at
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimination that the
Court found that, even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representation was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination.
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, :396 U. S., at 338- 339, i:;olated
· proof that for 12 years no Negro had bt'f'n appointed to thr jur~· commi~
sion of a predominantly Negro count~· wa:-; found insuffirient, ~tanding
·alone, to establish discriminatory intent.
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illustrated by the recent P!'!Ci~ign in Alexander v. Louisiana,l
1!05 U.S. 6~5 (1972), where we st11ted :
"The Court has nevev announced mathematical standard~
fov the demonstratiou of 'systematic' exclusion of black~
but has, rather, emphaHized that a factual inquiry i~
necessary in each case that takes into account all pos:.
sib1e explanatory facters. The progressive decimatioq
of potential Negr.o gr.and jurors is indeed striking here 1
but we dq not rest our. conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis~
crimination on statistic~:Ll improbability alone. for tlH'
selection pr-ocedur-es themse~ve§ were not racially ll<'U ~.
tral." 405 U. ~-, at 6~tJ .
In Ate:oonder, the evidence showed that 21 % of the rele vant
community wer() Negrq; the jui'y commission consisted of five
members "all of whom wer-e white, " appoiuted by a white
judge; the grand jury venit-e inc} uded 20 persons, only OIH'
of whqm was a Negro ( 5~); and none of tho 12 persous 011
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., a1
627, 628. This statistical ar1·ay was-as the Court notcd"striking." Yet the statistics were not found. in isolation. to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burde11
should shift to the State. Ibid. 1
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Ale:rr.mde1' make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other-! circumstantial
Thr Comt's rrliance on "the opportunit~- for cli:::crimination " not< ~!
in Alfxa:nder, ante, at 11-14, is clrarly mi::;placecl. Thr "~ ubjrr·tivity' ' of
the srlcction system cuts in favor of the State whrre, a.~ herr , tho~e who
control the selection procc::;s a.re membrr" of lhc ~amc class ns the l)CI'SOl1
'elaiming disrrin1inalion. Src text infra.
1
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and direct Pvidrnce of intent as may be available."
r. f • •• at-."

r
Arl1:ngtun

Heiuhts, -

c
ln this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
tho judgP who appointed the j'ury commissioners and later
presided over rt'spondent's trial was Mexican-American; thre<'
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-American ; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment.
including the foreman. were Mexica11-American;" and sevt•tt
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt wN<'
Mexica.n-Amcrican. In the year in which respondent was
.i ndicted. 52.5% of the persons 011 the grand jury list wel'l'
Mexican-American. In audition, a ma,lority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American. as wen'
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power anti
influe11ce were so held is not surprising iu a community when'
80/'< of the population is Mexican-American. As was em"Thr Court's opinion ll1<tkr~ ~rlrctiw 11::;r of langungt• in Arlingtoll
lnrgrf~· ignoring thr ba~;ic ntiionnlr of thi::; mo:<t twrut
rc•IPnmt deci:;ion . Thr Court quotr:,: only one :;enlence from that en::<<'
("Sonwtime;,: a clrnr pnttern, UIH'xplainable on grounds other than nt<'<\
<·m<'rg<'R from tlw rffrct of stntr action . . . . "), ante. at 10, lifting 1lw
~rntrnce from the middle of 11 pamgraph. -U.S .. at-. It. i~ evidrnt
from thr full pantgrnph, quotrd at pp. 7-8 , supra. nnd evrn man• Pvidrnt
from the full opiniou , that the language takrn out of contrxt br tlw
Court doe~ not fairlr rpffect th<' rcttionale of Arlington Heights or the ca~r,.
1t follow~. Indeed , the samr paragraph from which thr sin~lr ~entenc<·
was ·elrcted makes clear that "Ln]b~ent a pHttern a;; ~tark that iti
Gomillion or Yick Wo, impnct alonr i:; not determinativr , nnd thr Court
mu;,:t look to other evidrncr." Ser n. 9, infra.
"Thr Di:;trict Court notC'd th <tt thr number of .\Iexican-Am r ncan~ on
thr ~rnnd jur~· mil-(ht baYr brPn highrr had it not hpr•n for thr inabilit~· of
thr ,.ftt•rifT, a \frxican-Amrricnn, to lor·atr four of thl' originul mC'mbrr~ of
tlh· arr:t~· who W<'l'l' .\Irxican-Amrricnn. :)H-1 F. Supp. 79, ~3 . Unrl r r
Tt'X<I:- l:tw . ninr· of tlw 12 grand juror~ mu:;t concur brforp an indir·tmrJtl
cnn lw prr,.cnt<·d. Tr-.; . C'odr C'rim. Proc. J\rt. 20.19 (Hlflli) .

llrioht . whilr
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phasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-Americaq
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis.,
trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimi.,
nation case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials. 7
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners
,were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court ,
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
identify in advance t.hose potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbabl<'
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, 11 If
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp.
79, 90.
7 I do not sugg<'st, of course, that the mere fact
that Mexirt:tnAmcricans constitute a mnjority in Hildago County is dispositive. Th<'r<'
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other ret:t~ons ,
a majority of the population may not be able at a pa.rticular timr to
control or significant.Jy influence political decisions or the way the system
operates. &c Turne1· v. Fouche. supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The clm;sic situation in which
a "minority group" may suffer di~crimination in a. community is where
it is "relegated to . . . a po~ition of political powerles~ness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U . S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the MexicanAmericans arc not politically "powerless"; they are the mnjoritarian
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elert
and protect their own.
Nor do I 'liggest that pcr::;ons in position~ of power can never bt•
shown to hav<' disrrirnilli\ted against ot.her members of the same ethnic
or ra.cial group. I would hold only that re.~pond!'nt's statistical evidence,
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of di. crimination in thii$ Cfll3~.
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That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than aga.inst, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the•
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendan t,.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.. at 309. Were it
not for that natural inclination, and for its general recoguition in the community, there would be no reason to suppo:e
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimatt'
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only th~
individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain. 8
In Akins v. Texas, 325 U. ti., at 400, where apparently no
Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was on
the jury panel, the Court emphasied the high threshold of
proof required to brand officers of the court with discriminatory
intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
s The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commission would not ru~;c riminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itsrl(,
explnin the stntisticnl di spnrit~· shown by r<>spondcnt.. Tlw record is
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commis::;ion made itl'
selections and its motivation in Helecting as it did . But the rompo~ition
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the eount y
by MexicaJ1-America.ns, prompted t.he District .Judge t.o concludecorrectly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient. to show t iH'
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of vHri<ltion ~ houlcl bf'
tolerated here because the Tt'xas selection Hystem allow:> the governing
majorit y [of grand jury commi~:sioner::;J to f1wor their group when
select.i ng graJld iuror::;." 284 F. Supp., a.t 90.
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the part of the judicial arm of the government in deal,.
ing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It can..
not lightly be concluded that officers of the court disregard this accepted standard of justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today

has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury

commissioner~

of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairnes to
Mexican-Americans.
D
It matters little in this case whether such judicially noticr~
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subj ect to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys.. .
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican ..
Americans- while substantially represented on the grand jury
lists- were not represented in numbers proportionate to their
share of the total population. 0 The State responded by preNothing in this case remotely re~embl es the stark discrimination 111
Gomillion and Y ick W o. Nor do the statistics in this ca~e a.pproarh the
degree of exclu ~ i o n that haf' chara cteri11ed the ca,;e.,; in which we have
prrviously found grand jury disc rimination . s('(' n. 4, supra. In thiHcase,
in the yc:u in which the r e~ pond e nt wa::; indicted, 52.5.% of the JX' r~on s on
the grand jur~· list.-; wer<> M<>xican-American . Ante, nt 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupntion with the diHparity of repre:::entation of Mexican-Americans
in the total population and on th e grand-jury lists, the Court loHes sight sf
the constitutionnl ~ tandnrd . Respondent has no right. to "proportional
representation" of ~lexican -Am c rirn n s, Cqrter v, Jury Com1n'1~, · 39§ U. 8. 1
11
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senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commiSSIOners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court,
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Sta.te had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of rrespondent's class I the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S .. at\
628. ln my view the District Court correctly found that
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp .. at 90.
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not ckarly
erroneous.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. A11te, at
14. Pf'rhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not presPnting more Pvidence than it did. But until today's decision one
ma.y doubt whether many lawyers. familiar with our cases.
would have thought that respondent's statistics. under tlw
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago C'ounty.
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in thif; remote border county a.re manipulating
nt 330. He ha ~ onJ_,. thr right " to rrquirc that the State not clelibemtely
and s ystrmaticall~ · deny to rMrxiran-Americans] the right to participate
us juror:; in till' admini:stration of ju:stie{·." Alexander, 405 U. S., at
028-629.
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them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed tpe jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for fincling
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the Pilstrict
Court.
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join. dissenting.
The evidence relevant to tho issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three cate-gories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represented on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the politicai
dominance and control by the M exican-American majority in
Hidalgo County. I agree with the District Court that in light
of all the evidence respondent failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination. 1

j

A strong cal'c might hP made thnt. claims of gmnd jnry di ~ crimination
a.re not cognizable on fpflpm] habrn:< eorptt~ a.ftrr Stone v. Pow!.'!/,- U.S. f
(197o). Tn Ston!.' wP lwld that "'"h"re the ~tate h [t~ provided an
opportunity for fnll and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a
state priRoncr may not lw grantPd federal halwa ~ corpnR relief on the
ground t.hnt evidence obtained in an unronstitntionnl ~enrch or ~ciznre
was introdurrd at his trin.l." !d .. at - . UnlikP the prisoner in Stone,
who could comp!nin thnt. hi:' conviction rrstecl on e'ic!Pnr.c taintPcl by
Fourth Amcndmrnt Yiobtions and could n~k for a new trial with that
evidcnrp cxrludPd, the prisoner in thi~ case chnllon.gcs only thp now moot
determination by thr grnnd jury that there wa.< ~nfficiPnt rn11sc to proceed
1

~
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The Court today holds that a criminal defendant may/
demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely
by showing that the procedure for selecting gra.nd jurors
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinc-J
tions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the
equal protection ana.lysis mandated by our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
(1884). A state defendant cannot complaint if the Sta.te foregoes the institution of the gra.n d jury and proceeds against him
instead through prosccutoria1 information, as many States prefer to do. Sec Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103. 116-119 (1975).
Nevertheless. if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
line of cases beginnin!!; with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100
U. S. 303 (1880). this Court. has held that a criminal defendant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-62!1 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. Texa.s, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404{
(1045). As the Court points out, this right is a.pplicable
to trial. H•o points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Sto11e, the incremental benefit of extending habeas corpus ns a means of corrrcting unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures might be viewed as "outwrighed
by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of
criminal justice." !d., at-.
But as this issue was not addressed below and was not briefed or nrgued
in this Court, it would br innppropriate to rcsoh·e it in this ca~e.
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""hrre purposeful discrimination results only in substantial /
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, sec, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 306 U.S. 34G (1070).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-:::ection of the community." The right
to a "representative" grand jury iii a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit rcquirc'ment of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury undrr the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection
procedure "systematically excludc[s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail [s l to be reasonably representative
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was C'xplicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). a.nd Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-f
ing Development Corp.,- U. S.- (1977). In Atlington
H e1'ghts we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
It may bo that nondisrrimim tory met hods of selection will, ovrr time,
rrsult in n. representative gra.nd .illD'· 8co Carter "· Jury Cnmm'n. ~95
U. S., at 330. But the Fomteenth Amendment docs not mandate that
result. Nothil'Jg would JWe\·ent a State for ex:unple, from seeking to assure
informed decisionmaking by requiring that all grnnd jurors br lawyers
familiar with tho criminal la.w; and if that requirement Rhould result in
substantial undrr-rq1re,rntation on grnnd jnrie~ of some scgmcntl'i of 1hr
community in some areas of the State, the Fourteenth Amendment would
not render tho selection prorc.os uncons1 itutional.
2
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a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . "
-U.S., at-.
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues/ ~
of discriminatory intent or purpose:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattem,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hoplcins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick lVo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence." U. S., at (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.a This is
3 Although Davis and Arlington []eights make clear that proof of discrimmatory intent is required and that proof of impart or effect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the
nature of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of constitutiona1 violation even when the stati~tical pattern does not approach
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630.
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., a.t - n. 13. As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Court found that the disparity between tho-"e figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d.,
at 350. But the Court did not. view the statistics in isobtion. Turner
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointt..d
jury commissioners, who in tum selected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in to1al control. Even though all of the students in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court
had found tha.t, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been systema,tica.lly excluded from the grand jnrirs through token inclusion." !d., at
352. It was against this ba.ckground of pervasive discrimination that the
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representation was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination.
By contrast, in Cartel' v. Ju1'y Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 338-339, isolated
proof that for 12 ycarR no Negro had been appointrd to the jury commission of n. predominantly Negro county was found insufficient, standing
alone, to cstabli~h discriminntory intent.
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In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 7o of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one·
of whom was a Negro (5%>); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy oppo·rtunity
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden
should shift to the Sta.te. !d. , a.t 630.4
I
Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A.lexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
Heights,-U. S., at-.
B
I
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American ,5 and seven
4 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the Sta.te where, as here, those who
control the selection process a.re members of the same class as the person
claiming discrimination. See text infra.
J
5 The District Court noted that the number of Mexica.n-America.ns on
the grand jury might have been higher had it not been for the inability of
the sheriff, a Mexican-American, to locate four of the original members of
the array who were Mexican-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Under-
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of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were
Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent was
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the gTancl jury list were
Mexican-American. Tn addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-Anwrican, as were
a majority of the judg0s. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is MPxican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in tlw District Court, this case 1:s unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the gov0rning majority. and tlw resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
~~~

I

The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-Amcriran. The jury commission is the body
Texas bw, nine of the 12 grn.nd jurorR mu~t concur bdor(' nn indictment
ran be prcsentC'd. Tex. Code Crim. Pror. Art. 20.19 (1906).
G 1 do
not RUggeRt., of rDllfSE', 1hnt the mere fnct thnt 1\fcxicanAmericans constitute a mnjority in Hildnr;o Connty is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to
control or significantly influence political decisions or the way the system
operates. See Turner v. Fo~tche. supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which
a "minority group" ma.y suffer discrimination in a community is where
it is "relegated to ... a position of politica.! powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the MexicanAmericans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect
and protect their own.
Nor do I suggest that pcr8ons in positions of power ran never be
shown to have di~rriminated against other members of the same ethnic
or racial group. I would hold only thnt respondent's statiRtical evidence,
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case.

r
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vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, rational inferences from
the most basic facts in a democratic society render improbable
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate against him
and other Mexican-Americans. As Judge Garza observed, "If
people in charge can choose whom they want, it is unlikely
they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp.
79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may have a natural inclination to favor the de-l
fendant. See Strauder v. ·west Virginia, 100 U. S., at 309.
Were it not for that potential inclination, and for its generalj
recognition in the community, there would be no reason to
suppose that a jury selection process that systematically excluded persons of a certain race would be the basis of any
legitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race.
Only the individuals excluded from jury service would ha.ve a
persona.! right to complain!
I
The likelihood that 1he Mrxiran-Amerirnn rontrolkd jury rommis- 1
sion would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans docs not, in itself,
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commission made its
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the composition
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to concludecorrectly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the
requisite discriminatory intent.. "A broader range of variation should be·
1

75-1552-DISSENT
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

9

In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was onf
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel,
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the courts discre- (
gard this a.ccepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at 1
400-401.
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has "lightly" concluded that the gra.n d jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural predisposition to assure fairness to /
Mexican-Americans.

c

It matters little in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commis..c:;ion
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that MexicanAmericans- while substantial1y represented on the grand jury
tolerated here because the Texas selection system allows the governing
majority [of grand jury commi~sioners] to favor their group when
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90.
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lists-were not represented in numbers proportionate to their
share of the total populatione The State responded by pre- !
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury comnuss10ners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court,
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give riseto such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that theState had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class l the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S., at
628- 629. In my view the District Court correctly found that
the judge and jury commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90.
At the very least, the District Court's finding was not clearly
erroneous.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not present-

S GNothing

in this case remotely resembles the stark cliscrimination in
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this case approach the
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have·
previously found grand jmy discrimination. Peen. 3, supra . In this case,
in the year in which the respondrnt was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans
in tho total population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional
representation" of Mexican-AmNicans, Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S.,
at 339. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately
and systematically deny to [Mexican-America.ns] the right to participate
as jurors in the administration of ju~tice." Alexander, 405 U. S., ~~t
628-629 .

..
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ing more evidence than it did. But unti.l today's decision one
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases,
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under the·
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago County,
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in this remote border county are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District
Court .
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The evidence relevant to the issue of discrirnina.tior1 in thi~
case falls into three categories: first, the sta.t istical evidencf-l
int-roduced by respondent . in both the sta.t e and federal
proCeedings which shows tha.t the 80% Mexictln-Americall
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represented
the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the
state tri~l judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominance and control by the Mexica.n-Arnerican majority in
Hirlalgo County.
The Court today considPrs it dispositive tl)a.t tJ 1e lack of
proportional rei)resentation of Mexican-Americans on the
grand jury list.s in this county would not have occurred if
jurqrs were selected from the population wholly at random.
But one may agree that the disproportion did not occur by
chance without agreeing that it resulted from purposeful
• invidious discrimination. Tn my view, the circpmstances of
this unique case fully support the District Court's fi11ding
. t~n t the statistieal disparity-the basis of today's decision-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes
than from any intent to discriminate · against Ml•xicanAl'nericans.'
~
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The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon-.
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely
by showing that the procedure for sel('Cting grand jurorfi
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his rac0 or tlw
identifiable group to which he belongs. " Ante, at 11. By so
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinctions between the grand and petit juri0s, and misapplies tho
equal protectio11 analysis mandated by . our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S . .116
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complaill if th e State foregoes the institutiou of the grand jury and proceeds again t him
instead through prosecutorial information , as many Sta tes pre~
fer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. , 103, 116- 119 (1975) .
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by th e Equ a l
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
line of cases beginning with Straudet v. W est Virgina, 100
nrc not cognizable on federal habeas corptl ~ after ,~ton e v. Pou•ell. - U.S.
(1976) . In Stone we held that "where the Slate ha ~ prO\·ided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fomth Amendnwnt claim , n,
sta.te pri ~on er rrut~· uot· be gnwtecl fec!Pral habeas c orpu ~ rdirf on t lw
ground that. rvideiH'<' obt:1in ecl in an unronstitutiotrnl searc·h or srizun•
wnH introdncc•d at hi ~ trial.J' !d .. at - . Unllk1· the pri~o twr in Stone.
who rould romplain that h i~ convietion rrstc•d on P\·icl r nrt' taint('(] b~'
Fourth Amrndnwn t violati on;; and could a ~:;k for n llC\1' trial with that.
c·vicknre Pxcluc!Pd , tlw pri~onPr in thi;; c:rsr rhaltengp;,; onl~· the now moot,
detr rmination by thr grand j m~· that there wns suffi cir nt cntt~c· to prorPed
lo frinl. HP point s to no fl nw in the trial itself. As in Slonr, tlw imrcmPntal brnrfit. of rx t r ndin~ habc•as corpu s as n, mrans of rorrr('ting uncon~:d itutiomtl grand jnry ~el ec ti on procrclures migh t be viewed as "outweighed
h.\' lhc a'cknowlrdged ro~ t ~ to other values vital to a rational Ry~ t cm of
criminal just ire." Icl., at.-.
nut as thi ~; issur was not adclrcRsrd below and wns not bridc·d or nr·gucd
in thi: Court , it would he· in:tppropriatc to re,;olve it in this !':t ':'('.

75-i552-DISSENT

ASTA.NEDA v. PARTIDA

U. S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend.
1111t is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination , members of his own race arc exclud<'cl from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Low:siana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 3~!0
U. 8. 320, 335- 337. 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas , 330 U. R.
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. 1'exas, 325 U. S. 398. 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantia.]
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right.
to a "reprcsenta.t ive" grand jury is a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal t)rotection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state proCC'edings-to a representative petit .i ury under the Sixth
Amendment. Sec Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S ..522 (1975).
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendm.cnts arc applieable. a defe ndant need only show that the jury selection
procedure "systematically excludels] distinctive groups in the
eommunity and thereby faillsJ to be reas011ably representative
thereof. " !d., at 538. But in a sta.t e case in which the chalienge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth AmendmeHt
applies. and th e defendant has the burdC'n of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
"Jt, mn~· be t hnt, nondi ~c riminatory me1 hods of selection will. over time,
re~ ult

in a rC'pwsC'n t:ttivC' grand jur~·· SeC' Carter v. J?u·y Comm'n, :)96
U. S., nt 3.10. But !he Fourt•renth Amendmrnt does not mandate th::~t
result. Nothing would prevc•nt a State for rxamplr, from seeking to assure
informrd decisionmnking b~ · rrquiring that nll grand jurors be ln.wyrrs
familiar with the erimiwtl law; and if that. requirrment should result in
~ uhst.nntial undrr-rr pr<''i<'ntntion on grnnd juries of some ~C'grnrnts of the
romrmmity in ~o rnr arc:1s of 1hC' State, th r Fourteenth AmC'ndmcnt would
not. rend<·r the srl<'ction prorrss un con ~ titution a l.

75-1552-DISSEN1'

CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

Proof of discl'iminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 420
U.S. 229 (1976). and Arlington He·ights v. Metropolitan How; ...
ing Development Corp.,- U. S. (1977). In Arlington
Heights we said:
"Om· decision last Term in Washington v: Davis, 426
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not itTelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' ld., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause...•"
-U.S., at-.
We also identified the following standards for resolving
pf discriminatory in teut or purpose:

is~ues

"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumst~ntial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern.
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Go?nillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is thon relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a. pattem as stark as that in Gom·illion
ot· Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and tho
Court must. look to other evidence." U. S., at (footnotes omitted) .
'I
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.R This is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. R. 625 ( 1972), where we stated:
"The C'ourt has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has. rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
a Although Dav'is and Arlinytun Heiyhts make clear that proof of dis~
criminatory intent is required and that proof of imp11ct. or (•fl'ect, alone
is not, sufficient, we did recognize in Arlinyton Heights that. a les:>er burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Berause of the
nat.ure of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of ron~ •
stitutional violation rven when the stati!ltical pattern does not nppro11ch
the ext.remes of Yirk Wo or Gomillion." !d., a t - n. 13. As onr illustration, we cited T1trner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the stat.istical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general popula.tion and 37% of those included in the gra11d jur~' list.
The Court. found that the disparity between those figures was not, so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a fedora) court. !d.,
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the statistics in isolation. 'l'ume1·
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's pt'Cu!iar sy,.:trm of
appointing the county board of rducation. The circuit judge UJlpointul
jury commissioners, who in turn ~elected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students iu
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil ha.v'ing transfrrrrd
e!sewheve, alt of t.hf> membE>rs of the board of educa.tion wrre whit<', ns
were all of the members of the jury commission. The Dio;trici Court.
had fOtmd thn.t.. until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had bern systematically excluded from thr, grand juriE>s through token inclusion." ld .. at
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimir1ation that the
Court found that even a new grand jur~· list with 37% Negro rrprc:'entation was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination.
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury C'omm'n, 396 U. S., at. 338-339, i;;olatrd
proof thnt for 12 ~·ears no Negro had been appointed to the jury commission of a predominant!~' NE>gro eounty was found ins\rfficicnt, standing
alone, to establish discriminatory intrnt.

I'
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of potential Negro gralld jurors is indeed striking he1•e,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alolle, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630.
Tn Alexander, the evidence showed that 21 r, of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
nwmbcrs "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only Oil('
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted'striking." Y <'t the statistics were not found, in isolation. to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
tlw selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrimination" was the Court sa.tisfied that the hurden
should shift to the State, ld., at 630.·'
4 The Court's reli:mre on "the opportunity for discrimination '' 1101 c1!
in Ale:cander. ante, nt 11-14, is rlearly mi::;piRcrd. Th(' Comt ha.,; hc•ld
rrprrtt rdl~· lhnt the Texa system of 8f'lecting grand juror::; by thr u~r of
jur~· C'OmmisHionrr~ i1< ·'fair on its fnc(' and capable of being ut iliz<•d wit bout discrimirattion.'' Ilenwndez v. Texas, 347 lJ. S. 475 . ..f-71<-4-79 (195-1) :
nc<'ord, ::>mith '' ·Texas. 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The "subjretiYity" of
thr selection systrm cuts in fnvor of the St.atc where, n.· lwn', tho;;r whn
rontrol the . rlcrtion process are members of tlw sa me cl:t>'s n,.; the IJC'r:-:on
claiming di:>crimination. Sec text infra.
Apnrt from Alr!:ca11der nnd 'l'uru er, :-;ec• n. :~. supra. rhis Conrt b:1 ~
>'ll~l :tined r]a im ; of grand jury clisr.rimination in ( WO Ritua tions. :\J o;;( 01"
tltr• ea~e:< involvr totnl rxclu;;ion of mi11orilie::; from p::tr1icipntion on g;rnnd
jmiP:c ,4, lltild .. Mort h Carolina, ·~;g V. B. 713 (191! '1) (r~e }lP!!(l't! j~.~.~:~·•
iA ill :··uu'i ·). 8tebanhs v. f.~oui~; ..anu, :]56 F. 8. 6tl1 (196f) (no )rc ~rQ
.i~o~n11, i11 ij' PI' HI·'"'"'·') ; Rer!C<' v. Georgia. :l50 U. 8. ~5 {'1953) (no ~rgw
juror~ ill' lK Year::;): 1/eruandcz \'. Texa s, :3-1:7 U. 8 . . 4;75 (1954) (no
.\lr•'\icarl-1\nwri<·an jmor:-: ill 25 ymrs): Patton v. Missis~;ippi. :3:3~ U. S.
~(i:l ( J9 17) (no :\<•gro jmor~ iu 30 ~·ea.r:'): //ill \'. 'l'exos. :nG l . S. 400
(1!_1·12) (no :'\rgro gmnd jnror:-; in Hi ~·c:u~ or morr); Pierre v, /,ouisiana,

I
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Considered together, Davis, Arhnuton H eights. and !lle:r~
a11der make' clear that statistical evidence showing undl'rn'pl'esontatioll of a population group on the grand jury lists
should lw considered in light of "such other l circumstantial
and dirrct evidc'nco of intent as may bE:' available.'' A rlin{!tun
He-i ghts,- U.S., a t - .

r

B
fn this case. the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
prcsiciNI over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of thf' five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amel'ican; fiw of tht> 12 grand jurors who returned the indictnwnt.
including the foreman , were :M exican-American." and seven
of thr 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt "'C're

-----------..._1 'le1jLtrrl.S
N.J.1ro

:)()() l l. R. :~54 (1934) (
· : . · r in 40 ;.:en r>'); 1/a/e v. 1\.e/ltu r- k!/.
:m:3 !T. S. (il;~ (19:~8) (no Nr~m ,]uror~); Norris v. Alabama. :2!.!.1 r. S .
.)K7 (J0:iii) (no ~PI!:I'O juror~ in ll '' long: num lwr '' of ;.·Pa r~); l? r•ucr.< 1·.
Alabama. 192 l l. S. 226 (1904) (no NP!!:I'O jmor~); ('artf'l' ,.. Te.ras. 1/i
!'. S. 44:2 (l !JOO) (no ~ '!.'( 1'0 ju1or~): Hush 1·. Kc nllt"k!f, 107 11. S. llO
(II'~:~) (no ~rgro juror~); Neal 11. D eloll'n7'f', 10:3 F. S. :l70 (11-\i'O J (no
Xq1;ro juror ;); Strauder v. Ires~ Virginia, 100 U. S. 30:3 (1~~0) (no
\'Pgro jurors). Thr rrmaindrr of thP ra~<'ii involv<' srvere limitntion of a
minorit;.· '" p:1rt iripn t io!J by rokc•n inclusion: Sims v. Ocoroia. :lS9 l ;. S .
.f().f (HHii) (Nrgro<'~ con~ritntir•g 2-l.4% of tlw tuxpayrn; limited to 4.7<1,
of t host' on th<' grand jury liHt); Jon es v. Q<'oroio, ;~~9 U. H. :24 ( l!JI\7 I
(.\rgro(·~ C'OI!Htitnting HJ.i% of tlw tnxpn)·<·r~ limit t>d to 5.0 <'~ of thosP
on th(' .imy [i , t): Whitus v. Ut!orgia. :3S.'i !J. S..545 (10tii) (\'rgror·'
constituting 27.1% of tl](' tn>.payNs limit rd to 9.1 % of tlw grand .im;.·
.~---\-.(-.n-:-ir...<>-:-)"; Cn88ell ,.. Texas. :r~9 U. ~- 28:2 (19.50) (limitation of ol!r l\'r~ro
juror on raeh panel); Smith, .. '!'c.ras. 811 U . S. 1:21:' (l9i0); (5 ~c·gm
gnt nd jmor~ in :1 i ·;.·r:: r period) .
r. The Di~trirt Court notPd thnl the nntnb(•r of :\fexiean-Amrrir:ms 011
lh(• grall(l jur~· might hav<' bern highrr had it r1ot hrl'n for, thr inability of
the· Rhrrilf, a Mrxi<'au-Aut(•ri(·an , to locat<' four of thr origiwd membr1·~ of
thr arr:t.l' who \\'PW ::\Ic•xi(•nn·Amerir::tn. :3S.f F. Snpp. 79, 83. Um!Pr
Trxn~ lmr. nin<' of thr 12 gral!(l juror" ruust ('OtH'11r before mt indirlmPltl
l•a11 h(' JHP~('I!Ic·d. Tex. Code• C'rim. Pnw. Art. 20.19 (1960).

Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964)
(one Negro juror in 24 years)·
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 u.s: 584 (1958)
(one Negro JUror 1n 18 years);
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Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent wM
indicted, 52.5 7c of the persons on the grand jury list were
Mexican-American. In ~dditi~n ,' a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power aud
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the Dis.trict Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials. 6
The most significant fact in this case, aU but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
W<'re Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by: the Court.
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
o I do not suggr;,t., of c•ourst>, that the mere · fact thnt ·~d(•xic·a n,
Americans constitutf' a majority in Hildago County is diRpositivr . There
are ·mnny rommunitie~ in whirh , by virtue of historical or otlwr reu ~ou s,
a majority of the populnt.ion may not be able at a particular tinw to
control or significant.Jy influt>rwe political deciRions or the wny thC' system
opcratRs. Sc>c Turnn· v. Fouche, SU]Jm . But no ont> cnn eoptend st' riously
thnt Hildago County is such a community. The rla,:sic sit uation in which
a "minority group" mn~· suffer discrimination in a community i;; where
it. is " relcga.trd to .. . a po~ition of politicnl powrrlcRsncs:>." San Antonio
School Distri.ct v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (197.'3) ·. Hrre the MexicanAmericans nre noL politicnlly " powC'rle,:s"; they are the mn.joritminn
llolitieol rlC'mcnt of the cqmmunity, with demonstrated copnbility to elect
und prot ect. their own.
'
Nor do I .,:nggP,.:I. thnt pN~OJl:< in posi tions of power cnn never be
Hhown to have discrimiua t('d 11gaiust ot hrr mcmbrn; of tlw ~H ITIC' ethnic
o1· ral'inl group. I \\'onld hold only that rC'spondent 's stn ti.~t ieal cYidc>nee,
widHlut more, is lll ~u!Tirient to proYe a elaim of di;;(•riminaOon in this case.

15- 1552- DISSENT
CA TANBDA v. PARTIDA

identify in advance thosE> potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-American~
,control both the selection of jurors and the political process,
rational inferences from tho most basic facts in a democratic
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against them~
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than agu.inst. those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See
Straudcr v. West Virginia, 100 U.S., at 309. Were it not for
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of
thf'ir own class. there would be no reason to suppose that a
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate compJaiut by criminal defendants of that nice. Only the indivi~uals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain.
In A Ieins v. 'Pe:ras, supra, where apparently no Negro was on
the jury commissio11 and only one of 16 was on the jury panel,
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to
brand officers of tlw court with discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of tliscriminatory practice in sf'lecting a
grand jury panel challf'nges an essential element of
proper judicial proccdurf'-the requirement of fairuess on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with pf'rsons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be rOJ)rludf'd that officers of the courts discte-

I

I
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325 U. S., at

gard this accepted standard of justice."
400-401.

With all respect, I am compe1led to say that the Court today
has ulightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but
also their likely inclina.t ion to assure fairness to McxicaHAmericans. 7

c

It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebl,Jtting it after it, was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either hy
presenting proof or by calling attention to fa.cts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced sta.tistics showing tha.t MexicanAmericans-while substantiaUy represented on the grand jury
lists-were not represented in numbers proportionate to their
share of the total population. The State responded by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commiSSioners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
the county. entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court,
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
I

7

r agrer

with 1\fn . .f l'KTJCE MA HSliA LL. ante, at 3, thnt Htr r eot ~· p r~ ('CI)r0rning identifin blr c l n~:;<'s in our ;;ociPty havr no place in thr dPc is i on~ of
t hi~ Court. Tha t is n compelling reason . in my vil:w, not to apply
~ t a t b ti r al formul:ls and , tatrment.s of con cern about di sc rr tionn r~ · HClC'C·l iou prorPdure>'-drvrloped in wholly different cirrum;;;tances, ~e<· n. 4,
~ u pra-to the rt\'S pondr nt 's claim of discriminatio1' against MexicnnA tnP ric·n n~< in th ~.,; 1111iqm' Mexicnn-Am<'rirnn coUun.unity .

•

~
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assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise
to such a burden. Accordingly. at ·the close of the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evide11ce that the
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied I to members of [respondent's class] the right to participate as juror·s
, in the administration of justice." A lexauder, 405 U. S.. at
628- 629. The District Court found that the judge ami jury
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least.
that finding was not clearly erroueous. 8
The C01.1rt labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.e, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not presenting more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our ca~Ps,
would have thought tha.t respondent>s statistics. under the
eircumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County.
were even a.rguably sufficient to establish deliberate and sys' tic discl'imi na.tion.
temtt
.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statisti~s that the Mexican-Americans who control the lev('J'g
" Xothing in this easr remotely re~embles thr stark cjiscriminntion ill
Gomillioa ;tnd Yick Wo. Nor do the Hta.tisties in this r:lilr approach thl'
degri'C of exclusion that has charaCt('rized thr CH!:'CS in which we ha\·e
pl't'viou><l~· found grand jur~· diserimination. Sre n. 3. su7n:a. In this ea"~'·
in the yrnr in whieh the rrspondent wns indieted, 52.5% of the J1C'r8on~ on
the grnnd jury li~ts wrrr Mexican-Amrrican. Ante, a.t 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupation with the disparity of reprei:ient.ation of Mexic11n-AmeriennH
in the totRL population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loso:s sight of
thd ronstitutioual standnrd. Hrspondent has no right to ''proportinual
reprel:'('ntntion" of J\frxiean-Amrrirans, Cartel' v. Jury Cnmm'n, :l9fi {]. H..
nt 339. He has only the right "to rcqnire that the State not clPlib('I'Hfely
and systemriticfllly den~' to [Mexicnn-AmPric:ms] the right to pnrticipate
as jurors .i11 the aclmini~tmtion of ju;;tiec." Alexandel', 405 U. S., at

628-,629.

J .
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of pmwr in this remotl.' honlC'r county ar<' ma.nipulat,ing
them to discrimina.t<' "against th<'msel vPs." Tn contrast, the
judges on the scene. the state judge who appoint<•d tl1<' jury
commis ·ioners and pr<'sidf'd ov<'r respondf'nt's tl'ial and the
l .llikd Stat<'s District Judge- both Nl<>xican-An1<'rieans and
familiar with the community-- perceived 110 basis for rPspond ent's claim of invidious diRcrimination.
l t ~('<'InS to me that the Court today, in rejecting tlw Dif'trid ( 'nurt's finding that 11 0 such discrimination took plae(•.
1,,1s <'rn·d grievou~ly. I would reinstate th<' judgnwnt of the
[)j ~. trict Court.
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The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistic~tl evidence
introduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal
proeeedings which shows that the 80o/o Mexican-Americau
majority · in Hidalgo County was .not proportionately represented on the grand jury lists; second. the ·testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts jurlicia.lly noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominaiice and control by the Mexican-American majority in
Hidalgo County.
The Court today considfrs it dispositive that .tl te lack of
proportional representation of Mexican-Amerjc1;1nS on the
grand jury lists in this county would not have occurred if
jurors were selected from th e populatioll wholiy at rando)n .
But one may agree that thf disproportion· did not occur by
chance without agreeing t hat it resulted from purposeful
· invidious discrimination. In my view, the circumstances of
this unique case full y support the District Court's fi11ding
tl{a t t he sta tistical diepar:ty- the basis of t oday's d<'ciswn- Is more jikely to have stemmed from ~1. utral eauses
than from a.ny intent to discriminatD ·against M('xicallAmericalis.t
1
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A
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon.,
rstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merrly
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurorfoi
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his rae€' or tlw
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinctions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies tho
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury docs not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. Cal1:jornia, 110 U. S. 516
(1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against hirn
instead through prosecutorial information, as mauy States prefer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-110 (1075).
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints ih1posed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Ameudment. Thus in a
line of cases beginning with Straudet v. West Viryina, 100
arc not cognizable on frdcrnl habca::; corptls aftrr -~tone v. Pou•ell.- U.S.
(1976). In Stone we lwld that "where the Statr h:1s providt•d an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fotlrth Amrndmrnt claim, a
<'fa.tr pri~oner tru1~· not br gr<IJltrd frdrral habra:-; roqm~ rrlirf on 1he
g!'Ound thnt rvidenrc• obtained in an unron~titutional srnrch or seizure•
wnH introduced at hi~ trial. l> !d .. at - . Unlike· thc pri~olirr in Stone.
who could complain that hi,.; convietion rC',.;ted on P\'idC'nN' taintrd h~,
Fourth Amrndmrnt. violations and rould ao:k for n t1cw trial with thnt.
C'\'icl<•nrc rxrludNI, tlw pri~onrr in thil:' cnsr rhaliPngr:,: on]~· t hr no\\' mooL
det0nnination by th£> gmnd jnry that ihrr£> was sufficient rn\1~(' to proreed
to trial. HP points to no flaw in thr trinl itself. As in StmU', thr inrremC'ntnl benefit· of rxtending hah0m; C'Orpm; ns a meam; of rorrerting unron"
:,:litutionnl grnnd jmy ~rlertion proerdures might be viewed ns "outweighed
lJ.,. the acknowledged rost~ to other valucs vital to a rational sy~tcm of
criminal justirc." !d., a t -.
Hut as this isRuc was noL addrc;;~cd below and w:1s not brirfrd or argued
in thi,;; Court, it 1\'oulcl Jx- inappropriatr to re.;;olvc it in thi~ <':l::i(\
-
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U.S. 303 (1880) , this Court. has held that a criminal defend.
ttnt is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination , members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'11, ~~\){)
r. S. 320, 335-337. 339 (1970); Cassell v. Te:ws, 339 U. S.
282. 287 (HH50); Aki11s v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398. 403- 404
(1945). As the Court poiuts out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimina.tion results only ill substantial
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970) .
But a state defendant has 110 right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right
to a "representa.tive" grand jury is a feclera.J right tha.t derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand .i ury .
That right is similar to the right-applicable to· state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the ~ixth
Amendment. SPe Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975).
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable. a d~fcndant need only show that the jury selection
procedure ."systematically excludels] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative
thereof." /d., at 538. But in a state case in which the chalfcnge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies. and the defendant has the burcl<'n of proving a violation of thr Equal Protection Clause.
"Tt mny bc• t hilt. nondi ~c riminator~· mC't hods of l'C'lectiqn will. over tinw,
r<'8tdt in n i·Ppn,,.Pntntive grnnd jury. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n , :m6
t . S., at 3~0. Bu t tlw Fourt•C'e nth Amendment does not mandate that
rC'sult. Nothing woHlcl prevPnt a StBte for C'Xmnple, from sC'eking to assure
informC'd decisionmaking b~ · rrquiring that all grand jurors bC' lawyers
fllfnilinr with the rrimi11n! lnw; and if that requirement ~ hould result in
Rub:-;tantial llndrr-rP prP~ <'nf:ttion on grand juries of some segment.s of the
romrnunit y in ~ orrw are:l ~ of tlw State, th<' Fourteenth Amendment would
not. rendc·r the :-eiPction pro r r~s un c on ~ titution ul.
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Proof of disct•iminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Dav'is, 420
U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington He'ights v. Metropolitan Hous.
ing Development Corp., U. S. (1977). In Arl-ington
Heights we said:

"Our· decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 42()
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not iiTelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' ld., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, ..."
-U.S., at-.
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues
pf discriminatory intent or purpose:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of iutent as;
may be available. The impa.ct of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another, "
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern.
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. YicA: "JtVo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a, pattern as stark as that in Gom,illion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Comt m.ust look to other evidence." U. S., at (footnotes omitted).
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.R This is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
40.5 1 . S. 625 ( 1972). where we stated:
"The Court has never announced mathematical sta.ndards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
a Alt.}iough Davis and Arlington Heights make clea.r that proof of dis~
criminfttory intt>nt is required nnd thnt proof of impact or eft'ect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a. le::;ser burden
ma.r be appropria.tt> in the eontext of jury selection. "BecausH of the
nature of the jury selrction tqsk ... we have permitted a findin~ of con~
stitutionnl violation rvPn when the statiE'tical pattern does not appronch
the t>xt.remes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." Id .. at n. 13. As Oil<' Jllustration, we rited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the stflt.istical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 130%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the gram! jury list.
The Cou.r t, found that the disparity between those figures was not, so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal (•ourt. !d ..•
at 350. But. the Court did not. view the statistics in isola.tion. Turner
was J)Ot a criminal case; it involved instPad Georgia's I)('CU!iar sy,;trm of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointtd
jury commissioners, who in turn !'elected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this ;;y;;tt>m
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of t.he studPnts iu
the county schoolA were Negro, every white pupil having tnul8ferrcd
elsewhere, all of t.he mPmbers of the board of education wcrP white, ns
were all of the members of the jury commis.~ion. The District Court
had found tha.t., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been systematically t>xcluded from the grand jurit>s through token inclusion." ld., nt
352. It was ngain~t tl1is background of pervasive discrimination that the
Court found tha.t even a nt>w grand jury list with 3i% Negro rrprCRrntation was the product of continued, purpo~eful discrimination.
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comrn'n, 396 U. S .. nt. 338-339, isolatrd
proof thn.t for 12 ~·ears uo Negro had been appointed to the jury commission of a predominant!~' NPgro county wm; found ins~Jfficicnt, o;tandin!!
alone, to establish di::;criminatory intrnt.
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of potential Negro gra11d jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial dis~
criminatio11 on statistical improbability alone. for the
SPlection procedures themselves were not racially neu~
tral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630.

In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the r£'lcvan t,
community 'n're l'legro; the jury commission consisted of fiv(•
lll(lmbers "all of whom were white." appointed by a \rhit<'
judge; the gnwd jury venire included 20 persons. only onP
of whom was a Kegro ( 5% ) ; and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. /d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." · Y ct the statistics were not found. ill isola.tio11. to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining th11t
thP ~Wlection system "provided a clear and easy opportu11ity
for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the hurdrn /
should shift to the State, ld., at 630:1
/
4

x

The Court's n•li:111re on " the opportunity for diPcriminiltiou'' uon•t!
itt Alexande1', antr•, at 11-14, is elearl~· mi ~plaerd . Thr Court has hrld
t'l'praL·dl~ · that t lw Trxa" systrm of ~ rlectin~ grand juror:; by 1ilC' u.-;c· of
jur~· commisoiOIH'I'~ i1< "fair on ito fnce and capable of being utiliz<'d wit bout di~c rimimt iou. " If e1'nandez v. 'l'exas. :347 lJ. S. 475, 47S-·H9 ( 1954) ;1
:H·c·ord Smith , .. 'I'Pxas. 311 U. S. 128, 130 ( 1940). Thr "~ ubjl' ot ivit~·" of•
the selertion s~·f' tcm cuts in favor of the Statr wherr, as herl', tho~r whu
rontrol the srlrrtion proress are members of the snrnc clas.~ a::; the prr«on
elniming dii<crimiJHltion. Sec tcxl infm.
Ap:~rt from Jtle.rander a nd T·u1'11 er. >iC'C' n. :3, supra. 1 t•hi ~ Court ha."
~ ll :'f:t i ll<'d ti:tii1H of gr:tlld jur~· di s~ rim ina lion in i WO. s ituations . .:\Jo...;t of
t !JP C'Hl:>C'~ invol vr t ota I exc lu ~ ion of minorit irs from p ~Ht icipa t ion on grand
- jurit)~: "~told<. No;th-b'aJoiJ';zu , !)76 P. ~. 7T!J (19_64) {IJO ?Jq.,tu j'.taliOh
'
W. ') J .'(ttl ' ) j i'1lfHl" 1'1J II , .JtJt:iLi:cf::l, '3~8 b. . . ~. 8t ' l (l96tJ)
(lib ~ ~ t~10
·jlll I i:n 01 (I II ' :·nn ·).j Heer:e /1, Gc01'(Jia. :l50 U. tl . .'\5 (Hl5:i) (no ~l'gro
.Pnor ~ 111 ll' ~·<>:H~); Her11a11dez v. Texas, 847 U. 8. 47!) (1954) (no
\ ] r, iean -. \m cr i<·<~n juror~ in 25 yenrs ) ; Patton ,., Mississip pi. :3:32 U. S
-l(i:l ' (JDii' ) (no \ l•gro juror,; in :30 ~·rar~) ; lli/1 v. Texas. :~Hi tJ. H. 4ll0
1!1·1:1.1 (no ::'\C'f! I'O grnnd jurors in 16 ~·r:H;:; or m orl'); Pierre v. fjouisiana.
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Considt>rccl together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A.le:rrtllder mu.k<' clear that statistical evidence showi n~ undt>rt'('(lrPsc'ntatioll of a population group on tlw grand jury lists
should be COIISidPrecJ in light of "such f Other J circumstan tia]
HIH] direct evidence of intent as may br available." Arlington
Heights, - U.S .. a t - .

B
In this case . the following critical facts are beyond disp
the judge who appointed the jury commission<:'rs
later
presickd over respondent's trial was Mexican-Am' can; thr<'e
of the five jqry commissioners were Mexican- nerican; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array · , ·e Mexican-American; five of tlw 12 grand jurors who r
rned the indictment,
i1~t'luding the. f~reman, were Mexi .n-Ameri.can.r· an~l seven /
ol tlw 1~ pet1t JUrors who retur ed thf' verdict of gmlt wc'r'(' /

no :~Ofi

l l. :4.

:~.'i-t

(19:34) (

Kq~ro: uro

in 40

)'<•nr~);

fla il· "·

[(eu tuci.~S ~

:m;~ P. R. (il:~ (19:{8) (n Nrgro juror~ ; Norris v. Alabama. ~!H l'. ~
~ (J0>L'i i (no "\'(•gro .i nror::: in a "long nurnh r r" or ~·rar.•) : Uo(! r' t" ,.,
tllnballla. Hl~ ll. 8. 326 (Hl04) (no Nrp;ro jmors); ('arter ,.. Te.ws. lii
!'. S . .J-1:? t 1 0~l0) (no \ · ~ro jutor;.:): /Jush \' . Kr•J i/w•ktJ, 107 ll. ~. 110
( ISS:3) (no ~rgro juror~); Neal ''· Delall'are. 10:) l'. S. :ml (lSSll ) (no
:\cgro juror .:): Straurhr "· Jl' est Virgiuia, 100 ll. S. :;o:; (li'SOJ (no

:\<'gro jmon.:). Th<' r<'mnind r r of tiH• ra~<'H invoiv<• ~rv Pr r limJ lal ion of :1
mino rit)··~ pnrtiripatio!l b)· tokc•n inriuHion: Sims v. Ueorgia. ;JS9 l l. t::'.
-!U.J. (HHii) (~q?;rors co n ~ titu t i Pg 2-t.4% of th<' taxpayer:; lirnit ('d to 4 . 7 ~~
of thos1• on tlw gra nd jm)· list); Jones .v. Georyia, :;sg ll. ~. 2-1 ( 19fi71
(;\r·gro<'" rom;tit uting 19.7 % of iiH' ta xpny<' r~ limit ed to 5.0'{ of those·
on tlw jury Ji ,t ): Whitus v. (ieoruia. :;x:i U. S . .5-!5 (lOtii) (:\cgroc•-.:
eonstituti ng :Zi .l % of thr tn>. p:1yers limit rcl to 9.1 °1, of th e• gmncl jm~ ·
wn m· : Cassel/ ,.. 'Pe~·as. :l:lf) U. t-'. 2~2 (1!:11)0) (lin1it:liion of onr ~l'~ro
juror on rac h patH'!): Smith\'. 1'c.ws. :) 11 U . S. 1:2S ( 19 HI); (5 ;\<•gr()
grand juror~ in a 7-~· c·::r p Priod) .
< Thr Di ~trict C'omt nolt•d that tlw numhc•r of i\frxica n-Anwrir::u1s 011
the gram! jur~· might havP lwPn highrr Jwcl it not hl'Pn for thl' inability of
thr f'hrrilf, a J\lrxieaJt-Auwric:lll, to locnk four· of th r origitllli mrmhrrH or
th<' arm.'' \l'ho \l'rrr :\fr xi rn n-A mPrirnn . :l84 F. Snpp. 79, 8:3. ll uckr
' 1' (':"\:1 ,; IH\\'. nin P of tl\(' 1:2 grand juror~ mn~t <'OIH'IIr before :Ill indirtmelt(
/
•·an ht• Jll'<'~t' lll('d . Trx. Co<l•· ('rim. l'ror. Art. 20.19 (19t:iiil.
_/

Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964)
(one Negro juror in 24 years)·
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 u.s: 584 (1958)
(one Negro JUror ~n 18 years);
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Mexican-American. In the ye~,tr in which r~pondent w:u~
indicted , 52.5% of the persons op the grand jury list were
Mexican-American. In ~ddition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials. 6
The most significru1t fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion , is that a majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court.
ante, at 11- 14, the jury commission has the opportUJ)ity to
o I do not ~ uggr~ t., of I' Our~e, that the mere fact that ).1Irxil·anAmericnns constitutr a majorit~· in Hildago Count~· is dispositi\'C'. There
are mnny communitieR in which , by virtue of historical or otlwr rca ~on ~,
a mnjority of the populntion may not be able at n particttlnr t.ime to
rontrol or ~ignificant.Jy inAurnce political deci~ions or thr, way thr s~·s tem
operates. Sec Tul'ner v. Fouche, su7>ra. But no one cnn cont end st>riously
thnt Hild11go County is such n. community. The cla ~si c . ituation in whieh
a "minority group" ma~· r;ull'(•r discriminntion in a community is where
it Is "rclcgat ('([ to ... a position of political powcrlc~snP ss." Son Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973) . Here the MexicanAmericans are not politirnlly "powcrle;:s"; they are the mn.joritarian
politica.J olrmcnt of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect
tmd prot ect their own.
Nor do I :m~gP~ t that pN~ ou ::; in positions of power cnn nC'ver be
;;howu to lmv1• di~c· riminntcd ngainst othrr mrmbrrs of the "amr ethnic
or r:tl'ial gmnp. T 1\'0ttld hold o11ly that m;pondrnt!s s tati ~ tiral cddence,
wii hout more, is m;;nffirirnt to proye a elnim of dis1•rimina(j{)lt in this cuse.

75-1552-D ISSENT
CA TANEDA v. PARTIDA

I

identify in advance those potA>ntial jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstancPs, where Mexican-Amc•ricanEJ
,control both the selection of jurors and the political process.
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratie
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminatP against him and other Mexican-Americans. As
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom
they want. it is unlikely they will discriminate against themft
selves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That in<.lividuals are more likely to discrimina.t e in favor of.
than against. those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defenda.nt. has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. ::-lee
Straudcr v. West l'irg1:nia, 100 U. S., at 309. Were it not for
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of'
their own class. there would be no reason to ' suppose that a
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate comj)]aint by crimillal defendants of that race. Only thl:' individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain.
Ill Akins v. Texas, supra, where appa.rently no Negro was on
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel,
~he Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to
brand officPrs of thr court with discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory pr.actice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an css0ntial element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness Oil
tiH' part of the judicial ann of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot light~y he coticluded that officprs of the courts discte•

•

75-1552-DISSENT
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

gard this accepted standard of justice."
400-401.

325 U. S., at

· With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but
also their likely inclination to assure fairness to MexicanAmericans. 7

c

It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
preseilting proof or by calling attention to faets subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systE>matic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here,. respondent produced statistics showing tha.t MexicanAmericans-while substantially represented on the grand jury •
lists-were not represented in numbers proporti
~~..f?':'-n:;-;;e:7.m::-:.,...C~---:::;.
share of the total population. The
responded by presenting the testimony of the · ge who appointed the grand
jury commissioners.
er facts. such as the presence of
Mexican-America1 n a majority of the elective positions of
the county, e1 red the record through judicial notice. The
gether with the facts noted by the District Court,
satisfy the State's burden of pr~duction-even

~I

agree with MH . .ft:sTIC~<; MAHSHALL~ that :,;tt>reot~·pc•.:; <·cnrrnung iclentifiablr clas~<·s in our ~oriety havr no pT:l'Ce ,in the cl<' rision,; of
thi~ Court. Thnt i-; n comprlling n•ason , in my view, not to apply
stati;:ti<·al formulas :mel ,1ntements of conrern about discrrtionarY sclrrt ion proredur~-dcvrloped in wholly different cirrumsta~ccs, sc:e n. 4,
wpra~to the rrspondent's claim of discrimination ag11in ~ t MexicanAt.t)h-ieans in thi,~ uni<{ttf' ;\fexi.cnn-Am<~riran community.
I •

'fl'

,,

3/17/77

Rider, p. 10, n.7, 1st • (Casteneda)

Cf} M~

.

Just1ce Marshall views the

Mexican-Americans of Hidalgo County as a "minority
group" and suggests that these Mexican-Americans may
have adopted "the majority's negative attitude towards
the minority," much as "many Jewish prisoners [in Nazi
concentration camps] adopted the values and behavior
patterns of their Gestapo guards."

Ante, at 3.

The citizens of Hidalgo County, both Mexican-American and
Anglo, may be more than a little astonished by this comparison.
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assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise
to such a burden. Accordingly, at ·the close of the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Rtate had "deliberately and systematically den [ied I to members of [respondent's class] the right to pa.rticipat<> as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. R~. at
628- 629. The District Court founcl that the judge and jury
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least.
that finding was not clearly erroneous."
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant.c, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not p r e s e n t /
ing more evidence than it did. But until today's uccision one
n~ay doubt whether many lawyers. familiar with our cases
would have thought that respondeut's sta.tistics. under· tlw
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County.
w~~re: even a.r guably sufficient to establish deliberate and systemritic discrimina.tion.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on tlw basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the lev<'r'S
~ 2\"othing in this ca~P remotely re~embles thr stark discrimination in
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the sta.tistics in this cn~e approach the
degree of cxcluf'ion thnt has charactrrized the ca~,;es in !which we hn,·(•
previou,;l~· found grand. jury di~crimination. See n. a. SU7JI'U. In this ('ili'C,
in the yeflr in which the rrspondcnt was indicted, 52.5% , of the J:>eri'on~ on
the gmnd jury li:sts werP Mexican-AmPrican. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupation with the disparity of reprc~entation of Mcxican-Amcrirnns
in the tot.al popul11tion and on thr grnnd-jury lists, the Court lost'S >"ight of
the ronl'titutionnl :shmdard. Hf'spondNtt has no right '
"proportinn:d
reprc~Sentfltion" of .Mrxi(':tn-Arnf'rirnns, Carter v . .hp-y Cmmn'u. a9fi !J. R..
nt 339. He has on!~' the right "to require thllt the State not ddiberatdy
and sysfemntically den~· to I Mexicnn-Americans] the right to pnrticipntr
as · jurors .in the :Himini~tration of jm;tiec." Alcxa.nder, 405 U. S., at
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of pow<'r in this rrmot<' border eounty arc ma.nipulaf,ing
them to discriminate "against themselvc·s.'' Tn contrast, the
judges on the scene. the state judge who appoill tr·d thr jury
com m is ioners and presidf'd ovC'r rcspondrn t's trial and the
P n ited Statrs District Judgr-both MPxican-:\nwricans and
fn 111 il iar with the community- perceived 110 basis for r<>spondf' nt's claim of invidious discrimination.
l t "'f'C'ms to me that the Court today. in rejcctiiig tlw Dist ril"t Court's finding that no such discrimination took plae<',
l,;lf: f'IT<' d grievously.
I would reinstate the judgmf'Ilt of the
l )jq rict Court.

F.. lLE "CU.t:;) _:.
PLEASE RETURN
IYl~K

TO FlLE

1 8 1977

5th DRAFT

..SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 75-1532
' Claudio Castaneda,
Sheriff,)On Writ of Certiorari to tho
Petitioner,
United States Court of Ap=
v.
peals for the FHth Circuit.
Rodrigo Partida.
[February --, 1977]
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and
Mn. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the sta.te and federal
proceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represented on the grand jury lists; second. the testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third. the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority i11
Hidalgo Cou11ty.
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans on the
grand jury lists in this county would not have occunw1 if
jurors were selected from tlw population wholly at random.
But one may agnJc that the disproportion did not occur by
chance without agreeing that 1t resulted from purposeful
invidious cliscrimination. rn my vie·w, the circumstances of
this unique case fully support the District Court's fi.11diug
that the statistical disparity--the basis of today's decision-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes
than from a11y intent to discriminate against MexicanAmericans. 1
1 ,\
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A
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demon-..
strate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurors
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinctions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 51G
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand .fury and proceeds aga.inst him
instead through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (HJ75).
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Ji:qutll
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in n
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West l!irg1:na, 100
on frderal hnbeas rorpu~ aftPr Stone v. Pou•ell.- l i. ~ .
In Stone we lwlcl · that "whrre the State hn~ provid<·d au
opportunit y for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendmrnt elnir11 , a
~t:t.t(' pri~oner ma~· not. be grautPd frdPntl hnbe:u< corpn~ rPlief on 11r('
ground t.hat. c vickncP obtained in an tllll'Onstitutionnl 8e!lrl'h or ~Pi7.tii'P
wa.~ introduced :1t hi~ trial." !d .. at . Unlike the pri~on<'r in Stoll e.
who l'Ould complain that hi~ ronviet ion rr,;tl'd on evidPncC' t:tiutrd hy
Fourt.h Am(·ndment violation~ :~nd could a"k for n nc•w trial wii h that.
L·viden('C n:-.clucl~·d , tltt> pri,mwr in · thi~ rn~r ch;t.lleng(',.; only 1'l1c now ntool
cldrrmination ),~· tht> grand jur~· that thrre w;ts :,;uHicicnt ca1t"P to proePcd
to trial. He point" io no fhn1· in tlw trial itself. A~ in Stolle, the incrrwcnlal bcnrftt ol' t·xtrnding h;tbr;ts ('Ol'llUH a" a means of correding tlli<'Oll stitutionul grand jury "rlectwn pro('rclures might be viewed as "ou1weiglwd
h~r the acknowlrdged eosts to other value, vital to a rational system of
criminnljnstice." ld., at - .
Hut aR tbi. i~~tH' was uot addres8rd below and was not briefrd or Hrgucd
tn this Cuurt , it would be inappropriate to n'~ulvc it 1n i hi;; c·a ~ e .
ttre not

-

cogniz~tbk•

( 1970).
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U.S. 303 (1880), this Court has held that a criminal defend ..
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comrn'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 287 (1950); Akins v. 'Pexas, 325 U. S. 398, 403- 404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show tha.t the jury selection
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative
thereof." I d., at 538. But in a state case in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
It may be that nondiscriminatory methods of selection will , over time,
result. in a represcntativP grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Cornm'n, 396
tJ. S., at 330. But the Fourbeenth Amendment does not mandate that
result. Nothing would prevent a Stnte for example , from seeking to assure
informed decisionmaking by rrquiring that all grand jurors be lawyers
familiar with the criminal law; and if that requirement should result in
subsiantial uuder-rcprcsrntation on gra nd juries of some seg ment~; of the
eommunity in some nrens of t he Stnte, the Fourteenth Amendment wot~ld
~1ot render 1he selection pl·ocess unconstitutional.
2
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated ill our rpcent decisions in Washinoto11 v. DaV1:s, 426
'U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitam. Housing Development Corp.,- U. S. - (1977). In Arlington
Heights we said :
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis. 426
U. S. 229 (1976). made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it rPsults in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purposP is rPquit·<>d
to show a violatio11 of the Equal Protection Clause . . . ."
-U.S., at - .
We also identified the following standards for rcsolvil1g is:-:U('I!
o'f discriminatory i11tent or purpose :
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of i11tent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds othet· than race. emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Y ick lVo v. Hoplcins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick W o, impact alone is not determinative. and the
U. S., at ~
Court must look to other evidence." (!footnotes omitted).

•
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury. 3 This is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Lo11isiana,
405 U.S . 625 (19'72), whrrc we statrd:
"The Court has 11ever announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a fa.ctual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes i11 to account all pos·
sible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
3 Although Davis a.nd Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis~
criminatory intent is required and that proof of impact m· efl'c<.'t alone
is not sufficient, we did recognizE' in Arlington Heights that. a l e~~er burdE'n
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. " B0eause of Llw
nature of the jur~' selection task ... we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the stati~tical pattern does not approac h
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at n. 13. A~; one illm;tration, we cited Tnmer v. Fmtche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) .
In Tnrner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constJtutcd HO%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list,.
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclo8e corrective action by a federal court. !d.,
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isola.tion. Turuer
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculin.r sy~teru of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointu1
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The graud .imy,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of thi~ sysl<>rn
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the studrnt~ in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, Wl
were all of the members of the jury commission. Tlw District Cou rt
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been syHtema.t.ically excluded from the grand juries through token inclu~ion." ld., at
352. It was against this background of JX'I'vn sivc discrimination that the
Court found thnt even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro fl'JH'C'~<' llf ation was the product of continued, purposeful di~crimination.
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S., at 338-3~~9, isolat0d
proof that for 12 ~·0ars no 1\egro had b0rn aprointecl to the jury eommiH-sion of a predominnntly Negro co1mly was found insufficient, sf :mding
alone, ~o C's lablish discriminatory iutrnt.
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here 1
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for Lhe
selection procedures themselves we1:e not racially neu~
tral. ...." 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 pcrsonf< on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. frl., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining thac
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrjmination" was the Court satisfied that the burdC'n
should shift to the State, I d., at 630.4
·~The Court.'s reliance on "the opportunity for discrimin:ltlon" notrd
,in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. Tlw Conrt has lwlcf
repeatedly that the Texas system of selecting gra.n.d jurorH by t be us(· or
jury commissioners i~ "fair on its face and capable of being utilized wit flout. discrimination ." Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954) ;·
'a ccord, Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 130 (1940). The '·subjectivity " or
the selection system cuts in f:wor of tl1e State where, as I1erc, ti1osc wJw
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person
claiming discrimination. See text infra.
Apart from Alexander and Turner, o>ee n. 3, supr-a., thi::; Comt h:~:,
Rusta.iucd rlaims of gr:md jury discrimination, in two ~ituatio11~. Mo~t of
! he case." involvP !otnl rxclusion of minorities from participation on grand
jnriP.": Reece v. Oeoroio, :350 U. S. 85 (1955) (no Negro jmnrH i11 li'ycar~): l!ernondez v. Texas, :147 U.S. 475 (1954) (no Mexi('an-Am,.ricat .l
juron. in 25 year~); Pattorn v . Mississippi. 3:32 U.S. 463 (1947) ~nu ~~·p;1o
jurnrs in :30 .n·ar~); Hill 1·. Texas. :316 P. 8. 400 (1942) (no ~cgru
grand jmurs in 1() .nar,; or morr); !'terre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. :35-1,
(19:34) (no ;\'cgro r~rand jmor~ in 40 years); Hale v. Kenturky , ::;m
U. IS . fiJ:{ (Htl~) (no ?\t·gro .iuror."); Norris v. Alabama, '294 1J. S.
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing undcrrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such f other I circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlingtou
Heights,- U. S., at-.
B
ln this case, thr following critical facts are beyond disp11te :
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three'
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictnwnt.
including the foreman, were Mexican-Americal1, 5 and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were
5N7 (19:55) (no Ne>g;ro juror~ in a "long number'' of yrar~); Nvu!'rs v.
Alabama, 192 ll. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. 'l'f'.m~. 177
C S. 44:2 (1900) (no Negro jurors); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 l 1 • S. 110
(JNS;j) (uo N<·gro juror~); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. ;j/0 (l~NO) (110
\Trgro juror-;); 8trauder Y. ·west Virginia, 100 U. S. 30:J (lK!-.0} (11o
\Tegro juror:;). Tbr rrmainder of tlw case,; involve ~ev<•re limitntio11 of a
miiwrity'~ pnrticipat ion by tokrn inclu ·ion: 8irns v. Georoia. ;~~D \'. t'.
-104 (19fi7) (Nrgroe::; C'On~titnting 24.4% of the taxpayer~ limitPd to 4.7c1r
of 1ho.'e on th<· grand jury list); Jones v. Gcoroia, ;{89 U. S. :24 (.HHi'i'l
(:'\rgro<·~ con~titntiug 19.7 % of thr taxpayrn; limitrd to 1).0~ of tho,-e
on tlw jury list) ; Whitus v. Georgia, :385 U. S. 545 (19117) (1\egro<''
constituting :27.1% of thr t:txpa.'·crH limited to 9.1% of tlw grand jur.'·
vrnire); Anwld v. North Carolina. :m1 U. S. 773 (191)~) (on<· :\q;ro
juror iu 24 year~); Eubank8 v. Loui8iana. 356 U. S. 5i-:4 (1951'1) (<)JH'
:'\<•gro juror in 11-\ yrar"); Cassell v. Tc.'Cas, 3:39 U.S. 2H:Z (HJ50) (lirnihtion of 011(' :'\<•gro juror Oll pae h pallel); Smith v. Texas. :311 l 1 . :-1. u;;
(J9-Hl) ; (5 ~egro grand jurors m a 7-yr:tr pniod).
r. Thr J)i~t riel Comt noted thnt t IH' rHunber of :Vfrxiran-Anwrir:m~ 011
the gr:1nd jury might· hnvr IJP(•n highrr had it not been for thr inability of
thr sheriff, a 1\Jexican-Amrnran, to lornt'l~ four of the origiwrl rnrmbrr" of
the :r.rrny who wC'n' Mrxiran-Americnn. 3S4 F. Supp. 79, 83. Undrr
Trxns law, ninr of thr 12 grand juror" mu"t conrur brforr nn indi'rtmen(
c·an h<• Jli'C'"rll!Pd . Tr-x. Co<ll' Crim . Proe. Art. 20.19 (19fifi)
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Mexican-American. In the ye~r in which respondent WM
indicted, 52.57c of the persons on the grand jury list were
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of th~ judges. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surpnsing in a community where
O«J'n of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District J uclge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in tlw District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has invoh·ed a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the JUry
selection process, wa held hy a white clectorat<> and white
officials.6
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored m the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury connnis ioner~:;
were Mexican-American. The JUry commissiou 11:; the' body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurot':'i.
Und<.'r the Texas selC'ction system, as noted by tlw Court,
rmte, at 11-14, tlw jur·y commission has the opportunity to
0
J do not ~\II!:!?;<'HI, of rour~r, that th<· nwrr faet th:1t :\fP\H';tllAmerirans ronf'tllutc a majority in Hildago ounty ~~ di,;po:<it11·r. There
arp mnny communitirs in whirh, by virtur of lu~torical or othPr rca:-on,,
·1 mnjority of the population may not be able nt a parti('ulnr tim<· to
r-ont rol or l'i~nifirnntly infturiH.'<' pohtiral drri•JOnl' or the w:1~ t h<' ~y>:tem
oprratr8. Rrc 'l'urner v. F'ourhc, .supra. But no onr Pan <'Ontrnd ~<'riously
Ihn t. Illldago County i~ such n. rommunit~·. Til(' rla~.-<ic l"Jt ua tion in whrrh
n "minority group" mn~· ~uiTrr d1~ermunat ion Ill a <'Olllllllllllt~ 1,.. where
tt 11' "rrlrgnted to . . a positiOn of political powPrl<'>'• IH'~"·" Still Antonio
SchoolDi.~tnct \ . Rodrif}uez, 411 F., J, 21\ (19i:;). Ilrrr thr ::\fp-.;wnnAmericans arc not politically "powrrle•s"; tlH ·~ arc tlw maJOflt.'lnnn
political rlrmrnt of thr commun1ty, w1th dPmon,.tra1<'d <'ap:llHlit\ to cl<'ri
and protect. their own.
Nor do I -<u~gr·st that pN.·on~ 111 po,..1t10n~ of powPr <':Ill n<•n•r· lw
.-hown to h:t,.,. di,<·rillliJJ:tl< ·d again"t otla•r m<·mlH•rs of thr ,-amr <•thmr
or ra<·ial gronp. 1 \IOUld hold onl~· th·tt r<·•pond<•JJt\ "talbiH·al ('lidc•n<·,
IYitlHllll IIIOr<'. is Jll"llfJif-H•rtt to pHl\.1' a f•l:tnn of (li,;<•ri rqin:tlion !11 tht" C':t!jQ,

..
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans
control both the selection of jurors and the political process,
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As
Judge Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor· of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S .. at 309. Were it not fol'
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of
their own class, there would be no reason to suppose that a
jury selection process that systematically excluded persOilS
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain.
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury pane],
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent :
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a.
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness 011
thP part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly bP concluded that officers of the courts discre-

• k.
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gard this accepted standard of justice/'
400-401.

325 U. S .• at.

With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today

has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioner .
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty hut
also their likely inclination to assure fairnes to .Mf'xicanAmerica.ns.7

c

It matters little in this case whether such judicially notieeable facts as the composition of the grand j m·y commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's pr·ima facie case nt Uil'
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by statistieal
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limiLI'd
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to lhe
State. Once tlw State has produced evidence- either hy
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subjeet !o
judicial notiee- the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, l'esponclent produced statistics showing that 1\!IcxicanAmerica.ns--while substantially represented on the gratH] jur~·
list _ ,verc llOt represented in numbers proportiona t<• to 1heir·
,\lH. ,]Us'J'H.:E 1\L~HSITALT. \'lew~ t·he :vJt•x Jcnn-Anwncan.-: of Hld:tl).!:o
C'ount.'· ~'" n " minorit)· ~roup" :tnd ~ugge~t~ that ilwse :Vfexi<·nn-AnH·ri(':Jil
ma.1· han· adopt <·d ''1lw m:~jonty's negat1ve :111 it udf.' toward:- I ht· minorir.\' ...
much a~ " man)· Jrwil'h priHonf•rs [in ?\lazi eoncPJJI.ration <'Hillps I adopl< ·<l
flw ralu<·~ and lwhav10r pattrm~ of thrir C:oc;tapo !:(ll:trcb." Alll<'. al :{,
T hP e i1JZ< 'II~ of Hidnlgo County, both MPxican-Amrricnu ami Ang.lo , lll :l,l'
I>•· mon· than :1 ht.tlP nstoml:'hed by this comparison
1 ~tg rrr with :\Ji L .fU tr.I'ICE :'vfABSHALL thn1 ;;terPOt~· pp,; (•()Jl('('i'l\illg·
idc•nt ifia hi<' dussrs in ou r ,-orll'h' h:l\'<' no plarP Ill llw clP"i~ion- qf
f hi" Court. Th:ll 1~ a <·om pPlling, rea:,:on , 111 m~· Yirw, not f o a PI''·'·
.statist!(':\] formulas and ~tat ('ffi<'ll l ~ of conct•rn a bout di,.<·n•t IOll:t r~· sc•lP<'··
t ion procrdun·- dPYc•lop<'d m wholly ditfPr<>nt cirrum,;tnn<'e~. ~<'<' 11. 4,
upra -to the rr~ponclrllt '~ clnim of discrimination agamol l\fpxi<·an·.
7

•t\l,n.<'ricnn~ in I h1~ uni<[llP ;\1<'XIr<ll1-Atl1Pl'll'll ll rotl)Jli111Jlly

.-.

,.
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!!hare of the total population. The State responded by pre~
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commiSSioners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court.
sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give risf'
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that thC'
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to melllbers of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 40.5 U. S.. at
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very kast,
that finding was not clearly erroneous. 8
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the statC' iutroduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not prf'SC'nting more evidence than it did. But until today's decision one
may doubt whether ma.ny lawyers, familiar with our cases,
8

Nothing in this case remotely rt>sembles the stark discrimmation m
~tnd Yick Wo. Nor do the st~ttistics in this case approach the
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have
previou><ly found grand jury discrimination. Sec n. 3, supra. Iu thi:; r~tse,
in the year in which the respondent was indicted, 52.5% of the per~ons on
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. ln its
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans
in the tot~1l population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of
the constitutional stand:ucl. HE'~pondent ha~ no right to "proportional
representation" of MC'xican-AmPriean~, Carter v. Jury Com111'11, ;:1!)6 U.S.,
at 339. He has only the n~ht "to require that the State not deliberately
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate
as juror:; in the administration of justicC'" AleJ;ander, 405 U. S., at

Gomillion

6~8-629.
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would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo County,
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in this remote border county a.re manipulating·
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judg<'S on tlw scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
colllmissioners and presided ov<'r respondent's trial and the
Puit<'rl Stat0s District .Judge- both Mexican-Americans and
fantiliar with th0 community-perceived no basis for respondellt's claim of invidious discrimination.
It S<'ems to me that the Court today, lll reJecting tlw District Court's finding that no such discrimination took place,
has Nr<'d grievously. 1 would reillstate the judgment of. the
Distri('t Court.

· ~·
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join~ dissenting.
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evideuce
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal
1Jl'Oceedings which shows that the 80% Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represt'ntcd on the grand jury lists; second. the testimony of tlw
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operatrd in this case; and third. the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the politieal
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in
.Hidalgo County.
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans 011 thr
grand jury lists in this county would uot have occurrc'cl if~
jurors were selected from the population \wholly at random.
But Olll' may agree that the disproportioi\ did not occur by ~
chauee without agreeing that It resul~ti from purposeful
invidious discrimination. ln my vi0w, the circumstances of
this unique cas0 fully support the District Court's fiudiug
that the statistical disparity-the basis of today's decision-is more likdy to havr stemmed from neutral causes
than from any intent to discriminate against MexicanAmt'ricans. 1
1A

.'

.

.~ tro11g

c:t"t' ma1 he rn:tdP that rhtlllL" of p;r:md ,inrv

ch~rrimination
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A
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely
by showing that the procedure for . selecting grand jurors
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his race or the
identifiable group to which he bPlongs." Ante, at 11. By o
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutioual distinctions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand JUry does not apply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U .• '. 51 G
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the ~tate foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds agaillst him
instead through prosecutorial informatiou, as many States prefer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (1075).
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
Jinc of cases beginning with Strauder v. vVest T!1'rgina, 100
:trr not cogniz:1 hl<• on f<'!kral habt>a~ <'orpu~ a ft!•r .'itonr ". Pm<'ell, l i. :-\ .
(Hl7G). In Stone '''<' ]l('ld that "whcn• tlw Rtat<' ha~ prcn·id<'d au
opportunity for full :tnd fair litigation of :1 Fourth Amrndmrnt <·lnim, a
~1:1 t t' pri;;onl'!" mar not bt• gr:t nt !'d frdN:tl hn b!'a" l'Orpu" rrl it'!" on t IH'
gmund that r,·idt'lll'l' obtained Ill an ltlH'Olli<titutional ~rarl'h or ~(· iwrP
,,·n;; introdm·P<.I at lu~ trial." !d., at - . l.'nlikr thp pri,mwr in Stone .
who rould l'Oillplnin that h1~ <·mwirtion n•::<tNl on Pvid<'n<·(• l:tint<'d h.1
Fourth AnH•iHlntt•nt l'iolation~ :mel could a::<k for n rre11· trial with that.
l'vid<·rH·t• P:~ochr<lt•d, t ht• pri~om•r in t hi~ ca~r challrnp;l'~ only t hl' 11011' mooL
detNmination h)· tht• grand JIIr.'· that thrrr wa;; ~nfli('Il'nt c;~tr~l' to prO('<'l'd
to trial. He polllt::< to no flaw irr tlw trial It~<'ll'. A~ in Stoll!'. thl' inrrrllll'lltal lwnf'fit of (•Xtendmg Jr:ilJl':l~ ('Ol'Jlll" H:< :t ITll'llllH Of C'OI'I'('('t lllg lnl(•()JItititutionnl grand jur~ · ·'<'ic<·trmr pro<·<'durc::; might hr virll·cd a14 '·outwrigiH'd
h~· til<' :trknowlrdgNI l'O;;t::; 1o other values vital to n. rationnl ;o;y~tcm of
crimin[ll .instire." !d., at Tlut a>' thi:-; i~~u<' wa;; not addrP::<O'rd below ami was not brrrfrd or argur<.I
til thi~ Court , 11 wonltl I)(' in:1ppropriate to n•>;oln· it 111 thi>i <·n~<.·

•
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U.S. 303 (1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defend~
ant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are ex~
eluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282. 287 (1950); Akins v. 1'exas, 325 U. S. 308, 40~404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantia.}
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, sec, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is similar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975) .
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are appli~
cable, a defendant need only show that the jury selection
procedure "systematically exclude[s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative
thereof." !d., at 538. But in a state case in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
It mar be that nondiscriminatory m ethods of selection will, over time,
in n reprr.~e nt a tiv e grand jury. See Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396
U. S., nt, 330. But th e Fourt,e enth Amendment docs not mandate that
result. Nothing would prevent. a St a tr for example, from seeking to assure
informed decisiomnaking by rrquiring that all grand jurors be lawyers
familinr with the crirmn:1l law; and if that. requiremrnt should result in
substantial und<>r-repre~r ntati o n on g;rnnd juries of some segments of th e
<'ommunity in i'orne arens of t he S tat e, the Fourteenth Amendment would
not rrndc r the :;election pl·orr;;s unconsti t ut ional.
2

rr~ult,
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washingto11 v. Davis, 426
11. S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Meb·opolitanHousing Development Corp.,- U. S . - (Hl77). Tn Arlington
Heights \Ve said :
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis. 426
U. S. 229 (1976). made it elear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it rPsults in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is r·equir·('(]
to show a violatiou of the Equal Protection Clause. . . ."
-U.S., at - .
We also idc11tified the following standards for resolving issues
of discriminatory intent or purpose :
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of iJJtent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,''
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other· than race. emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the goveming
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yiclc Wo v. Hoplcins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ; Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yiclc W o, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidf'ncE>." U. S., at ~
(•footnotes omitted).
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged dis~
crimination is in the selection of a state grand jury. 3 This is
illustrated by the recent decision in A.lexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. A. 625 (1972), whPre \\'e stated:
"The Court has 11evcr· announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, ratlwr, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary i11 each case that takes into account all possible c>xplanatory factors. The progressive decimation
a Alt.hough Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of dis~
criminatory intrnt. is required and that proof of impact or ell'ect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights tl1at. a le~~rr burd<>n
may be appropriate in the contrxt of jury selection. "Br<'aU~r of tlte
11ature of the jury selection task ... we have permitted a finding of eons1itutional violation rvrn when the stati~tica[ pattern does not appr·oach
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d. , at.- n. 13. As one illm:tration, we cited Tumer '"·Fouche , 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes const1tutcd ()0°{of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list .
The Court found that the disparity between tho~e figurr:;; was not flO
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. Td.,
at 350. But. the Court did not view the sta.tistics in isola.twn. 'l'urner
was not. a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's prculin r system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appoint< cl
jury commissioners, who in turn ~elected the grand jury. The grand j11ry,
in turn, selected the board of education . At every layer of this sys(<'Jll
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the ~tudcnt~ in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transfcrn·d
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were whit<', :li'l
were all of t.he members of the jury commission. Thr District Court
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negrors had brrn ~ystem
atically excluded from the grand JUries through tokrn incluHion." !d., Hl
352. It was against this background of prrvaHive cli~crimination that tlw
Court. found that even a new grand jury list w1th 3i% Nrgro rrpn•,pntation was the product of rontinucd, purpo~eful di~crimination.
By contrast, in Carter v . .!ury Comm'n. 396 U. S., at a:~s-3:m. i~olntcd
-proof tha.t. for 12 years no Krgro had hr<'n appointrcl1o the jury <·ommiH'Sion of a prrdominnntl~· Nrgro eonnty was found insufficient, standing
alone, to establish di~rriminatory intrnt
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking herc 1
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves wet:e not racially neutral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. lrl. , at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted11striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in .isolation , to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrjmination " was the Court satisfied that the burrkm
should shift to the State, !d., at 630.4
·~The

Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination " noted
The Conrt ha s lwkf
repeatedly that the Texas system of selecting gran,d juror~ by the u~c· or
jury commissioners i~ "fair on its face and capable of being utili zed wit fl out discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475, 478- 479 (1954) ;·
'accord, Smith v. Texas , 311 U. S. 128, 130 ( 1940). The "snbjPclivit y" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, t hose wi10
control the selection process a.re members of the same class as the pcrsorr
claiming dis<'rimination. See text infra.
Apart from Alexander and Turner, see n . 3, supm, tlus Comt ha H
sustai n<'d claims of gr~md jury discrimination, in two situation ~. .\Iosl of
the case,, involve tota l exclusion of minorities from participation on gra nd
juriP~: Reece v. Geu1pia, :150 U. S. 85 (1955) (no Negro jmor ~ 111 11\
_Y{';\r~): ll emandez v. Texas. :347 0. S. 475 (1954) (no lVlexic-:uH\m,.ricall
,iuron· in 25 ye:m): Patton Y . Mississippi. 3:32 0. S. 463 (1947) lllu ~\Pp:Io
jurnr~ in :30 ~·<·nrs): /h/1 v. Texas. a i6 TT. S. 400 (1942) (no :--Jcgro
grand juror~ in 16 .n·ar,; or morr): P~er-re v. Luuiswna, :306 P. S. ~)5-t
(1m3'!) (no :\'l'gro grand jnro r~ m 40 y(•ar~): Hair v. Kentur·k y, :30:3
U 8 . f\]:) (HJ>lK) (no NC'gro juror~): Norris v. Alaba'ma, 2.94 U. 8.
,i n Alexander, ante, at 11- 14, is clearly misplaced.
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and A le.t~
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing und(•rrepresentation of a populatioll group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other I circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
Heights,- U. S., at-.
B
1n this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; thrcr
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-Amel·ican; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were ·Mexican-American," and st•vrtl
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt wcrr
5~7

(19:35) (no NPgro

juror~

in a. " long numbpr'' of

)' ear~);

Uouers v.
177

Alabama, 192 V. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. 'J'r.m~.
r. S. 44~ (1900) (no ~<'!2:1'0 jurors); Bush v. Kentucku, 107 l 1• S.
(JI't<:3) (no Nrgro jmor~); Neal v. Dela·ware, 108 U. S. :370 (lt<t<O)
~rgro jmor~); 8trauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. :3m (1~>-:0)
N Pgro

juror~).

Thr rrmaindPr of ihP cases involve

miiwrity'~ pari icipat ion by tokrn inclusion:

~evt>rc

110
(no
(no

limitation of a

Sims v. Georoia. :3S!J \". 1:'.

404 ( l!)(i7) ( N rgroc:~ ron~tituting 24.4% of t hP taxpayer~ lirnitrd to 4.7 '7r
of iho~P on tbc• grand jury li~t); Jones v. Georoia, :380 U. R. 24 (HJii7)
(::\ep;ror~ constituting 19.7 % of the: taxpayer;; limited to !).0% of thoH'
on tlw jury li'it) ; Whitus v. Georgia, :385 U. S. 545 (19H7) (1\rgrot·~
ron;;tiiuting 27.1 % of tlw taxpa~·erH limilPd to 9.1 % of tlw grand jur~
vrnircJ ; Arnold v. North Caroli'lla, :m"\ U. S. 77:3 (190-i) (otw i\('p;ro
juror in :!4 yrars) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana. :356 U. S. 584 (1958) (<lllP
:\f>gro juror iu 11:1 ye~1r"); Cassell v. Texas , :3:39 U.S. 21'\2 (HJ50) (lil!lit:ltiun of our .'-:t·ll:ro juror on earh patl<'i); Smith v. TexaR. :~11 ll. ~- 12'1
(J9-Hl); (5 ~r·gro gmnd juror~ 111 n 7-yr:u prriod).
5 TllC' Di~trici Court notrd thai thr number of l\Jexiran-Amcric:lli H on
the gn1nd jury mip;hi hav<' hPr·n highrr hnd it not been for thr in:tbility of
the :;hPritT, a Mrxiran-Amrnran, to loeat'P fonr of the original membCI':- of
thr a.rrny who w<·n• \lcxicnn-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Undrr
Texaii law, nillr or thr 12 gr:md juror~ Illll~i concur brforc <111 indirimcnt
·r·:tll be prP~rniPd . Trx. C'ocl<' Crin1. Pror . Ar1 . 20.19 (19f\6) ,
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Mexican-American. In the ye~r in which respondent wa.s
indicted, 52.5% of the persons O)l the grand jury list were
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of th~ judges. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing maj'ority, and the resulting powe1· over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
o.fficials ..0
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
o I do not ~uggr:st., of cour~e, that thr mrre fact that MexH'anAmcric:ms constitute a maJority in I-Illdago County is cli~positive. There
nrc many commun.itics in which, by virtue of historica.l or other rca ~IJllS,
a maJority of the population may not be able at a. pa.rtirular time to
r·ontrol or significantly influrncr political deciHiom; or the wn~· thr system
opern.ics. Src Turner v. Fouche, supra. But, no one cnn contend ~eriously
thnt. Hildago County is such a. community. The clas~ic situation in which
n "minority group" may ~>nffcr di~rriminat ion 111 a commtmity j,. where
it. is "J·rlegated to ... a position of politicnl powpr)e."~ nc:>s." San Antonio
, chool Distn'ct v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. l, 28 (197:~). Hrre the l\.fcxicnnAmerica.ns are not politically "po wcrle~s "; thc·y are thr n:w.ioritarian
polltical clement of the commtm1ty, with demon~trated eapability to elect
and protect their own.
Nor do I .~nggrst. that pPr~ums in position~ of powPr <'all nrver be
shown to h:~n' dis<"rimiuat<'d against othrr meml)('r~ of the ~amr rthnir
or n1f'inl grnup. I would hold onl~· that rC'~pond<·n l\ ~tntl~li<"nl eYidcTlf'C,
without. !1!01'(', is insu{fi('iP!It IO !Jl'O\'(~ a !']aim Of' r{i;.;<'rilltinafiOII j!l thi;; i'Hi)Q,

..

.
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have , panish
surnames. fn these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans
control both the selection of jurors and the political process,
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As
Judge Garza observed. "If people in charge can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they \vill discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against. those who share their own Identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. 8ce
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S .. at 309. Were it not for
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of
their own class. there would be no reason to supposr that a
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons
of a certain racE' would bE' the basis of any l0gitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the individuals excluded from jury service would have a pcn;onal
right to complain.
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on
th0 jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel,
tlw Court cmphasiz0d the high threshold of proof r0quin'd to
brand officers of tlw court with discriminatory intrnt :
"An allrgation of discriminatory practicE' in selC'cting a
grand jury panel challenges an essC'ntial elrmcnt of
proper judicial procrdurc- the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with JWrsons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the courts discre-
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gard thi accepted standard of
400-401.

JU

tice."

325 L1• ~: .• at

With all respect, 1 am compelled to . ay that thr Court today

has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury

conunisgionPr~

of this county have disregarded not only thc•ir Rworn duty bnt
also their likely inclination to assurr fairnrs. to MPxi<'an~
merican ... '

It matter little in this case whethrr such judicially notie<'able facts a. the composition of the granrl Jmy commission
are viewed a defeating respondent's prima facie cast' at !hC'
outset or as rebutting it after it, was established by sta I istical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limit<-d
to its effect in . hifting tlH' burden of going forward to 111<·
tatR. Once the State has produced evidence rithrr hy
prr<;enting proof or by calling attention to facts subj<>cf to
Judicial noticP- the only question i whether Uw rvidPnc·p
in the n•eord is sufficient to demonstrate delibcratr and :-;y:--~1em a tic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced statistics bowing that Mt>xtc:w Americans- - while substantially represented on the grarHl jurv
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I agree with Mr. Justice Marshall, ante, at 4,

that stereotypes concerning identifiable classes in our
society have no place in the decisions of this Court.
For that reason, I consider it inappropriate to characterize the
Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County as a "minority
group" and on that basis to suggest that these MexicanAmericans may have "adopt[ed] the majority's negative
attitudes towards the minority."

Ante, at 3.

This type

of speculation illustrates the lengths to which one must
go to buttress a holding of purposeful discrimination that
otherwise is based solely on a lack of proportional
representation.
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15hare of the total population. The State responded by pre~
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commissioners. Other facts. such as the presence o~
~
Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective positions o~
the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court.
sufficed to sa.tisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give' rise
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close of the evidence.
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the right to participate as juror~
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S .. at
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated agatnst
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least,
that finding was not clearly erroncous. 8
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state illtroduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. A11t·c, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not pres('nting more evidence than it did. But until today's ckcision one
may doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases,
8 Nothing in this rase remotely resembles the stark discrimmntion 111
Gomillion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this cnse npproach the
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have
previously found grand jury di~rrimination. Sec n.;!, supra. In this ease,
in the yrar in which the re~pondent was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupation with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans
in the total population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court lose~ 1<ight of
the constitutional standard. Hespon.dent has no right to "proportional
representation" of l\[rxicnn-Amrri<'nn~, Carter v. Jury Cornm'n, :~06 U. B.,
at 339. He has only the right •·to require that the Stnte not deliberately
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate
a<i juror;; in the admini~tration of justiC'P." Alexander, 405 U. S., at

628-629.

t
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would have thought that respondent's statistics. under the
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hidalgo C o u n t y /
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in this remote border county are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
j udgrs on the scene; the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and t,he
Pnitcd States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
fa1niliar with the community-perceived uo basis for respondent's claim of invidious discrimination.
It sc•ems to me that the Court today, in rejecting the District Court's fiiHiing that no such discrimination took place,
has NrwJ grievously. J would reinstate the judgment of the
District Court.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE and
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal
proceedings which shows that the 80o/o Mexican-American
majority in Hidalgo County was not proportionately represented on the grand jury lists; second, the testimony of the
state trial judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with respect to the political
dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in
Hidalgo County.
The Court today considers it dispositive that the lack of
proportional representation of Mexican-Americans on the
grand jury lists in this county would not have occurred if
jurors were selected from the population wholly at random.
But one may agree that the disproportion did not occur by
chance without agreeing that it resulted from purposeful
invidious discrimination. In my view, the circumstances of
this unique case fully support the District Court's finding
that the statistical disparity-the basis of today's decision-is more likely to have stemmed from neutral causes
than from any intent to discriminate against MexicanAmericans.1
1

A strong case may be made that claims of grand jury discrimination
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A
The Court holds that a criminal defendant may demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause merely
by showing that the procedure for selecting grand jurors
"resulted in substantial under-representation of his ra,ce or the
identifiable group to which he belongs." Ante, at 11. By so
holding, the Court blurs the traditional constitutional distinctions between the grand and petit juries, and misapplies the
equal protection analysis mandated by our most recent
decisions.
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not a,p ply
to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516
( 1884). A state defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him
instead through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S., 103, 116-119 (1975).
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100
are not cogniznble on federal habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell,- U.S.
(1976). In Stone we held that "where the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a. Fourth Amendment claim, a
state prisoner may not be granted federal habC'as corpus rdief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at his trial." !d., at - . Unlike the prisoner in Stone,
who could complain that his conviction rested on evidence tainted by
Fourth Amendment violations and could ask for a new trial with that
evidence excluded, the prisoner in this cnse challenges only the now moot
determination by the grand jury that there was sufficient cause to proceed
to trial. He points to no flaw in the trial itself. As in Stone, the incremental benefit of extending habeas corpus as a means of correcting unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures might be viewed as "outweighed
by the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of
criminal justice." !d., at-.
But as this issue was not addressed below and was not briefed or argued
in this Court, it would be inappropriate to resolve it in this case.
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U. S. 303 ( 1880) , this Court has held that a criminal defendant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g. , Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 287 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403- 404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable
where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial
rather than total exclusion of members of the defendant's
class, see, e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 ( 1970).
But a state defendant has no right to a grand jury that
reflects a fair cross-section of the community. 2 The right
to a "representative" grand jury is a federal right that derives
not from the requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
That right is simila.r to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth
Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975).
To the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show tha.t the jury selection
procedure "systematically exclude [s] distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail[s] to be reasonably representative
thereof." Id., at 538. But in a state case in which the challenge is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, and the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
It may be that nondiscriminatory methods of selec6on will , over time,
result in a representative grand jury. See Cart er v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S., at 330. But the Fourt,eenth Amendment does not mandate that
result. Nothing would prevent a State for example , from seeking to assure
informed decisionmaking by requiring tha.t all grand jurors be lawyers
familiar with the criminal Jaw; and if that requirement should result in
substant ial under-representation on grand juries of some segments of the
community in some areas of t he State, the Fourteenth Amendment would
not render the selection process unconstitutional.
2
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Proof of discriminatory intent in such a case was explicitly
mandated in our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous...
ing Development 9orp.,- U. S. (1917). In Arlington
fi eights we said I
"Our decision last Term in Wa~hington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 ( 11}76), made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a. racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' !d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. . . . "
-U.S., at-.
We also identified the following standards for resolving issues
of discriminatory intent or purpose:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Y ick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
U. S., a t Court must look to other evidence." (footnotes omitted).
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The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.8 This is
illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
a Although Davis and Arli11gton Heights make clear that proof of dis~
cri.nllna,tory intent is required and that proof of impact or effect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the
nature of the jury selection task . . . we have permitted a finding of con~
stitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." /d., a t - n. 13. As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Cou,rt found that the disparity between those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. /d.,
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner
was not a criminal case ; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointtd
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the members of the board of education were white, as
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been systematically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." !d., at
352. It was against this background of pervasive discrimination that the
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representation was the product of continued, purpo ·eful discrimination .
By contrast, in Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S., at 338-339, isolated
proof that for 12 years no Negro had been appointed to the jury commission of a predominantly Negro county was found insufficient, standing
alone, to establish discriminatory intent.
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of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral. ... " 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro ( 5 ro) ; and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. Id., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not found, in isolation, to
constitute a prima facie case. Only after determining that
the selection system "provided a clear and easy opportunity
for discrimination" was the Court sa.tisfied that the burden
should shift to the State, !d., at 630!
• The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted
in Alexander, ante, at 11-14, is clearly misplaced. The Court has held
repeatedly that the Texas system of S<'lecting grand jurors by the use of
jury commissioners is "fair on its face and capable of being utilized without discrimination." H ernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478--479 (1954);
accord, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (194-0). The "subjectivity" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, those who
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person
claiming discrimination. See text infra.
Apart from Alexander and Turner, see n . 3, supra, this Court has
sustained claims of grand jury disrrimination. in two situations. Most of
the eases involve total exclusion of minorities from participat ion on grand
juries : R eece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955) (no N<'gro jurors in 18
years); Ilernandez v. T exas, 347 U. S. 4-75 (1954) (no l\lexican-American
jurors in 25 years); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947) (no Negro
jurors in 30 years); Hill v. T exas, 316 U. S. 400 (194-2) (no Negro
grand jurors in 16 years or more); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354
( 1934-) (no Negro grand jurors in 40 years) ; Hale v. K entucky, 303
U. S. 613 (1938) (no Negro jurors); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S.

L
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~
(lnder make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
Heights,- U.S., at-.
B
In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American/ and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the verdict of guilt were
587 (1935) (no Negro jurors in a "long number" of years); Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904) (no Negro jurors); Carter v. T exas, 177
U. S. 442 (1900) (no Negro jurors); Bush v. K entucky, 107 U. 8. 110
(1883) (no Negro jurors) ; Neal v. D elaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880) (no
Negro jurors ); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880) (no
Negro jurors). The remainder of the cases involve severe limitation of a
minority's pa.rticipation by token inclusion: Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S.
404 ( 1967) (Negroes constituting 24.4% of the taxpayers limit ed to 4.7%
of those on the grand jury list ); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24 (1967)
(Negroes constituting 19.7% of the taxpayers limited to 5.0% of those
on the jury list); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967) (Negroes
constituting 27.1% of the taxpayers limited to 9.1% of the grand jury
venire); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964) (one Negro
juror in 24 years); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. 8. 584 (1958) (one
Negro juror in 18 years); Cassell v. T exas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950) (limitation of one Negro juror on each panel); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128
(1940); (5 Negro grand jurors in a 7-year period).
5 The District Court noted that the number of Mexican-Americans on
the gra.nd jury might have been higher had it not been for the inability of
the sheriff, a Mexican-American, to locate four of the original members of
the array who were Mexican-American. 384 F. Supp. 79, 83. Under
Texas law, nine of the 12 grand jurors must concur before an indictment
can be presented. Tex. Code Crim. Pro c. Art. 20.19 (1966).
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Mexican-American. In the year in which respondent WM
indicted, 52.5% of the persons on the grand jury list were
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
p. majority of the judges. That these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
soro of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials.G
The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at 11-14, the jury commission has the opportunity to
o I do not suggest., of course, that the mere fact that MexicanAmericans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of the population may not be able at a particular time to
control or significant.ly influence political decisions or the wa.y the system
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a community is where
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. 8. 1, 28 (1973). Here the MexicanAmericans are not politically "powerless"; they are the majoritarian
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect
and protect their own.
Nor do I suggest that persons in. positions of power can never be
shown to ha.vc discriminated against other members of the same ethnic
or racial group. I would hold only that respondent's statistical evidence,
without more, is insufficient to prove a claim of discrimination in this case.
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identify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish
surnames. In these circumstances, where Mexican-Americans
control both the selection of jurors and the political process,
rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic
society render improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans. As
Judge Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons who may be inclined to favor the defendant. See
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S., at 309. Were it not for
the perceived likelihood that jurors will favor defendants of
their own class, there would be no reason to suppose that a
jury selection process that systematically excluded persons
of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain.
In Akins v. Texas, supra, where apparently no Negro was on
the jury commission and only one of 16 was on the jury panel,
the Court emphasized the high threshold of proof required to
brand officers of the court with discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the courts discre-
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gard this accepted standard of justice." 325 U. S., at
400-401.

With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today

has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their sworn duty but
also their likely inclination to assure fairness to Mexican~
Americans. 7

c

It matters little in this case whether such judicially notice~
able facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and sys~
tematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, respondent produced statistics showing that Mexican~
Americans-while substantially represented on the grand jury
lists--were not represented in numbers proportionate to their
share of the total population. The State responded by pre~
senting the testimony of the judge who appointed the grand
jury commissiOners. Other facts, such as the presence of
Mexican~Americans in a majority of the elective positions of
I agree with MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, ante, at 4, that stereotypes
concerning identifiable classes in our society have no place in the decisions
of this Court. For that reason, I consider it inappropriate to characterize
the Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County as a "minority group"
and on that basis to suggest that these Mexican-Americans may have
"adopt[ed] the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority. "
Ante, at 3. This type of speculation illustrates t he lengths to which one
must go to buttress a holding of purposeful discrimination that otherwise
is based solely on a lack of proportional representation .
7
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the county, entered the record through judicial notice. The
testimony, together with the facts noted by the District Court,
~ufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even
assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise
to such a burden. Accordingly, at the close o.f the evidence,
the question for the District Court was whether respondent
had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
State had "deliberately and systematically den[ied] to members of [respondent's class] the right to participate as jurors
in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. S., at
628-629. The District Court found that the judge and jury
commissioners had not intentionally discriminated against
Mexican-Americans. 384 F. Supp., at 90. At the very least,
that finding was not clearly erroneous. 8
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that the state introduced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at
14. Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for not presenting more evidence than it did.. But until today's decision one
may doubt whether ma.ny lawyers, familiar with our cases,
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under the
circumstances of this case a.nd prevailing in Hidalgo County,
were even arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
8 Nothing in this case remotely resembles the stark discrimination in
GomiUion and Yick Wo. Nor do the statistics in this case approach the
degree of exclusion that has characterized the cases in which we have
previously found grand jury discrimination . Sec n. 4, supra. In this case,
in the year in which the respondent was indicted, 52.5% of the persons on
the grand jury lists were Mexican-American. Ante, at 5 n. 7. In its
preoccupa.tion with the disparity of representation of Mexican-Americans
in the tot.al population and on the grand-jury lists, the Court loses sight of
the constitutional standard. Respondent has no right to "proportional
representation" of Mexican-Americans, Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. 8.,
at 339. He has only the right "to require that the State not deliberately
and systematically deny to [Mexican-Americans] the right to participate
as jurors in the administration of justice." Alexander, 405 U. 8., at
628-629.
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There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from
~tatistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers
of power in this remote border county are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for respondent's claim of invidious discrimination.
It seems to me that the Court today, in rejecting the District Court's finding that no such discrimination took place,
has erred grievously. I would reinstate the judgment of the
District Court.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, dissenting.
The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest.
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the MexicanAmericans who controlled the jury selection process in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Americans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the
proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief and established
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination.
I
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly,
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respondent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt.
After respondent was convicted and sentenced he raised for
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
. By accepting that claim, the Court today requires the State
to release respondent:r-and to indict and try him again if the
witnesses are still available-although there is no question
that a properly constituted grand jury found him guilty.
There being no question of respondent's guilt, the threshold
question in this case is whether federal habeas corpus relief
is available to challenge the composition of the grand jury.
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to overturn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly unconstitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time
.~imits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and cannot show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he co-ntends that
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the
state appellate court. considered its merits in affirming his
conviction.
It is true that in Francis we left open the question whether
the general rule applicable to consideration of claims of unconstitutional grand jury discrimination in federal habeas
proceedings should bar relief where the state courts consider
the merits of an untimely claim. We said that in such a
case "different considerations would ... be applicable." 425
U. S., at 542 n. 5. It does not follow that, as the Court today
summarily concludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered
the claim on the merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante,
at - . It may be that where a state court considers a grandjury-discrimination claim despite failure to raise it before
trial, federal review is available by certiorari in this Court.
See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283, 288-292 (1975).
But in my view, the State's consideration of the merits affords
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no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,U.S.- (1976).
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed
petit jury, based on properiy admissible evidence, is like a
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logicaliy inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the
way of CQnvi~Wm, if factuai guiH is established." M erma v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question,
accordingly, is whether the aiieged grand jury discriminatiort
is the sort of defect that will "stand in the way of conviction;
if factual guiit is va1idiy established."
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere;
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an in"'
formation and, if the defendant is to be detained for any significant period before trial, by a judicial determination of
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119
( 1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect
in the probable cause determination will not void a subsequent conviction . "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the
defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." I d., at 119.
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is true that this
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after conviction. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972),
we set aside a state conviction on the ground that members
of the defendant's race had been deliberately excluded from
the grand jury which returned his indictment. This broader
scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the
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convicted defendant, whose guilt is no longer a mere probability, but for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kif!, 407 U. S.
493 (1972). We have, in essence, given the criminal defendant standing on appeal to assert the rights of those who may
yet be unfairly indicted, or improperly excluded from jury
service, as a result of the alleged discrimination.
But allowing standing to assert the rights of others is
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individuaU Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his
conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited
to the integrity of the state determination of guilt in the particular case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold,
therefore, that the State's decision on direct appeal to consider the claim of grand jury discrimination does not present
a case for federal habeas relief where-as here-the state
prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt in his own case.
The decision of the Court today, sub silentio, appears to
extend to availability of habeas corpus relief well beyond its
present ample frontiers. 2
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to entertain
respondent's claim could be viewed as plain error, this issue
was not briefed or argued in this case. In view of its importa.nce to the federal system, the question should not be resolved
"It is clear, not only from the language of [ 42 U. S. C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3)
and 2254 (a) , but also from the common law history of the writ, that the
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the
legality of that. custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody . . . ." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
2 In no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court have before it a
federal habeas corpus petitioner who, like the respondC'nt here, complained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which
indicted him. Indeed, the only habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v.
Kiff, supra, 407 U. S. 493. Peters involved claims of discrimination in the
selection of the petit as well as the grand jury.
1
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in the absence of plenary consideration. It would be appropriate, rather, to set the case for reargument or to remand it
for reconsideration of the question whether federal habeas
corpus relief is available.
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' holding that respondent established unconstitutional discrimination in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the
merits.
II
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the sta.tistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal proceedings which tends to show underrepresentation of MexicanAmericans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second,
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and
third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination.
A

In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand
jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the community."
Ante, at - , and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S. 299 ( 1976) , and Arlington Heights v. Metro(1977).
politan Housing Corp.,- U.S. The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply
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to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead
through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119.
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defendant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U. S. 320, 335-337, 339 ( 1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable in
cases involving grand as well as petit jury selection, see, e. g.,
Alexander, supra, and in cases where purposeful discrimination results only in substantial underrepresentation rather
than total exclusion of members of the defendant's class, see,
e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community."
Ante, at 10, and n. 13. The right to a "representative" grand
jury is a federal right that derives not from the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury,
That right is simlar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). To
the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show substantial underrepre-
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sentation of his own race or class to demonstrate a constitutional violation. But in a state case in which the challenge
is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amen~ment applies,
and the defendant has the burden of proving that the underrepresentation is the result of systematic and purposeful
discrimination.
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated in
our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. In Arlington
Heights we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." U.S., at-.
Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate
impact is enough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, the burden shifts to the state to
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-.
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arlington Heights.
B
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards
for determining whether an evidentiary showing constitutes
a prima facie case of discrimination shifting the burden of
going forward with evidence to the State:
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as

..
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may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. 8., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence." U. 8., at (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury. 8 This is
3 Although Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is required and that proof of impact. of effect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the
nature of the jury selection t{lsk ... we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., a.t- n. 13. As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d.,
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the emembers of the board of education were white as
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 ( 1972), where we sta.ted:
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decima.t ion
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." 405 U. S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not sufficient to constitute
a prima facie case. Only after determining that the selection
system "provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden should shift
to the State. lbid. 4
were all of the members of the jury commiSSIOn. The District Court.
had found that, until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been systematically excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion." I d., at
352. It was a.gainst this background of pervasive discrimination that the
Court found that even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representation was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination.
4 The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted
in Alexander, ante, at - , is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here , those who
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person
claiming discrimination. See text infra.
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
U. S., at-.
Heights, supra, In this case, the following critical facts a.re beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury arra.y were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the veridct of guilt were
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80% of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white
officials.~
5 I do not suggest., of course, that. t.he mere fact that Mexica.nAmericans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of the popula.t.ion may not be able at a particular time to
control or significantly influence political decisions or the way the system
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which
a "minority group" ma.y suffer discrimination in a community is where
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
. Court's opinion, is that a majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
. vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at-, the jury commission has the opportunity to iden~
tify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish surnames. This means that a majority of the commission ate in
a position-if they so choose to exercise their power-to place
only Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels. That they
.have exercised their power with greater restraint scarcely
justifies an inference of discriminatory intent. To the contra.ry, rational inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic society render wholly improbable respondent's claim
of an intent to discriminate against him and other MexicanAmericans. As Judge Garza. observed, "If people in charge
can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant. has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons having a natural inclination to fa.vor the defendant.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S., at 309. Were
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni~
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppose
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only the
Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the ma.joritarian
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect
and protect their own .
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain. 6
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where apparently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of
16 was on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high
threshold of proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the court disregard this accepted standard of justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has ulightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to
Mexican-Americans.

c
It matters litt.le in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commission would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itself,
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is
essentially silent as to t.he manner in which the commission made its
selections and its motivation in selecting as it did. But the composition
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the county
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to conclude-correctly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of variation should be
tolerated here because the Texas selection system allows the governing
majority [of grand jury commissioners] to favor their group when
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90.
6
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
.in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
. Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical showing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed
the grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the
right to participate as jurors in the administra.tion of justice."
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S., at 628. In my view the District Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination
insufficient.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that "the state intro, duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ant-e, at
- . Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would have
thought that respondent's statistics, under tlie circumstances
of this case and prevailing in Hildago County, were even
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic
discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in
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Washington decide solely on the basi~ qf inferences fnont
~tatistics that Mexican-Americans in this remote border
county who control the levers of power are manipulating
them to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community- perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District
Court.
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PowEJLL, diril§enting.

The Court today requires the release of a state prisoner on
federal habeas corpus although it finds no fault with the
finding of guilt on which his conviction and confinement rest.
The Court reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the MexicanAmericans who controlled the jury selection process in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against Mexican-Americans in selecting the grand jury that returned the prisoner's
indictment. In my view, the Court misconceives both the
proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief and established
principles applicable to grand jury discrimination.

I
Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of burglary
of a private residence at night with intent to rape. Although
Texas law afforded respondent an opportunity to challenge
the indictment before trial-and, indeed, required him to do
so-respondent offered no timely objection to indictment or
the selection of the grand jury that returned it. Accordingly,
he was brought to trial before a petit jury. This jury, whose
composition is conceded to have been proper, found respondent guilty of the crime charged beyond any reasonable doubt.
After respondent was convicted and sentenced he raised for
the first time the claim that is now before us: that the grand~
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jury which indicted him had been selected by a procedure infected by discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
y accepting t at c a1m, t e Court today requires the State
to release respondent-a.n d to indict and try him again if the
witnesses are still available-although there is no question
that a properly constitutedl o@llftl'ld: jury found him guilty.
TllePe 8eiR~ RQ 'fH9iti9R 9f P8BfJen8e~tt's ~wilt., tlle tliPel!liehi
Afl81!liiiA iR thii QQM ii urbe*her federe 1 li9188ft@ 061}5&8 telief
ii ?U9illltfile ~e challenge bhe eomt,eeiti8R 9£ *he grand jnqk
In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we held
that when a state prisoner asks a federal habeas court to overturn a state-court conviction because of an allegedly unconstitutional grand jury indictment, the prisoner must show-as
a general rule-either that he raised his claim within the time
~imits imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause
and was actually prejudiced. Partida did not raise a timely
objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so, and cannot show actual prejudice. Nevertheless, he contends that
we should consider his claim on collateral attack because the
state appellate court considered its merits in affirming his
conviction.
H is ~~ ""e tftllt ~ Francis we left open the question whether
the general rule applicable to consideration of claims of unconstitutional grand jury discrimination in federal habeas
proceedings should bar relief where the state courts consider
the merits of an untimely claim. We said that in such a
case "different considerations would ... be applicable." 425
U. S., at 542 n. 5. It does not follow that, as the Court today
summarily concludes, "[s] ince the Texas courts considered
the claim on the merits, ... we are free to do so here." Ante,
at-!-.

~ ~n

'
my view, llil! ~tftte'~onsideration of the merits

/

75-1552-DISSENT
CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

3

no basis for federal habeas review. Cf. Stone v. Powell,U.S.- (1976).
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and instructed
petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence, is like a
valid plea of guilt: it "simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the
way of conviction, if factual guilt is established." Menna v.
New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975). The initial question,
accordingly, is whether the alleged grand jury discrimination
is the sort of defect that will "stand in the way of conviction,
if factual guilt is validly established."
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and elsewhere,
is to establish that there is probable cause for detaining the
accused and for requiring him to stand trial. But there is
no constitutional right, applicable to the States, to be indicted
by a grand jury. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
In many States the grand jury's function is served by an information and, if the defendant is to be detained for any significant period before trial, by a judicial determination of
probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pu.gh, 420 U. S. 103, 118-119
(1975). In that context the established rule is that a defect
in the probable cause determination will not void a subsequent conviction. "[A]lthough a suspect who is presently
detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the
defendant wa
·
ending trial without a determina---.,JLvu o probable cause."
/d., at 1
Where a State proceeds by indictment, it is r
Court has recognized a broader scope of review after co
tion. Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 ( 1972),
we set aside a ~ conviction on the ground that membersl
of the defendant's race had been deliberately excluded from
the grand jury which returned his indictment. This broader
scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the
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convicted defendant, whose guilt is no longer} Mt8P8 }1F8ls&@ii
for the rights of others. Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S.
493 (1972). We have, in essence, given the criminal defendant standing on appeal to assert the rights of those who may
yet be unfairly indicted, or improperly excluded from jury
service, as a result of the alleged discrimination.
But allowing standing to assert the rights of others is
inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus. The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to the individuaJ.l Where a prisoner challenges the process that led to his
conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus properly is limited
to the integrity of the iWoi determination of guilt in the particular case. See Stone v. Powell, supra. I would hold,
therefore, that the jtate's decision on direct appeal to consider the claim of grand jury discrimination does not present
a case for federal habeas relief where-as here-the state
prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt in his own case.
The decision of the Court today, sub silentio, appears to
extend+ availability of habeas corpus relief well beyond its
present ample frontiers. 2
Although I think,.bltll C'!l~otPt 8f lx~:f.lelll!!' d88i8ien to entertainl
respondent's claim,@llwl~ M8 zrin e8 ~!'! tJlllil~ etr8t , this issue
was not briefed or argued in this case. In view of its importa.nce to the federal system, the question should not be resolved

~but

"It is clear, not only from the language of [42 U. S.C.] §§ 2241 (c) (3)
and 2254 (a), but also from the common law history of the writ, that the
essencr of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the
legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody . . . ." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475, 484 (1973).
2 In no case cited in the Court's opinion did the Court have before it a
federal habeas corpus petitioner who, like the ~espondent here, complained only of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which
indicted him. Indeed, the only habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v.
Kif!, supra, 407 U.S. 4931 ~involved claims of discrimination in the
selection of the petit as well as the grand jury.
1

I}
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in the absence of plenary consideration. It would be appropriate, rather, to set the case for reargument or to remand it
for reconsideration of the question whether federal habeas
corpus relief is available.
As the Court nonetheless affirms the Court of Appeals' holding that respondent established unconstitutional discrimination in the grand jury selection process, I turn now to the
_/
merits.
~
II
The evidence relevant to the issue of discrimination in this
case falls into three categories: first, the statistical evidence
introduced by respondent in both the state and federal proceedings which hmdlil t@ sho'-'!underrepresentation of MexicanAmericans in the grand juries of Hidalgo County; second,
the testimony of the state trial judge outlining the Texas
grand jury selection system as it operated in this case; and
third, the facts judicially noticed by the District Court with
respect to the political dominance and control by the Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County. I agree with the
District Court that in light of all the evidence respondent
failed to establish unconstitutional grand jury discrimination.
A

])e 'If lop"'' t\1:

..

In my view, the Court approaches the evidence with a
serious misconception of the applicable legal principles. It
begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand
jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the community."
Ante, at -t-, and n. 13. In adopting that principle the Court
abandons the traditional equal protection standards that have
always applied to claims of grand jury discrimination and
ignores our most relevant recent decisions: Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976) , and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housingl Corp.,- U.S.- (1977).
The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply

75-1552-DISSENT
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to a state prosecution. Hurtado v. California, supra. A state
defendant cannot complain if the State foregoes the institution of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead
through prosecutorial information, as many States prefer to
do. See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U. S., at 116-119-.
Nevertheless, if a State chooses to proceed by grand jury it
must proceed within the constraints imposed by the Equal
~
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in a~
line of cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virgina, 100
U. S. 303 ( 1880), this Court. has held that a criminal defendant is denied equal protection of the law if, as a result of
purposeful discrimination, members of his own race are excluded from jury service. See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U~ S. 320, 335-337, 339 ( 1970); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S.
282, 287-290 ( 1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403-404
(1945). As the Court points out, this right is applicable m
OiliQil i~u9luii•@ @F&tH.~ 8:il wgll ali pQtit jHF3' i!Qlll9tieft, eee, e. g.,
.4le~81ruiBP; 8M~Ptll,

a.nd in ett~ee where 2urposeful discrimination results only in substantial underrepresentation rather
than total exclusion of members of the defendant's class, see,
e. g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
But a state defendant's right not to have members of his
class excluded by discrimination from grand jury service has
never before today been thought to embody a right to a grand
jury that reflects "a fair cross-section of the community."
Ante, at 10, and n. 13} The right to a "representative" grand
jury is a federal right that derives not from the Md9WPhen~h
.A Hllondmontli! requirement of equal protection but from the
Fifth Amendment's explicit requirement of a grand jury.
.1... That right is sinJar to the right-applicable to state proceedings-to a representative petit jury under the Sixth Amendment. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975). To
the extent that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a defendant need only show substantial underrepre-

75-1552--DISSENT
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sentation of his own race or class to demonstrate a constitutional violation. But in a state case in which the challenge
is to the grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies,
and the defendant has the burden of proving that the underrepresentation i~ the result of systematic and purposeful
discrimination.
This equal protection analysis was explicitly mandated ill
our recent decisions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. In Arlington
Heights we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426
U. S. 229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact. 'Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' I d., at 242. Proof
of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." U.S., a t - .

1

Today the Court holds that a showing of disproportionate
impact is enough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group, the burden shifts to the state to
rebut the prima facie case." Ante, at-.
This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis and Arlington H eightsJ.

B
In Arlington Heights we identified the following standards
£Qp eletePI11iBiHg 'nH:ethet att evidcn:titt:r, sksv?iJ;~8 constitutes
a -prii!Qa 'aQi@ @&!!e sf elieeriminte~isn eliifii¥~g t~Q l;mrQQA Qf
SQiPS £~ward wit~ e vielenee ~o bhe Obtete.
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as

..
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may be available. The impact of the official actionwhether it "bears more heavily on one race than another,"
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an
important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ( 1886); Guinn v. United States, 238
U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ( 1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the
Court must look to other evidence." U. S., a t (footnotes omitted).
The analysis is essentially the same where the alleged discrimination is in the selection of a state grand jury.\. This is

jJ

,.

j Although Davis and Arlington Heights make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is required and that proof of impact. oJ. effect alone
is not sufficient, we did recognize in Arlington Heights that. a lesser burden
may be appropriate in the context of jury selection. "Because of the
nature of the jury selection task . . . we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach
the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion." !d., at_::::... n. 13. As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 (1970).
In Turner the statistical evidence showed that Negroes constituted 60%
of the general population and 37% of those included in the grand jury list.
The Court found that the disparity between those figures was not so
"insubstantial" as to foreclose corrective action by a federal court. !d.,
at 350. But the Court did not view the statistics in isolation. Turner
was not a criminal case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education. The circuit judge appointed
jury commissioners, who in turn selected the grand jury. The grand jury,
in turn, selected the board of education. · At every layer of this system
white citizens were in total control. Even though all of the students in
the county schools were Negro, every white pupil having transferred
elsewhere, all of the 1~embers of the board of education were white as

,.

~
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illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:
"The Court has never announced mathematical standards
for the demonstration of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks
but has, rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is
necessary in each case that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The progressive decimation
of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here,
but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral." 405 U. S., at 630.

.fovl1dJ

i~

1sola'h""'J

In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant
community were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five
members "all of whom were white," appointed by a white
judge; the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one
of whom was a Negro (5o/o); and none of the 12 persons on
the grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro. !d., at
627, 628. This statistical array was-as the Court noted"striking." Yet the statistics were not .;~tJtel'!* to constitute
a prima facie case. Only after determining that the selection
system "provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrimination" was the Court satisfied that the burden should shift
to the State. Ibid.'S.,
were all of the members of the jury commission. The District Court
had found that., until the suit was instituted, "Negroes had been system-~
aJ.ically excluded from the gra<ld juries through token inclusion." I d., at
352. It was against this background of pervasive di~crimination that the
Court. found that. even a new grand jury list with 37% Negro representation was the product of continued, purposeful discrimination.
) The Court's reliance on "the opportunity for discrimination" noted
in Alexande1', ante, at. -i;-. is clearly misplaced. The "subjectivity" of
the selection system cuts in favor of the State where, as here, those who
control the selection process are members of the same class as the person
clajming discrimination. See text infm.

,,

/

(2,1:>~ A- P· ~

3/

- It may be, as the. Court suggests, that
nondiscriminatory methods of selection will, over
time, result in a representative grand jury.
Carter v. Jury

Comm'n~

See

supra, 396 U.S., at 530.

But the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate that
result.

Nothing would prevent a state, for example,

.. ~
") k'1ng b y
.
. f orme d d ec1s1o
f rom seek 1ng
to assure 1n

requiring that all grand jurors be lawyers familiar
with the criminal law;and if that requirement should
result in substantial underrepresentation on grand
juries of some segments of the community in some
areas of the state, the Fourteenth Amendment would
not render the selection process unconstitutional.
j
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Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and Alex~
ander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Arlington
~Heights, supra,- U. S., at-.
--~r,. In this case, the following critical facts are beyond dispute:
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners and later
presided over respondent's trial was Mexican-American; three
of the five jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of
the 20 members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American; five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment,
including the foreman, were Mexican-American; and seven
of the 12 petit jurors who returned the veyfijct of guilt were
~·
Mexican-American. In addition, a majority of the elected
officials in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were
a majority of the judges. That. these positions of power and
influence were so held is not surprising in a community where
80lfo of the population is Mexican-American. As was emphasized by District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who presided over the habeas proceedings in the District Court, this case is unique. Every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved a situation where
the governing majority, and the resulting power over the jury
selection process, was held by a white electorate and white ~
officials.~
/
.) I do not suggest., of course, that the mere fact that Mell.icanAmericans constitute a majority in Hildago County is dispositive. There
are many communities in which, by virtue of historical or other reasons,
a majority of t.he population may not be able at a particular time to
control or signifieant.ly influence political decisions or the way the system
operates. See Turner v. Fouche, supra. But no one can contend seriously
that Hildago County is such a community. The classic situation in which
a "minority group" may suffer discrimination in a community is where
it is "relegated to ... a position of political powerlessness." San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 28 (1973). Here the Mexican-
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The most significant fact in this case, all but ignored in the
Court's opinion, is that a. majority of the jury commissioners
were Mexican-American. The jury commission is the body
. vested by Texas law with the authority to select grand jurors.
Under the Texas selection system, as noted by the Court,
ante, at T •th~ jury commission has the opportunity to idenw
tify in advance those potential jurors who have Spanish surnames. T.Ai8 ~efW.ls t.Aa.t & m&;ierit) ef th.i QQ-"';A:l:issies ai:Q isfti l"BBitie~;~.
if t.Aey sa I!Aeeee te ent".t'eiee ~wit power to pla~
9113ly Meyjcep, A mgrigaA8 88 ~Pft>fH~: jli~· }38>Rels. Tlu~t ~ey
.R&.e exetcised their powet witlr greater testraittt scmeel;,
juiiti~ii as iBfereBee sf Qiiigriminatwy intint
To thi 88ft
~' rational inferences from the most basic facts in a demd•
cratic society render ~ improbable respondent's claim
of an intent to discriminate aga.i nst him and other Mexican ..
Americans. As Judge Garza. observed, "If people in charge
can choose whom they want, it is unlikely they will discrimi·
nate against themselves." 384 F. Supp. 79, 90.
That individuals are more likely to discriminate in favor of,
than against, those who share their own identifiable attributes
is the premise that underlies the cases recognizing that the
criminal defendant has a personal right under the Fourteenth
Amendment not to have members of his own class excluded
from jury service. Discriminatory exclusion of members of
the defendant's class has been viewed as unfairly excluding
persons having a natural inclination to favor the defendant.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.S., at 309. Were
it not for that natural inclination, and for its general recogni•
tion in the community, there would be no reason to suppose
that a jury selection process that systematically excluded
persons of a certain race would be the basis of any legitimate
~
complaint by criminal defendants of that race. Only t~

majoritaria~

Americans are not politically "powerless"; they are the
political element of the community, with demonstrated capability to elect
and protect their own.J..

/

·.

~

Nor do I suggest that persons in positions of power

can never be shown to have discriminated against other
members of the same ethnic or racial group.
only that respondent's statistical

evidenc~

I would hold
ia tsis ease,

without more, is insufficient to prove a cl~ of
L'~ ~1.$ CQ~~. I
dis crimina t
- - -,.
'

,(.

;
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individuals excluded from jury service would have a personal
right to complain.~
In Akins v. Texas, supra, 325 U. S., at 400, where apparently no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of
16 was on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high
threshold of proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory practice in selecting a
grand jury panel challenges an essential element of
proper judicial procedure-the requirement of fairness on
the part of the judicial arm of the government in dealing with persons charged with criminal offenses. It cannot lightly be concluded that officers of the court disregard this accepted standard of justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court today
has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure fairness to
Mexican-Americans.

.Q nA
It matters little in this case whether such judicially noticeable facts as the composition of the grand jury commission
are viewed as defeating respondent's prima facie case at the
) The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled jury commission would not discriminate against Mexican-Americans does not, in itself,
explain the statistical disparity shown by respondent. The record is
essentially silent as to the manner in which the commission made its
selections and its mot.ivation in selecting as it did. But the composition
of the commission, in light of the overall political control in the cmmty
by Mexican-Americans, prompted the District Judge to concludecorrectly, I think-that the statistics were insufficient to show the
requisite discriminatory intent. "A broader range of variation should be
tolerated here because the Texas selection system a.llows the governing
majority [of grand jury commissioners] to favor their group when
selecting grand jurors." 284 F. Supp., at 90.

L ..

-
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outset or as rebutting it after it was established by statistical
evidence. The significance of the prima facie case is limited
to its effect in shifting the burden of going forward to the
State. Once the State has produced evidence-either by
presenting proof or by calling attention to facts subject to
judicial notice-the only question is whether the evidence
.in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process.
Here, the State responded to respondent's statistical showing by presenting the testimony of the judge who appointed
the grand jury commissioners. Other facts, such as the
presence of Mexican-Americans in a majority of the elective
positions of the county, entered the record through judicial
notice. The testimony, together with the facts noted by the
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's burden of production-even assuming that respondent's evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a burden. Accordingly, at the
close of the evidence, the question for the District Court was
whether respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately and systematically den [ied] to members of [respondent's class] the
right to participate as jurors in the administration of justice."
Alexander, supra, 405 U. S., at 628. In my view the District Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination
insufficient.
_JIThe Court labels it "inexplicable" that Ofhe state intra. duced only the testimony of the state trial judge. Ante, at
Perhaps the State fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly. But until today's decision one may doubt
whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would have
thought that respondent's statistics, under the circumstances
of this case a.nd prevailing in Hildago County, were even
arguably sufficient to establish deliberate and systematic
discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when Justices here in

r ·
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Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences front
in this remote border
.statistics that Mexican-Americans
'.
county who control the levers of power are manipulating
~hem to discriminate "against themselves." In contrast, the
judges on the scene, the state judge who appointed the jury
commissioners and presided over respondent's trial and the
United States District Judge-both Mexican-Americans and
familiar with the community-perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination. Since I share that
perception, I would reinstate the judgment of the District
Court.
\

lfp/ss

2/10/77

Rider A, p. 2

Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from
raw statistical data, the Court does not require "proof
of racially discriminatory intent".

Instead, finding that

a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the
statistical showing", the Court declared:

lfp/ss

Rider A, p. 6

2/10/77

This case should have been laid permanently to rest,
as to the trial court decided, because of respondent's
failure to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent.
But even if one accepts arguendo that statistical evidence of
disproportionality makes out a prima facie case, I agree
with the District Court that respondent's case is overwhelmingly rebutted by the facts of which that court took
judicial notice.

In Arlington Heights, speaking of the

burden on the complaining party, that proof of discriminatory
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available".

As respondent introduced no direct

evidence of intent, we must BB look to the entire record
and setting

none of which is in dispute - for such

inferences as may be drawn that bear upon

xx

intent.

In

reality, all that respondent presents is an argument that
discriminatory intent may be presumed from the statistical
disproportionality.

Even if the setting were a typical

community with a predominantly white population the
statistics here are not persuasive; there is no indication
of mere tokenism.

2.
On the state's side of the case, wholly rational
inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic
society refute respondent's claim of intent to discriminate
against him and other Mexican-Americans

6.

Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to
entertain respondent's claim could be viewed as plain
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this case.
In view of its importancem the federal system, the
question should not be resolved in the absence of plenary
consideration.

It would be appropriate, rather, to set

the case for reargument or to remand it for reconsiderstion on the question whether federal habeas corpus relief
is available.
But absent a willingness on the part of the Court
to make this disposition of the case, I now address the
merits.

:

.,
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No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

/o.J._..., \• ~·., .~ ~
the Court e eaay ignores
t\
decisions:

our most relevant recent

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided
January 11, 1977.

Neither .Q:L,tbes e.. case•.J • c:i ted, and

::C ~P.e+<.~lj•L~-r

~e Court's x preoccupation with ~Astatistics is ~salty
incompatible with the equal protection analysis explicitly
mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights.

In the latter

case we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. 'Disproporationate impact is not
irrelevant, but it not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 242.
Proof of racially discriminatory intenr-or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.

"Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of official action - whether it 'bears
more heavily on one race than another,'
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may
provide an important starting point. * * *
But . . • [a]bsent a patt ern as stark as that
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative,
and the Court must look to other evidence."

,.,.

-

lfp/ss

2/10/77

Rider A, p. 2

Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from
raw statistical data, the Court does not require "proof
of racially discriminatory intent".

Instead, finding that

a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the
statistical showing", the Court declared:

2.
- ~~:zz;(~
Htlllt n ( cnt

~ TAe ~\Hi't :t.fi~ wsei:l;rjaisregardin~l!'
Ill. r..~ '-; ~ ~"''C.tft,(p t'e9Q d ga1i, ~ olds

in effect that

pact alone" is

(

~~ a, ·
~J.y,1 ~ ...... ~·~........._~_,.....~
\ discri7

ion(.a(::!,.!J the statistical showing", the

Court declared:

- - - - - - - - --

"Once the defendant has shown substantial
underrepresentation of his group, the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie
case." Ante at 11.

;r~ lington Heights,

as in Davis, we

held~~i~

the contrary:
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply
failed to carry their burden of proving
[on the basis of impact alone] that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's
decision." Slip op. at 17.
To be sure, the

~

courts below also fell into the

same error :}o finding that the defendant [respondent here]
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical
disproportionality between Mexican American population and
the composition of

~

grand jury panels.

These courts

did not have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and
Arlington Heights, but - even so - they misapplied
~

~

perhaps the single most relevant precedent addressing

pr22i~~

jury

the issue of alleged discrimination in grand

. I:~

selectio~A !lex~er

'/o<

v. Louisiana, aP6 U.S. 625

(1972)~

3.
I~

eke•

e~

Mr. Justice White - speaking for the Court -

made clear:
"The Court has never annou ced mathematical
xxaHaiHgx standards for the demo stration' of
'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather,
emphasized that a factual inqui
is necessary
in each case that takes into account all possible
ex& explanatory factors. The progressive
decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is
indeed striking here, but we do not rest our
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated a
prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially
neutral." 405 U.S. , at 630.

~

In Alexander, the

Court~reiterated

the standard that

a complaining defendant must show that the state has
"deliberately and systematically der{ied] to members of
his race the right to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice."

Id., at 628.

~~-~

In AJ eyaodir

the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community
were Negro ; the jury commission consisted of five members
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge;
o£

t!~aoper-~bfl'!!!

of ~Negro
t\

8IJ.

~ ...J •• l, "2.. f.)~
the grand jury venire ~ only one

I

(5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand

jury that indicted defendant was Negro.

Id. at 627, 628.

This statistical array was - as the Court noted - "striking".

~ ~.w

' ;-

·~44.~; (.·tfut),., ~ ~~

ami ~et~as not (a i o~ sufficien~ o support a "conclusion

-

that petition has demonstrated a prima facie case of

4.
invidious racial discrimination".
{

Id., at 630.

Rather,

~ ~-~AMA•I-*
the Court lookea to a cCfmbination of factors, specified

"

in detail:e. in the opinion.- as

~«SRKKXKHX.~«

a prima facie case of discrimination".

~

There is simply

"constitut[ing]

Id. at 631.

Jf comparability between the facts

in this

case and those in any other jury composition case decided
by this Court.

'FQQ "grotrp" alleged to aa.ve been discriminated

~R~ Mexican-America~ omprised

79.2% of the population;

the judge who appointed the jury commissioners was MexicanAmerican; three of the five incumbent jury commissioners
were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20 members of the grand
jury array, five of the 12 grand jurors who indicted
defendant, the foreman of the grand jury, and

x seven

of the 12 sfxxk:e. petit jurors who found petitioner guilty
all were Mexican-American.

5.
As these facts belie on their face any inference of

~· ~4_, ~

discrimination, respondent

~elie d

"

.,..e1

on a 10-year statistical

presentation as proof of "systematic racial discrimination
in the selection of grand jurors".

These figures showed

that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, only 39% of
the grand jurors who served in Hildago County were
Mexican-American.

The trend was toward a higher percentage,

averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year period prior
to respondent's trial.

Ante at 4.

The Court relies almost

exclusively on
averages in holding that

respondent ~

facie case xmaxxiR shifting the

BKX~R

made out a prima

burden of proof to

)

the state.

Once having reached this conclusion, it was

easy to resolve this case
"The state offered no evidence at all either
attacking respondent's allegations of ~am
discrimination or demonstrating that his
statistics were unreliable in any way."
Ante, at 5, 11, 14 and 16.

,,

,,

Indeed, the Court thought it inexplicable that "the
state introduced practically no evidence."

Ante at 14.

Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly.

But until today's decision one may

doubt whether a many lawyers, familiar with our cases,

6.

ght that respondent's statistics, under
the circumst

ces of this case and prevailing in Hildago

~ ~ ~<..,£:.., ,1- ~

County,

"Hoi£ •

4c..(._

a prima facie case.

"

But if there was

room for doubt at the time of the trial below, all doubt
was dispelled by our

decision~n Davis and Arlington Heights

making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not
determinative" and that the burden remains on the complaining
, party to prove "discriminatory intent or purpose". '(/f' Jld
Heights
"demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may

tl/)

be available".
ai~

This view was consistent with the Court's

admonition in Alexander that, in a jury discrimination

case, a court must consider the entire factual situation
and "take into account all possible explanatory factors".
405 U.S., at
th~

CqSe are

A
~ot

Efte-f..a~t

atld relevmrt: setting of

in dispute, we are free to examine them

alleged denial of equal protection with respect to jury
selection "calls for our examination of the evidence to

-----

7.
for ourselves

on the
evidence,

thr distr::l.ct

~ed
of law.

The Court's opinion states that we "granted
certiorari to consider whether the existence of a 'governing
majority'iR in itself can rebut a prima facie case of
)

discrimination in grand jury selection.

II

Ante at 9.

It is puzzling to speculate as to the origin of this
asserted reason for granting certiorari.

The questions

presented in the petition for certiorari were not so framed,
and neither was our grant so expressed or limited.

The

district court did emphasize that Mei Mexican-Americans
were in theory and in fact a governing majority in
Hidalgo County, but no one seriously suggests that this
fact alone is relied upon to rebut a case of discrimination

8.

----- ------

the burden of proof had been xksf shifted to

alysis should commence with the facts relating
to the indictment and conviction of this respondent.

As

noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge
who presided at the trial
Americans.

It would be

~pea ~~v&- e~

wkel~

~

Mexican-

irrational to suggest that
~

these facts - the most relevant facts Ato respondent's
conviction - permitted any inference of discrimination.
The Court, therefore,H was forced to rely on the bare
statistical bones of
the ratio

population mix.

A far more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's
opinion is the composition of the grand jury commissioners,
)

the body vested by Texas law with the authority to select
grand jurors.

Respondent did not choose to present statistics

as to this body for the entire 10-year period.

The record

does show, however, that for the XHSXRRaxaak two and a
half years prior to respondent's trial the judge who

-~~~c..e~~~~~c-·~(~~
appointed the grand jury commissioners Afollowed the

''

~

• •\

14ttu., _

policy of naming "three Mexican-Americans and the other
two might be Anglo with Anglo names or . . • a colored
man."

App. 63, 64.
It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that

the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power.

Here

that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans.
udge
J~ A~mi~

testified that he considered, in addition

to other things, the population mix in appointing the jury
commissioners.

By naming three Mexican-Americans to the

commission he gave them the power and authority - if they
chose to exercise it that way - to place onlf Mexican-Americans
on grand jury panels.

·The fact that they exercised that

power with greater restraint
inference

~

J IJ~ ~.J...+ 6._;
scarcelyAa credible

~~~s~~~nclusive

answer

~

to any imputation of J..RViai.gw.s intent was given by United
A.

States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's
habeas corpus petition:
"If pxapis: people in charge adt can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate
against themselves. A broader range of variation
should be tolerated here because the Texas selection
system allows the governing majority [of jury

commissioners] to favor their group when
selecting grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79,
(1974) ('1~ ~ ~)

N~
e to Jpe AceJ'ed ~quo_te- k om

2/10/77
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J d
c ose

· ~~~th~wer

to

/()

~

Judge

Ga~z

, hi

elf thoroughly f 1miliar wit?
/

County,

as follows:

~opy

. 36 of petition and end en

~ In Akin v. Texas (supra) at 400, where apparently no

W1L-•·

Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 on the
A

jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold of
proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:

"An allegation of discriminatory practice in

selecting a grand jury panel challenges an
essential element of proper judicial procedure the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial arm of the government in dealing with
persons charged with criminal offenses. It
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of
the court disregard this accepted standard of
justice."
,.
~~~

With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court

"
today has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury commissioners

of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what m11y

a.~eetnaea

assure fairness to

~
t:A
be their

natural inclination to

Mexican-Americans ~Finally,

the fact -

found by the District Court - that Mexican-Americans were
the governing majority in this county further refutes any
inference of purposeful discrimination.

The Court's opinion

refers more than once to the absence of evidence on behalf
of the state.

But the critical facts,a of which judicial

e
notice could be taken, are beyond dispute.

I;

In addition

to those set forth above evidencing control of the situation
by Mexican-Americans, a majority of the elected officials
were Mexican-American and a majority of the judges and jury
commissioners in the county also were Mexican-American.
That these positions of power and influence were so held
is unlikely to be accidental in a community in which 80%
of the population is Mexican-American.

As Judge Garza

emphasized, in dismissing respondent's petition ,
case is

~

~tally~ unique

t his

in that every other jury discrimina-

tion case reaching this Court has involved situations
HRHR

where the governing majority, and the resulting power

and control, lay with a white electorate and white officials.
There is indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total
~

unreality ~ Justices here in Washington decid~ on the
;.

basis of inferences from

sael~s

Q£ statistics ~hat Mexican-

Americans in this remote county who control the iea levers
of power are manipulating them to discriminate "against
themselves".

In contrast, the judges on the scene, the

state circuit judge who appointed the jury commissioners,
the state judge who presided over respondent's trial,

and the United States District Judge - all Mexican-Americans
and familiar with the community - perceived no basis whatever
for finding the necessary invidious discrimination.

lfp/ss

Rider A. p. 6

2/10/77

:11
This case should have been laid permanently to
a-e •

~-~toat':-e ~t-dee1:d~

rest~

because of respondent's

failure to carry his burden of proving discriminatory intent.
~

But even if one accepts arguendo that statistical evidence of
..

,.,..._

~.
me~~ OtiC

disproportionality

1\

a prima facie case, I agree

with the District Court that respondent's case is

8¥e£ -

~·4.,,..L ••
t.J_
wkel~a~ly rebutted by theAfacts of which thlt court took
1

judicial notice.

In Arlington

· ' -

Heights ~peakiR8 8 f7tlt~

intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available".

~.-vAt.~~

)\evidence of intent, we must as look to the entire record
and setting - none of which is in dispute - for such

,,c..t.~~

I\ inferences

as may be drawn ,.

r~ie~ Jl11

that respondent presents is an argument that

discriminatory intent may be presumed from the statistical
disproportionality.

Even if the setting were a typical

community with a predominantly white population the

-

~M4~~~.
a-li's
rre ~ J~N....
/

. t•:Lcs h ere are '\nKs tat :Ls

..

~@li'8et&~i:'Ve" ,

~ ~/..- ~ -~ ~,..,)( of mere tokenism.

la8

Hl ;uui: &~n

2.

~ On

the state's side of the case,

,~ell y

rational

inferences from the most basic facts in a democratic

,~.,~~ ~ t 11'1~~ ...-6-t..t.,
~
society refa~ respondent's claim of Lntent to discriminate
~

against him and other Mexican-Americans
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This is aAo

~stronger

8iJQn

t

4~··-~~

case for requiring proof

A

A

of discriminatory intent by the complaining party than
WQre

t~ ~i&waei~~ ~

Davis and Arlington Heights.

The

"impact" did not necessarily ever have a discriminatory
effect.

In a jury selection case the protected constitut·· anal

interest is the right to a fair trial.
Ln this case, statistical or otherwise, that
prived of a fair trial.
the

Putting

was controlled by a
d respondent was

Americans,
drawn from a

five
, the disparity here
resulting four of the

"probably becau e
inal members of the array
be located"; and, finally, t
respondent had a majority

dis proportionality
tainted the fairness of

~

respondent's trial.

2.
~

By contrast, in Davis the effect of the alleged

414.~~
discrimination was the deprivation of jobs to the complaining
parties.

"

In Arlington Heights, the effect

a1 1 e8~gnJJ.8'MWi.iaisuatien

was total:

a~

jwpa.s&sr

~1e

the complainants there

were denied the desired opportunity to build low-cost
housing.

.
~·"'--1...
~

It is therefore evident that the

p~waehjlh&y

of

causation between the alleged discrimination and the effect
on the asserted constitutional right is far more attenuated
in this case than in Davis and Arlington Heights.
demanding level of proof of discriminatory
therefore should be required.

xx

A more

intent
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Gastaneda fn.

The holding in Davis and Arlington Heights was not a
new departure, although we noted that "some contrary
indications may be drawn from some of our cases".
Heights, slip op. at 12.

Arlington

Indeed, one of the precedents

relied on in Arlington Heights was Akins v. Texas, 325

u.s.

398, 403-404 (1945), a jury selection case.

lfp/ss

2/10/77

·Castaneda fn .

The term "Mexican-American" is used here, as in
the various opinions, to mean persons with Mexican-American
surnames.

lfp/ss 2/10/77

Castaneda fn.

The Court's opinion may be read as implicitly
suspicious of the Texas system for the selection of grand
jurors.

See,~·&·'~

at 13, 14.

It is said that the

system "is highly subjective", but this characterization
cuts in favor of the state in this case because Judge
Jose Alamia, who chose the jury commissioners, was MexicanAmerican and he deliberately placed the commission in the
control (3 to 2) of fellow Mexican-Americans .
67-71.

App. 62, 64,

In any event, as the Court concedes the

constitutionality of the Texas system has been accepted
by this Court .

~.

at 14 .

Accordingly, there is no

basis for relying on the Texas system as supporting the
inference the Court draws from the sta tistics .

Certainly,

as applied in this case, the operation of the system
refutes that inference .

lfp/ss

2/10/77

Castaneda fn.

The Court relies on Judge Garza's finding (actually
a legal conclusion) that respondent "established a bare
prima facie case" by his statistical evidence.

But,

strangely, the Court ignores the most significant finding
of fact made by the District Court, namely, that viewing
the case as a whole there was no discrimination:
"The petitioner's percentages appear somewhat
inaccurate and the circumstantial evidence
of lack of discriminatory intent is strong.
• • • The petitioner did show a long continued
history of alleged disproportion, but there
is no evidence of tokenism, total exclusion,
discriminatory acts or failure to act, or an
inherently dangerous selection system."
F. Supp., at _ .

lfp/ss

Castaneda fn.

2/10/77

I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact
that Mexican-Americans constitute a majority in Hildago
County is dispositive.

There are many communities in

which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, a majority
of the population may not be able at a particular time to
control or significantly influence political decisions or
the way the system operates .

But no one seriously can

contend that Hildago County is such a community.

As we

have noted elsewhere, the classic situation in which a
"minority group" may suffer state discrimination is where
it is "relegated to such a position of political powerless•
ness" as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."
District v. Rodriguez,

-

u.s.

San Antonio School

-' - (1973).

Here

the Mexican-Americans are not politically "powerless'f;
they

~

the majoritarian political element of the community ,

with demonstrated capability to elect and protect their
own.

T

lfp/ss
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Castaneda, fn.

As pointed out in Arlington Heights proof of
discriminating intent as a motivating factor "demands
a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available.''

This view was

consistent with the Court's admonition in Alexander that,
in a jury discrimination case, a court must consider the
entire factual situation and "take into account all!possible
explanatory factors".

405 U.S., at

-·

As noted in Akins

v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 402 (1945), the alleged denial
of equal protection with respect to jury selection "calls
for our examination of the evidence to determine ourselves
whether a federal constitutional r&ght has been deined • • • • "

lfp/ss

Castaneda, fn . ___

2/10/77

This is a stronger case for requiring satisfactory
proof of discriminatory intent by the complaining party
than Davis and Arlington Heights.
necessarily

~

The "impact" did not

have a discriminatory effect.

In a jury

selection case the protected constitutional interest is
the right to a fair trial.

Credulity is stretched to the

breaking point to argue, in face of the degree of
participation of Mexican-Americans in the entire process,
that the effect of past disproportionality tainted the
fairness of respondent's trial.

By contrast, in Davis

the effect of the alleged discrimination was the actual
deprivation of jobs to the complaining parties.
Arlington Heights, the effect was total:

In

the compla,inants

there were denied the desired opportunity to build low-cost
housing.
It is therefore evident that the likelihood of
causation between the alleged discrimination and the effect
on the asserted constitutional right is far more attenuated
in this case than in Davis and Arlington Heights .

A more

demanding level of proof of discriminatory intent therefore
should be required.

lfp/ss 2/10/77

Castaneda, fn. ___

The Court's opinion states that we ''granted certiorari
to consider whether the existence of a 'governing majority'
in itself can rebut a prima facie case of discrimination in
grand jury selection.

. . ."

~

at 9.

It is puzzling

to speculate as to the origin of this asserted reason for
granting certiorari.

The questions presented in the petition

for certiorari were not so framed, and neither was our
grant so expressed or limited.

The District Court did

emphasize that MeKican-Americans were in theory and in fact
a government majority in Hidalgo County, but no one
seriously suggests that this fact alone is relied upon
to rebut a case of discrimination even if the burden of
proof had been shifted to the state.

I
I

\

\

lfp/ss/lab 2/10/77

caataneda fn.

-

The Court'a opinion reflecta aome auapicion
of the Texas ayatem for the selection of grand
jurors.
~

The ay1tem ia aaid to be "highly aubjective",

at 13, 14, but this characterization cuta in

favor of the atate in thia caae because Judge Jose
Alamia, who choae the jury cosaiaaionera, waa
Mexican-American and be deliberately placed the
commiaaion in the control (3 to 2) of fellow
Mexican•Americana,

App. 62 , 64, 6 7-71.

There ia

1

no baaia for augge1ting that tbe Texaa ayatem
aupporta the inference the Court draws from the
statiatica.

Certainly, aa applied in this case,

the operation of the ayatem • wbether aubjective
or not - placed the selection of grand jurors in
the banda of Mexican-Americana.

In any event, aa

the Court concedea, the con.a titutionality of the
Texas ayatem bae been accepted by thia Court.
at 14.

Ante,

lfp/ss
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No. 75-1552

CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Today's opinion for the Court ignores our most relevant
recent decisions:

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976)

and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided
January 11, 1977.
I

The Court's preoccupation with the perceived impact
of statistics is incompatible with the equal protection
analysis explicitly mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights.
In the latter case we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. 'Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at
242. Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.

****
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of official action - whether it 'bears
more heavily on one race than another,'
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may
provide an important starting point. * * *
But . . . [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative,
and the Court must look to other evidence."

2.
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from raw
statistical data, the Court does not require "proof of
racially discriminatory intent".

Instead, finding that

a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the
statistical showing", the Court declared:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial
underrepresentation of his group, the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie
case." Ante, at 11.
But in Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held precisely
the contrary:
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply
failed to carry their burden of proving [on
the basis of impact alone]that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's
decision." Slip op., at 17.
To be sure, the courts below also fell into the
same error:

finding that the defendant [respondent here]

had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical
disproportionality between Mexican-American population and
the composition of grand jury panels.

These courts did not

have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and Arlington
Heights, but - even so - they misapplied perhaps the single
most relevant precedent addressing the issue of alleged
discrimination in grand jury selection.

In Alexander v.

3.
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), Mr. Justice White speaking for the Court - made clear:
"The Court has never announced mathematical
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic'
exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized
that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case
that takes into account all possible explanatory
factors. The progressive decimation of potential
Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, but we
do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial
discrimination on statistical improbability alone,
for the selection procedures themselves were not
racially neutral." 405 U.S., at 630.
In Alexander, the Court also reiterated the standard that
a complaining defendant must show that the state has
"deliberately and systematically den[ied] to members of
his race the right to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice."

Id., at 628.

In that case

the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community
were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five members
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge;
the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one of
whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the
grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro.
628.

Id., at 627,

This statistical array was - as the Court noted -

"striking".

Yet this result (effect) of the system was

4.
not sufficient alone to support a "conclusion that
petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case of
invidious racial discrimination".

Id., at 630.

Rather,

the Court in Alexander looked to a combination of factors,
specified in detail in the opinion, as "constitut[ing] a
prima facie case of discrimination".

Id. at 631.

There is simply no comparability between the facts
in this case and those in any other jury composition case
decided by this Court.

Mexican-Americans comprised 79.2%

of the population; the judge who appointed the jury
commissioners was Mexican-American; three of the five
incumbent jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10
of the 20 members of the grand jury array, five of the
12 grand jurors who indicted defendant, the foreman of
the grand jury, and seven of the 12 petit jurors who found
petitioner guilty all were Mexican-Americans.
As these facts belie on their face any inference of
discrimination, respondent was forced to rely on a 10-year
statistical presentation as proof of "systematic racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors".

These

figures showed that for the 10-year period ending in 1972,

5.
only 39% of the grand jurors who served in Hildago County
were Mexican-American.

The trend was toward a higher

percentage, averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year
period prior to respondent's trial.

Ante, at 4.

The Court

relies almost exclusively on the disparity reflected by
these statistical averages in holding that respondent made
out a prima facie case, shifting the burden of proof to
the state.

Once having reached this conclusion, it was

easy to resolve this case by observing:
"The state offered no evidence at all either
attacking respondent's allegations of discrimination or demonstrating that his statistics
were unreliable in any way." Ante, at 5, 11,
14 and 16.
-Indeed, the Court thought it "inexplicable" that "the
state introduced practically no evidence.

Ante at 14.

Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly.

But until today's decision one may

doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would
have thought that respondent's statistics, under the
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago
County, were ever arguably sufficient to make a prima

facie

case~ But if there was

room

for~~time

of the trial below, all doubt was dispelled by our decisions

6.

in Davis and Arlington Heights making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not determinative" and that the
burden remains on the complaining party to prove "discriminatory
intent or purpose".

-~-----

II

This case should have been laid permanently to rest
because of respondent's failure to carry his burden of
proving discriminatory intent.

But even if one accepts

arguendo that the statistical evidence of disproportionality
made a prima facie case, I agree with the District Court
that respondent's case is rebutted by the record and by
facts of which that court took judicial notice.

In

Arlington Heights, we said that proof of discriminatory
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available".

As there is no shred of direct evidence

of intent, we must look to the entire record and setting -

. 7.
none of which is in dispute - for such relevant inferences
as may be drawn.

All that respondent presents is an

argument that discriminatory intent may be presumed from
the statistical disproportionality.

Even if the setting

were a typical community with a predominantly white population the statistics here are only marginally suggestive,
as they refute an inference of mere tokenism.
On the state's side of the case, rational inferences
from the most basic facts in a democratic society render
wholly improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans.

8.
Analysis should commence with the facts relating to
the indictment and conviction of this respondent.

As

noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge
who presided at the trial were Mexican-Americans.

It would

be irrational to suggest that these facts - the more relevant
facts as to respondent's conviction - justified an inference
of discrimination.

The Court, therefore, was forced

to~ly

on the bare statistical bones of a single element in the
adjudicatory process:

the composition of grand juries

over a span of years as compared with thepopulation mix.

A far

more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's opinion,
is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select
grand jurors.

Respondent did not choose to present statistics

as to this body f or the entire 10-year period.

The record

does show, however, that for the two and a half years

9.

prior to respondent's trial the judge who appointed the
grand jury commissioners - himself a Mexican-American
(Judge Jose Alamia) - follwed the policy of naming "three
Mexican-Americans and the other two might be Anglo with
Anglo names or . • • a colored man."

App. 63, 64.

It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power.

Here

that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans.
The appointing judge testified that he considered, in
addition to other things, the population mix in appointing
the jury commissioners.

By naming three Mexican-Americans

to the commission he gave them the power and authority - if
they chose to exercise it that way - to place only
Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels.

The fact that they

exercised that power with greater restraint scarcely justifies
a credible inference of discriminatory intent.

A conclusive

answer to any imputation of such intent was given by United
States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's
habeas corpus petition:

10.

"If people in charge can choose whom they want,
it is unlikely they will discriminate against
themselves. A broader range of variation should
be tolerated here because the Texas selection
system allows the ~overning majority [of jury
commissioners] toavor their group when selecting
grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79,
(1974).
(Italics in original)
-In Akin v. Texas, supra, at 400, where apparently
no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was
on the jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold
of proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:

"An allegation of discriminatory practice in
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an
essential element of proper judicial procedure the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial a rm of the government in dealing with
persons charged with criminal offenses. It
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of
the court disregard this accepted standard of
justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that in my view

-

the Court today has "lightly" concluded that the grand
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded not
only their duty but also what must be their natural
inclination to assure fairness to Mexican-Americans.

~~.; _ t ~u.41..,
Finally, the I&ae

-

~

io&&J by the District Court -

"

that Mexican-Americans were the governing majority in
this county further refutes any inference of purposeful .

11.

discrimination.

The Court's opinion refers more than once

to the absence of evidence on behalf of the state.

But

the critical facts, of which judicial notice could be taken,
are beyond dispute.

In addition to those set forth above

evidencing control of the situation by Mexican- Americans,
a majority of the elected officials were Mexican-American
and a majority of the judges and jury commissioners in
the county also were Mexican-American.

That these positions

of power and influence were so held is unlikely to be
accidential in a community in which 80% of the population
is Mexican-American.

As Judge Garza emphasized, in

dismissing respondent's petition, this case is wholly
unique in that every other jury discrimination case
reaching this Court has involved situations where the
governing majority, and the resulting power and control,
lay with a white electorate and white officials.

There is

indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total unreality
when Justices here in Washington decide on the basis of
inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in

~

this remoteJ\county who control the levers of power are

12.
manipulating them to discriminate "against themselves".
In contrast, the judges on the scene, the state circuit
judge who appointed the jury commissioners, the state judge
who presided over respondent's trial, and the United States
District Judge - all Mexican-Americans and familiar with
the community - perceived no basis whatever for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination.
III
In sum, this case should be reversed on either or
both of two grounds:

(i) it was plain error to approve

the shifting of the burden of proof to the state on the
basis of inferences drawn from statistical evidence of
impact or effect, a holding contrary to Davis and Arlington
Heights; and (ii) even assuming that respondent's statistics
justified shifting the burden to the state, it also was
error to disregard the District Court's finding - under
the facts and unique setting of this case - that there
was no intent to discriminate.

No. 75-1552

CASTANEDA v. PARTIDA

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Today's opinion for the Court ignores our most relevant
recent decisions:

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976)

and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided
January 11, 1977.
I

The Court's preoccupation with the perceived impact
of statistics is incompatible with the equal protection
analysis explicitly mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights.
In the latter case we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact.
'Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at
242.
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.

"Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of official action - whether it 'bears
more heavily on one race than another,'
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242- may
provide an important starting point. * * *
But . . . [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that
in Gomillion [364 U.S. 339] or Yick Wo [118
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative,
and the Court must look to other evidence."

2.
Relying almost solely on "impact" inferred from raw
statistical data, the Court does not require "proof of
racially discriminatory intent".

Instead, finding that

a "presumption of discrimination [was] raised by the
statistical showing", the Court declared:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial
underrepresentation of his group, the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie
case." Ante,at 11.
But in Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held precisely
the contrary:
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply
failed to carry their burden of proving [on
the basis of impact alone]that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's
decision." Slip op ., at 17.
To be sure, the courts below also fell into the
same error:

finding that the defendant [respondent here]

had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical
disproportionality between Mexican-American population and
the composition of grand jury panels.

These courts did not

have the benefit of our decisions in Davis· and Arlington
Heights, but - even so - they misapplied perhaps the single
most relevant precedent addressing the issue of alleged
discrimination in grand jury selection.

In Alexander v.

3.
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), Mr. Justice White speaking for the Court - made clear:
"The Court has never announced mathematical
standards for the demonstration of 'systematic'
exclusion of blacks but has, rather, emphasized
that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case
that takes into account all possible explanatory
factors.
The progressive decimation of potential
Negro grand jurors is indeed striking here, but we
do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial
discrimination on statistical improbability alone,
for the selection procedures themselves were not
racially neutral." 405 U.S., at 630.
In Alexander, the Court also reiterated the standard that
a complaining defendant must show that the state has
"deliberately and systematically den[ied] to members of
his race the right to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice."

Id., at 628.

In that case

the evidence showed ' that 21% of the relevant community
were Negro; the jury commission consisted of five members
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge;
the grand jury venire included 20 persons, only one of
whom was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the
grand jury that indicted defendant was Negro.
628.

Id., at 627,

This statistical array was - as the Court noted -

"striking".

Yet this result (effect) of the system was

4.
not sufficient alone to support a "conclusion that
petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case of
invidious racial discrimination".

Id., at 630.

Rather,

the Court in Alexander looked to a combination of factors,
specified in detail in the opinion, as "constitut[ing] a
prima facie case of discrimination".

Id. at 631.

There is simply no comparability between the facts
in this case and those in any other jury composition case
decided by this Court.

Mexican-Americans comprised 79.2%

of the population; the judge who appointed the jury
commissioners was Mexican-American; three of the five
incumbent jury commissioners were Mexican-American; 10
of the 20 members of the grand jury array, five of the
12 grand jurors who indicted defendant, the foreman of
the grand jury, and seven of the 12 petit jurors who found
petitioner guilty all were Mexican-Americans.
As these facts belie on their face any inference of
discrimination, respondent was forced to rely on a 10-year
statistical presentation as proof of "systematic racial
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors".

These

figures showed that for the 10-year period ending in 1972,

5.
only 39% of the grand jurors who served in Hildago County
were Mexican-American.

The trend was toward a higher

percentage, averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year
period prior to respondent's trial.

Ante, at 4.

The Court

relies almost exclusively on the disparity reflected by
these statistical averages in holding that respondent made
out a prima facie case, shifting the burden of proof to
the state.

Once having reached this conclusion, it was

easy to resolve this case by observing:
"The state offered no evidence at all either
attacking respondent's allegations of discrimination or demonstrating that his statistics
were unreliable in any way." Ante, at 5, 11,
14 and 16.
Indeed, the Court thought it "inexplicable" that "the
state introduced practically no evidence.
Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for
case so lightly.

Ante at 14.
~aking

this

But until today's decision one may

doubt whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases, would
have thought that respondent's statistics, under the
circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago
County, were ever arguably sufficient to make a . prima

facie

case~But

if there was room

for~~time

of the trial below, all doubt was dispelled by our decisions

6.
in Davis and Arlington Heights making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not determinative" and that the
burden remains on the complaining party_ to prove "discriminatory
intent or purpose" • .

II
This case should have been laid permanently to rest
because of respondent's failure to carry his burden of
proving discriminatory intent.

But even if one accepts

arguendo that the statistical evidence of disproportionality
made a prima facie case, I agree with the District Court
that respondent's case is rebutted by the record and by
facts of which that court took judicial notice.

In

Arlington Heights, we said that proof of discriminatory
intent as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry
into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available".

As there is no shred of direct evidence

of intent, we must look to the entire record and setting -

7.

none of which is in dispute - for such relevant inferences
as may be drawn.

All that respondent presents is an

argument that discriminatory intent may be presumed from
the statistical disproportionality.

Even if the setting

were a typical community with a predominantly white population the statistics here are only marginally suggestive,
as they refute an inference of mere tokenism.
On the state's side of the case, rational inferences
from the most basic facts in a democratic society render
wholly improbable respondent's claim of an intent to
discriminate against him and other Mexican-Americans.

8.
Analysis should commence with the facts relating to
the indictment and ' conviction of this respondent.

As

noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge
who presided at the trial were Mexican-Americans.

It would

be irrational to suggest that these facts - the more relevant
facts as to respondent's conviction - justified an inference
of discrimination.

The Court, therefore, was forced torely

on the bare statistical bones of a single element in the
adjudicatory process:

the composition of grand juries

over a span of years as compared with thepopulation mix.

A far

more significant fact, virtually ignored in the Court's opinion,
is the composition of the grand jury commissioners, the body
vested by Texas law with the authority to select
grand jurors.

Respondent did not choose to present statistics

as to this body for the entire 10-year period.

The record

does show, however, that for the two and a half years

9.

prior to respondent's trial the judge who appointed the
grand jury commissioners - himself a Mexican-American
(Judge Jose Alamia) - follwed the policy of naming "three

•

Me xican-Americans and the other two might be Anglo with
Anglo names or . . . a colored man."

App. 63, 64.

It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power.

Here

that power rested securely in the hands of Mexican-Americans.
The appointing judge testified that he considered, in
addition to other things, the population mix in appointing
the jury commissioners.

By naming three Mexican-Americans

to the commission he gave them the power and authority - if
they chose to exercise it· that way - to place only
Mexican-Americans on grand jury panels.

The fact that they

exercised that power with greater restraint scarcely justifies
a credible inference of discriminatory intent.

A conclusive

answer to any imputation of such intent was given by United
States District Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's
habeas corpus petition:

10.

"If people in charge can choose whom they want,
it is unlikely they will discriminate against
themselves. A broader range of variation should
be tolerated here because the Texas selection
system allows the governing majority [of jury
commissioners] to favor their group when selecting
grand jurors." 384 F. Supp. 79,
(1974).
(Italics in original)
-In Akin v. Texas, supra, at 400, where apparently
no Negro was on the jury commission and only one of 16 was
on the jury panel, ·the Court emphasized the high threshold
of proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:

"An allegation of discriminatory practice in
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an
essential element of proper judicial procedure the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial arm of the government in dealing with
persons charged with criminal offenses.
It
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of
the court disregard this accepted standard of
justice."
With all respect, I am compelled to say that in my view

-

the Court today has "lightly" concluded that the grand
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded not
only their duty but also what must be their natural
inclination to assure fairness to Mexican-Americans.
Finally, the

~tc~~t~~- ~
~

fo~

by the District Court -

"

that Mexican-Amer'icans were the governing majority in
this county further refutes any inference of purposeful .

11.

discrimination.

The Court's opinion refers more than once

to the absence of evidence on behalf of the state.

But

the critical facts, of which judicial notice could be taken,
are beyond dispute.

In addition to those set forth above

evidencing control of the situation by Mexican- Americans,
a majority . of the elected officials were Mexican-American
and a majority of the judges and jury commissioners in
the county also were Mexican-American.

That these positions

of power and influence were so held is unlikely to be
accidential in a community in which 80% of the population
is Mexican-American.

As Judge Garza emphasized, in

dismissing respondent's petition, this case is wholly
unique in that every other jury discrimination'case
reaching this Court has involved situations where the
governing majority, and the resulting power and control,
lay with a white electorate and white officials.

There is

indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total unreality
when Justices here in Washington decide on the basis of
inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in

~
this remote!\county who control the levers of power are

12.
manipulating them to discriminate "against themselves".
In contrast, the judges on the scene, the state circuit
judge who appointed the jury commissioners, the state judge
who presided over respondent's trial, and the United States
District Judge - all Mexican-Americans and familiar with
the community - perceived no basis whatever for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination.
, III
In sum, this case should be reversed on either or
both of two grounds:

(i) it was plain error to approve

the shifting of the burden of proof to the state on the
basis of inferences drawn from statistical evidence of
impact or effect, a holding contrary to Davis and Arlington
Heights; and (ii) even assuming that respondent's statistics
justified shifting the burden to the state, it also was
error to disregard the District Court's finding - under
the facts and unique setting of this case - that there
was no intent to discriminate .

.
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; and third, the facts judicially noticed by the District
Court with respect to the dominance and control by the
4-to-1 majority in Hidalgo County.

I agree with the

District Court, presided over by a Mexican-American familiar
with the county, that this evidence - in its cumulative
effect - does not ·establish unconstitutional grand jury
discrimination.

A
In my view, the Court assesses the evidence in light
of serious misconceptions of the applicable legal principles.
It commences with the novel assumption that a criminal
defendant in a state court has a right under the

'l

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 11 (Castaneda)

But in a state case, in which the challenge is to the
grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and
the defendant has the burden of proving that the
underrepresentation is the result of systematic and
purposeful discrmmination.

lfp/ss
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Ride·r A, p. 14 (Castaneda)

Note to Charlie: I would move the substance of your
discussion of Turner v. Fouche (p. 14, 15) to a footnote,
as its presence in the text breaks the flow and force of
~r opinion.
I suggest a note along the following lines:

Although the holdings in Davis and Arlington Heights
racially
makes clear that proof of/discriminatory intent is required
and that proof of impact or effect is not sufficient, we
did recognize that in Arlington Heights a somewhat lesser
burden may be appropriate in the context of jury selection
"Because of the nature of the jury selection task • • •
we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation
even when the statistical pattern does not approach the
extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion".

M·•

at

-

' n. 13.

Turner v. Fouche, supra, was cited for this view.

But

it is clear from the Court's opinion in Turner that the
statistical disparity of the gradd jury list was viewed
as sufficient to meet complainant's initial burden only
because of background facts strongly supportive of
discriminatory intent.

Wurner was not a criminal case;

it involved, rather, Georgia's peculiar system of
appointing the county board of education.

That board,

consisting exclusively of white members was selected by
the grand jury which in

~was

drawn from a grand jury

list selected by a county jury commission.

,

..

The

2.
commissioners were appointed by the circuit judge.

At every

layer of this system white citizens were in total control
even though there was not a single white student in the
county

schools,~white flight~

having occurred 100%, the

entire board of education was white, as were all members
of the jury commission.

The District Court had found that

until the suit was instituted "Negroes had been systematically
excluded from the grand juries through token inclusion".
Id., at 352.

I t was against this background of pervasive

discrimination that the Court found that even a new grand
jury panel with 37% Negro personnel (against a 60% Negro
majority in the county) was not such an

"insubstantial'~

disparity as to foreclose corrective action by a federal
court.

Id., at 359.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 15 (Castaneda)

The analysis of Davis, and reiterated in Arlington
Heights, is wholly consistent in principle with that
applied in the jury discrimination cases.

This is

illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:

1fp/ss
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Rider A1 p. 18 (Castaneda)

In Turner, supra, 60% of the total population of
the county was black.

But it is abundantly clear that

the political power, as structured by Georgia law and
as inf fact exercised , lay solely with the white population .
See, note __ , supra.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 20 (Castaneda}

Note to Charlie: I suggest a rev~s~on of the paragraph
that begins at the bottom of page 20, but would put it
in a footnote substantially as follows:

The likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled
jury commission would not discriminate against MexicanAmericans does not in itself, explain the statistical
disparity shown by respondent.

The record is essentially

silent as to the reasons, presumably largely subjective,
that motivated the commission in making its selections.
But the composition of the commission, in light of the
overall political control in the county by Mexican-Americans,
prompted the district judge to conclude - correctly, I
think - that the statistics are insuffient to show the
requisite discriminatory intent.

"A broader range of

variation should be tolerated here because the Texas
selection system allows the governing majority [of grand
jury commissioners] to favor their group when selecting
grand jurors".

384 F. Supp., at

•

lfp/ss
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Rider A1 p. 5 (Castaneda)

Allowing standing to assert the rights of others at trial,
~..,__( ~ 'J·'L•~t.l•

f ~ .ty

on direct appeal and cettiorari,AimplLQ&~S d1f~~e
~

considerationst\frOHl

4 14 ~;),~·~~·

-~~ axm}i-esbfle

fi:P

£b~F~~~~

habeas corpus.

~

The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to
the individual.

The focus of inquiry in habeas corpus

generally is limited to the integrity of the state
determination of guilt in the particular case.
Stone v. Powell, supra.
the

state~

See

I would hold, therefore, that

decision on direct appeal to consider the

claim of grand jury discrimination does not present a
case for federal habeas relief where - as here - the
state prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt
in his own case.
sub silento,

The decision of the Court today,
~

appea~s

to extend the availability of habeas

corpus relief well beyond its present ample frontiers.

Note to Charlie: Depending on the outcome of your research
as to class actions in habeas, we can add a footnote drawing
the analogy and saying the Court kkas has not proved this
use of habeas corpus.

2.
Although I think the Court of Appeals' decison to
entertain respondents claim could be viewed as plain
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this Court.
Accordingly, it would be appropriate - as a minimum - to
remand the case for reconsideration of this question.

In

view of its importance to the federal system, the question
certainly should not be resolved in the absence of plenary
consideration.
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L~iting

Ingraham '

the use or total abandonment

of corporal punishment would be welcomed by many
as a societal advance.

But when such a policy

choice may reau.lt from this Court's determination
of an asserted right to due process, rather than
from the normal democratic processes of debate

and legislative action, we have the duty to weigh
the perceived societal
Eldridge, supra at

,...,.k

51/

~ .--

•
that

supra,

Mfthews v.
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Rider A, pg. 34

Insraham

We cannot say that these coats •• the
asserted state interests -- are insubstantial.
We are reviewing here the legialative judgment,
rooted in history and reaffirmed in the laws of
many states, that corporal punishment serves
important educational interests.

This judgment

certainly cannot be viewed as irrational in
light of the problem commonplace in the schools.
As noted in §2!! v. Lopez, supra,

· lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 5 (Castaneda)

As I read the Court's opinion it writes new law on the
subject of grand jury discrimination, expanding the reach
of - and some instances misa pplying - our prior authorities.
It does so in terms that can have an effect far beyond the
relatively narrow issue presented in this case.

Moreover,

because of the unique factual situation here presented,
it was quite unnecessary for the Court to write so sweepingly .

lfp/ss

a footnote)

Rider A
at some

3/24/77

None of the cases relied upon by the Court goes as
far as it does today in inferring purposeful discrimination
from statistical disparity alone.

Alexander, cited several

times, expressly said that '"stastical improbability alone"
is not enough.

A prima facie case of discrmination was

found there only because of the "combination of factors"
that clearly showed deliberate and systematic

1&·,

at 628, 631.

discr~ation.

In Carter v. Jury Commissioner, 396

u.s.

320 (1969), where no Negroes had been appointed to the
jury commission "during the 12 years preceding the commencement of suit", the Court found no discrimination saying:
"The appellants are no more entitled to
proportional representation by race on the
jury commission than on particular grand or
petit jury." Id., at 339.
The Court also cites, with little or no regard to their
factual setting, Aiken v. Texas, supra and Turner v.
Fouche, supra.
at ___ ; and n.

As shown elsewhere in this dissent (infra,
---~'

neither of these decisions supports

the principle today enunciated.

3/11/77

LFP/lab

Rider A

Castaneda

p. 11

It seems to me that the Court today, in rejecting
the finding of the District Court, has erred grievously.
Apparently bemused by statistical abstractions ( see,
~'

ante at ___), the Court also has ignored or mis-

applied the relevant precedents.

I would reinstate the

judgment of the District Court.

.

~

.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 9 (Castaneda!

has "lightly" concluded that the Mexican-American grand
jury commissioners of this county have disregarded their
sworn duty as well as their natural predisposition not to
discriminate against their fellow Mexican-Americans.

lfp/ss

Rider A1 p.

3/9/77

(Castaneda)

Mr. Justice Marshall argues, in his concurring opinion ,
that because the Texas "selection system is.entirely
discretionary" it is subject to abuse, citing cases
recognizing this as a possibility.

~;

at ___ •

But

the cases he cites also make clear that "the Texas synt:em
of selecting grand and petit jurors by the use of jury
commissioners is fair on its face and capable of being
utilized without discrimination."
347

u.s.

Hernandez v. Texas,

475, 478 (1954).

Reliance on the discretion vested in the jury
commission to "buttress" the inference of purposeful
discrimination derived from bare statistics"
___) is a bootstrap argument.
evidence in

thi~

(ante,at

There is not a shred of

case, other than the statistics, to show

abuse of discretion by the jury commission controlled by
Mexican-Americans.

There is no evidence remotely comparable

to the cumulative evidence of sustained, invidious discrimination against Negores in the cases cited by Mr. Justice
Marshall.

lfp/ss

3/8/77

,(Castaneda)

Rider A, p.

Mr. Justice Marshall , relying in his concurring opinion
on "social science theory and research", rejects as
implausible the view that the Mexican-American grand jury
majority - acting in this predominantly Mexican-American
community - would have a natural predisposition to deal
fairly with their fellow Mexican-Amer icans.

The only

specific example of this "social science theory" is the
rather startling one of the "concentration camps" in Nazi
Germany.

It would not have occurred to many observers,

even at this distance, to make even

th~a

6blique comparison

between the treatment of "Jewish prisoners • • • [by]
their Gestapo guards" with the Mexican-American officials
accused of "purposeful discrimination" in this case.

lfp/ss
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Rider A, p. 1 (Castaneda)

One may agree with the Court that the lack of
proportional representation of

Mexican-~ericans

on the

grand jury lists in this county would be unlikely to occur
if jurors were selected from the population wholly at
random.

But it does not follow that the disproportion

resulted from purposeful invidious discrimination.

In

my view, the totality of the circumstances fully supports
the District Court's finding that this statistical disparity that constitutes the basis for the Court's decision stemmed from neutral causes rather than from any intent
to discriminate against Mexican-Americans.

lfp/ss xiii 2/9/77

No. 75-1552 Castaneda v. Partida
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The Court today ignores our most relevant recent
decisions:

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., decided
January 11, 1977.

Neither of these cases is cited, and

the Court's x preoccupation with bare statistics is totally
incompatible with the equal protection analysis explicitly
mandated in Davis and Arlington Heights.

In the latter

case we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (197 6), made it clear that official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact. 'Disproporationate impact is not
irrelevant, but it not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination.' Id., at 242.
Proof of racially discriminatory inteor-or purpose
is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.

****
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of official action - whether it 'bears
more heavily on one race than another,'
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 242 -may
provide an important starting point. * * *
But • • • [a]bsent a pattern as stark as that
in Gomillion [364 U.S. ~39] or Yick Wo [118
U.S. 356], impact alone is not determinative,
and the Court must look to other evidence."

2.
The Court today, wholly disregarding our most recent
precedent, holds in effect that " impact alone" .!!!.
determinative.

Relying on a perceived "presumption of

discrimination raised by the statistical showing", the
Court declared:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial
underrepresentation of his group, the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie
case. 1' ~ at 11.
In Arlington Heights, as in Davis, we held explicitly to
the contrary:
"Respondents [in Arlington Heights] simply
failed to carry their burden of proving
[on the basis of impact alone] that discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's
decision." Slip op. at 17.

'\

To be sure, the g courts below also fell into the
same error - finding that the defendant [respondent here]
had made out a prima facie case by virtue of the statistical
disproportionality between Mexican American population and
the composition of the grand jury panels.

These courts

did not have the benefit of our decisions in Davis and
Arlington Hei&hts, but - even so - they misapplied what
is perhaps the single most relevant precedent addressing
precisely the issue of alleged discrimination in grand
~o(

jury selection:

Alexander v. Louisiana, ~6

u.s.

625 (1972).

3.
In that case, Mr. Justice White - speaking for the Court made clear:
"The Court has never announced mathematical

axaadxags standards for the demonstration of

'systematic' exclusion of blacks but has, rather,
emphasized that a factual inquiry is necessary
in each case that takes into account all possible
ex& explanatory factors. The progressive
decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is
indeed striking here, but we do not rest our
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated a
prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination on statistical improbability alone, for the
selection procedures themselves were not racially
neutral." 405 U.S., at 630.

In Alexander, the Court reiterated the standard that
a complaining defendant must show that the state has
11

deliberately and systematically der{ied] to members of

his race the right to participate as jurors in the
administration of justice."

Is!·,

at 628.

In Alexander

the evidence showed that 21% of the relevant community
were Negro, the jury commission consisted of five members
"all of whom were white", appointed by a white judge;
of the 20 persons on the grand jury venire, only one
was a Negro (5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand
jury that indicted defendant was Negro.

!£.

at 627, 628.

This statistical array was - as the Court noted - "striking",
and yet was not alone sufficient to support a "conclusion
that petition has demonstrated a prima facie case of

4.
invidious racial discrimination".

Id., at 630.

Rather,

the Court looked to a combination of factors, specified
in detaile in the opinion as

~EBRS:EiXIdtlkN«

a prima facie case of discrimination".

.!£.

"constitut[ing)
at 631.

There is simply so comparability between the facts in this
case and those in any other jury composition case decided
by this Court.

The "group" alleged to have been discriminated

against, Mexican-American, comprised 79.2% of the population;
the judge who appointed the jury commissioners was MexicanAmerican; three of the five incumbent jury commissioners
were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20 members of the grand
jury array, five of the 12 grand jurors who indicted
defendant, the foreman of the grand jury, and i seven
of the 12 afxxke petit jurors who found petitioner guilty
all were Mexican-American .

5.
As these facts belie on their face any inference of
discrimination, respondent relied on a 10-year statistical
presentation as proof of "systematic racial discrimination
in the selection of grand jurors".

These figures showed

that for the 10-year period ending in 1972, only 39% of

\
\
'\

the grand jurors who served in Hildago County were
Mexican-American.

The trend was toward a higher percentage,

averaging 45.5% for the two-and-a-half year period prior
to respondent's trial.

~at

4.

The Court relies almost

exclusively on the disparity shown by these statistical
averages in holding that respondent had made out a prima
facie case smaixia shifting the
the state.

BBX~R

burden of proof to

Once having reached this conclusion, it was

easy to resolve this case - as theCourt did - by observing:
"The state offered no evidence at all either
attacking respondent's allegations of &am
discrimination or demonstrating that his
statistics were unreliable in any way."
~' at 5, 11, 14 and 16.
Indeed, the Court thought it inexplicable that "the
state introduced practically no evidence."

-Ante

at 14.

Perhaps the state fairly may be faulted for taking this
case so lightly.

But until today's decision one may

doubt whether a many lawyers, familiar with our cases,

6.
would have thought that respondent's statistics, under
the circumstances of this case and prevailing in Hildago
County, had made a prima facie case.

But if there was

room for doubt at the time of the trial below, all doubt
was dispelled by our decisions in Davis and Arlington Heights
making clear that disproportionate "impact alone is not
determinative" and that the burden remains on the complaining
party to prove "discriminatory intent or purpose".

We did

point out in Arlington Heights that proof of such a purpose
as a motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may
be available".

aa,

This view was consistent with the Court's

admonition in Alexander that, in a jury discrimination

case, a court must consider the entire factual situation
and "take into account all possible explanatory factors".
405 U.S. , at

-·

As the facts and relevant setting of

this case are not in dispute, we are free to examine them
and drawn our own conclusion as to the constitutional issue.
As noted in Akins v. Texas, 325

u.s.

l/~~

398~(1945), the

alleged denial of equal protection with respect to jury
selection "calls for our examination of the evidence to

7.
determine for ourselves whether a federal constitutional
right has been denied • • • • 11

Indeed, the finding by the

district court that respondent had made our a "bare prima
facie case" was based solely on the undisputed statistical
evidence, and the district court's conclusion that this
resulted in shifting the burden of proof to the state was
an erroneous conclusion of law.
I turn now, in light of the Court's duty to make an
independent judgment, to consider the unique setting of
this case.

The Court's opinion states that we "granted

certiorari to consider whether the existence of a 'governing
majority'ia in itself can rebut a prima facie case of
discrimination in grand jury selection. • • • It

-Ante at 9.

It is puzzling to speculate as to the origin of this
asserted reason for granting certiorari.

The questions

presented in the petition for certiorari were not so framed,
and neither was our grant so expressed or limited.

The

district court did emphasize that Met Mexican-Americans
were in theory and in fact a governing majority in
Hidalgo County, but no one seriously suggests that this
fact alone is relied upon to rebut a case of discrimination

•

~o, .,/'·

8.

even if the burden of proof had been s:kai shifted to the
state.

Analysis should commence with the facts relating

to the indictment and conviction of

~

respondent.

As

noted above, three of the five jury commissioners, five
of the grand jurors who returned the indictment, a majority
of the petit jurors who found him guilty, and the judge
who presided at the trial appear to have been MexicanAmericans.

It would be wholly irrational to suggest that

these facts - the most relevant facts to respondent's
conviction - permitted any inference of discrimination.
The Court, therefore,w was forced to rely on the bare
statistical bones of a single element in the process:
the ratio of grand jury members to the population mix.
A far more significant fact, virtually ignored in the

Cou~~t's

opinion is the composition of the grand jury commissioners,
the body vested by Texas law with the authority to select
grand jurors·.
as to

~,his

Respondent did not choose to present

body for the entire 10-year period.

statistic~

The record

does ~how, however, that for the xwaxambt:aak two and a
I
I

I

half years prior to respondent's trial the judge who
I

appointed the grand jury commissioners followed the

I' .

9.
policy of naming ''three Mexican-Americans and the other
two might be Anglo with Anglo names or • • • a colored
man."

App. 63, 64.

It is clear from our jury discrimination cases that
the focal point of inquiry is the appointive power.

Here

that power rested securely in the hands of\ Mexican-Americans.
The appointing judge - himself a Mexican-American - Judge
Joes Alamia - testified that he considered, in addition
to other things, the population mix in appointing the jury
commissioners.

By naming three Mexican-Americans to the

commission he gave them the power and authority - if they
chose to exercise it that way - to place only Mexican-Americans
on grand jury panels.

The fact that they exercised that

power with greater restraint is scarcely a credible
inference under the circumstances.

A conclusive answer

to any imputation of invidious intent was given by United
States District Judge Garza , the able Mexican-American
jurist who conducted the evidentiary hearing on respondent's
habeas corpus petition:
"If pltspis: people in charge m:k can choose whom
they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate
against themselves. A broader range of variation
should be tolerated here because the Texas selection
system allows the governing majority [of jury

10.
commissioners] to favor their group when
selecting grand jurors . " 384 F. Supp. 79,
-- (1974)
~:

Add footnote keyed to above

~ In ~ v. Texas (supra) at 400, where apparently no

/~

Negro was on the jury conunission and only one of 16 on the
jury panel, the Court emphasized the high threshold of
proof required to brand officers of the court with
discriminatory intent:

"An allegation of discriminatory practice in
selecting a grand jury panel challenges an
essential element of proper JUdicial procedure the requirement of fairness on the part of the
judicial arm of the government in dealing with
persons charged with criminal offenses. I t
cannot lightly be concluded that officers of
the court disregard this accepted standard of
justice. ''
With all respect, I am compelled to say that the Court
today has "lightly" concluded that the grand jury conunissioners
of this county have disregarded not only their duty but also
what may be presumed to be their natural inclination to
assure fairness to Mexican-Americans.

Finally, the fact -

found by the District Court - that Mexican-Americans were
the governing majority in this county further refutes any
inference of purposeful discrimination.

The Court's opinion

refers more than once to the absence of evidence on behalf
of the state.

But the critical facts,a of which judicial

·~ -~

'

notice could be taken, are beyond dispute.

In addition

to those set forth above evidencing control of the situation
by Mexican-Americans, a majority of the elected officials
were Mexican-American and a majority of the judges and jury
commissioners in the county also were Mexican-American.
That these positions of power and influence were so held
is unlikely to be accidental in a community in which 80%
of the population is Mexican-American.

As Judge Garza

emphasized, in dismissing respondent's petition.

This

case is totally unique in that every other jury discrimination case reaching this Court has involved situations
KkBB

where the governing majority, and the resulting power

and control, lay with a white electorate and white officials.
There is indeed, at least for me, a sense of the total
unreality of Justices here in Washington deciding on the
basis of inferences from tables of statistics, that MexicanAmericans in this remote county who control the iaa levers
of power are manipulating them to discriminate "against
themselves".

In contrast, the judges on the scene, the

state circuit judge who appointed the jury commissioners ,
the state judge who presided over respondent's trial,

.

:t'-

,, to.•

;r.

and the United States District Judge - all Mexican-Americans
and familiar with the community - perceived no basis whatever
for finding the necessary invidious discrimination.

Castenida v. Partida, No. 75-1552
Mr. Justice Powell, dissenting.
The Court today requires the release of a
state prisoner on federal habeas corpus although it
)

finds no fault with the finding of guilt on which
his conviction and confinement rest.

The Court

reaches this result by holding that the prisoner, a
Mexican-American, has adequately shown that the
.scI« f.•'"" fr•ees.s ,

Mexican-Americans who controlled the j ~ry ieemmie.H;i8!l

in Hidalgo County, Texas, discriminated against MexicanAmericans in selecting the grand jury that returned the
prisoner's indictment.

In my view_, the Court misconceives

both the proper scope of federal habeas corpus relief
and

t

1

L..ts'tcb~s'-'d J
ij:al principles applicable to grand jury dis1

crimination.

2/14/77

ca/ss

I

Respondent Partida was indicted for the crime of
bu1lary of a private residence at night with intent to
~

A.Ls-~-t- I
Although Texas law affordea Pa~~ an opportunity

rape.

to challenge the indictment before trial - and, indeed,
required him to do so

l .J.,.u~~t"J

- -paz JE&t

off ered no

to

a~~ t~e indictment or the selection of the grand jury that
returned it.

Accordingly, he was brought to trial before

a petit jury.

This jury, whose composition is conceded

to have been proper, found

~ I' ~IJ
'~£Aa guilty of the crime

charged beyond any reasonable doubt.

L~-#-:~t- ,

After Paiirlia was

convicted and sentenced he raised for the first time the
claim that is now before us:

that the grand jury which

indicted him had been selected by a procedure infected by
discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
By accepting that claim, the Court today requires
the State to release respondent -

' ijt' to

~

4

indict and try

him again if the witnesses are still available - although
there is no question that a properly constituted grand
jury found him guilty.

There being no

question of respondent's guilt, the thresh old question in
this case is whether federal habeas corpus relief is
available to challenge the ro mposition of the grand jury.

...

In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), we held
hAhl•~

that when a state prisoner asks a federal court

~

;\

g aha aH

ee!!'fttt8

l'!!'eeeeain~

to overturn a state-court

conviction because of an allegedly unconstitutional grand
jury indictment, the prisoner must show - as a general rule either that he raised his claim within the time limits
imposed by state law or that he failed to do so for cause
and was actually prejudiced.

Partida did not raise a

'
timely objection, has shown no cause for failing to do so,
and cannot show actual prejudice.

Nevertheless, he contends

It is true that in Francis we left open the question
whether the general rule applicable to consideration of
claims of unconstitutional grand jury discrimination in
federal habeas proceedings should bar relief where the
state courts consider the merits of an untimely claim.

3.
We said that in such a case "different considerations would
• . . be applicable".

-

425 U.S., at 542 n.-.J 5.

It does not

,wt-Jiflc&

~

follow that, as the Court today sununarily concludes, I~inee :::0:.
the Texas courts considered the claim on the merits, . . .

\ &.ti..
we are free to do so here."

a.+ -

•)

1It may be

that where a state

court considers a grand-jury-discrimination claim despite
failure to raise it before trial, federal review is available
by certiorari in this Court.
420 U.S. 283, 288-292 (1975).

See Lefkowitz v. Newsome,
But in my view, the states

L A f.l-.rJ..$
~0 ~ 0 $ l S +<>-r
consideration of the merits le~& s ; p en eke ;;;; ' e

L~)

federal habeas revie~Qt£8+l uthetwlse lsarreti elsa:i!m. Bae ~
Stone v. Powell,_ U.S. _ _ (1976).
A verdict of guilt by a properly constituted and
instructed petit jury, based on properly admissible evidence,
is like a valid plea of guilt:

it "simply renders irrelevant

those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent
with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do
not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is
established."

Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975).

~

The initial question, accordingly, is whether thejgrand
jury discrimination is the sort of defect that will "stand

4.
in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly
established."
The function of the grand jury, in Texas and
elsewhere, is to establish that there is probable cause
for detaining the accused and for requiring him to stand
trial.

5vf +h.e.re 1S fl\o C.M..r -t, ~-lr~.; ~tfl.:rJ a•rflc'ctt ~/c
l'~e ConotitYtioA does not, bow~VQ~, ro~uire the

8 .J....:Ie s ·>
StRtQS ts
110

u.s.

+o t, t..
~reeeee

-MA

du f.t I 6~ ~ 1r:.ll-:-MA-~~=--___,

ey

sraBQ jur¥.

516 (1884).

Hurtado v. California,

In many states the grand jury's

function is served by an information and, if the defendant
is to be detained for any significant period before trial,
by a judicial determination of probable cause.
stein v. Pugh, 420

u.s.

103, 118-119 (1975).

See GerIn that

context the established rule is that a defect in the
probable cause determination will not void a subsequent
conviction.

"[A]lthough a suspect who is presently de-

tained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground
that the defendant was detained pending trial without a
determination of probable cause."

Id., at 119.

Where a state proceeds by indictment, it is
true that this Court has recognized a broader scope of

+o

fW

.
. r"' .
rev1ew
a f ter conv1ct
1on.

Thus in Alexander v. Louisiana,
a

405 U.S. 625 (1972), we set aside/xke state conviction on
the ground tb£ members of the defendant's race had been

tff,..,.
deliberately

qr-aM.d iCA/1,~ <tAJi.,c.t.. ~~wt~J lau ""'"J,c.1W~McT, 1
excluded from] . ~44'4f This broader

scope of review reflects a concern not for the rights of the
convicted defendant ,

l"""9"1"t... !iili~
u -c.

guilt is no longer a mere

. \ ~~ ~. ~ > 'fO 1 ..4 .S, 'I 1! {I'I]J.) • ..J
probability, but f

he rights of others.} We have, in

essence, given the criminal defendant standing on appeal
~

to assert the rights of those who _mayJ be enlills¥Q@a £ann
J ..,.

.-.,"'f',.

4JI

t"' J,,(

jW'59 eeruiee er

----

discrimination. ~

alleged

But allowing standing to assert the rights of
others is inconsistent with the function of habeas corpus.
The purpose of the Great Writ is to remedy injustice to

_!_j
the individual.

Where a prisoner challenges the process

that led to his conviction, the inquiry on habeas corpus
properly

is limited to the integrity of t he state

determination of guilt in the particular case.
Stone v. Powell, supra.

See

I would hold, therefore, that

the p.ate's decision on direct appeal to consider the
~

claim of grand jury discrimination does not present a
case for federal habeas relief where - as here - the
state prisoner is not challenging the finding of guilt

-

in his own case.

The decision of the Court today, sub silentio,

appears to extend the availability of habeas corpus

~I
relief well beyond its present ample frontiers.

Although I think the Court of Appeals' decision to
entertain respondent's claim could be viewed as plain
error, this issue was not briefed or argued in this case.
In view of its importancew the federal system, the
question should not be resolved in the absence of plenary
consideration.

It would be appropriate, rather, to set

the case for reargument or to remand it for reconsidera-

-----

tion

of the

question whether federal habeas corpus relief

is available.

As the Court nonetheless affirms the

~ourt

----

of

Appeals' holding that respondent established unconstitutional
discrimination in the grand jury selection process, I
turn now to the merits

.

8.

II \__.9-The evidence relevant to the issue of
discrimination in this case falls into three
categories:

first, the statistical evidence intro-

duced by respondent in both the state and federal
proceedings which tends to show underrepresentation
of Mexican-Americansm the grand juries of Hidalgo
County; second, the testimony of the state trial
judge outlining the Texas grand jury selection
system as it operated in this case; and third, the
facts judicially noticed by the District Court with
respect to the political dominance and control by the
Mexican-American majority in Hidalgo County.

I agree

with the District Court that in light of all the evidence
respondent failed to establish unconstitutional grand
jury discrimination.
A

In my view, the Court approaches the evidence
with a serious misconception of the applicable legal principles.
It begins with the novel assumption that a state criminal
constitutional
defendant has a/right to be indicted by a grand

jury "drawn from a fair cross-section of the corrmmnity."

>

Ante , at __ ' n. 13 •
1
·t he

9.

In adopting that principle

Court abandons the traditional equal

protection standards that have always applied to
claims of grand jury discrimination and ignores our
most relevant recent decisions:

Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 299 (1976), and Arlington Heights v.

-

.

Metropolitan

Hou~ing

Corp., __ U.S. __ (1977).

The Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
does not apply to a state prosecution.

Hurtado v.

L .:S vf,.,.._ • J

A state defendant
cannot complain if the state foregoes the institution
of the grand jury and proceeds against him instead
through prosecutorial information, as many states
prefer to do.
at 116-119.

See Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S.
Nevertheless, if a state chooses to

proceed by grand jury it must proceed within the
constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus in a line of

cases beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880), this Court has held that a
criminal defendant is denied equal protection of
the law if, as a result of purposeful discrimination,

10.

members of his own race are excluded from jury
service.

See,

~'

Alexander v. Louisiana, 405

U.S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Carter v. Jury

Comm'n ~

396 U.S. 320, 335-337, 339 (1970); Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282, 287-290 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945).

As the Court points out)

this right is applicable in cases involving grand
as well as petit jury selection, see,

~'

Alexander,

supra, and in cases where purposeful discrimination
results only in substantial underrepresentation
rather than total exclusion of members of the
defendant's class, see,

u.s.

~'

Turner v. Fouche, 396

346 (1970).
right not to have

members of his class excluded by discrimination from
grand jury service has never before today been
thought to embody a right to a grand jury that
reflects "a fair cross-section c£ the community."
The r i ght to a "representative"
grand jury is a federal r ight that derives not

~ ~ kc...~t- A--..J~+ ~

J

from thejrequirement of equal protection but from

11.

the Fifth

grand jury.

That right is similar to the right -- applicable
to state proceedings -- to a representative petit
jury under the Sixth Amendment.

See Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

To the extent that

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are applicable, a
defendant need only show substantial underrepresentation of his own race or class to demonstrate a
constitutional violation.

\ ust show that the
of systematic

Carter v.
But it
fide

~ ng wg~ld prevent

(

12.

But in a state

case~n

which the challenge is to the

grand jury, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and
the defendant has the burden of proving that the
underrepresentation is the result of systematic and
purposeful discr i mination.

This equal

protection analysis was

explicitly mandated in our recent decisions in
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corp.

In Arlington Heights

we said:
"Our decision last Term in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), made it
clear that official action will not be
held unconstitutional solely because
it results in a racially disproportionate
impact.

'Disproportionate impact is not

irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.'

Id., at 242.

Proof of racially

discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."

U.S., at

I
Today the Court holds that a showing of dispro-

13.

portionate impact is enough:
"Once the defendant has shown substantial
underrepresentation of his group, the
burden shifts to the state to rebut the
prima facie case."

~) at _ _ •

This approach is plainly incompatible with Davis

I

and Arlington Heights.

B~
In Arlington Heights
following standards for determining whether an
evidentiary showing constitutes a prima facie case

to the state:
"Determining whether invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available.

The

impact of the official action -- whether
it "bears more heavily on one race than
another, II Washington v. Davis, 426

_)

at 242

--

ing point.

u.s. '

may provide an important startSometimes a clear pattern,

unexplainable on grounds other than race,

14.

emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face.

Yick Wo v.

Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364

u.s.

339 (1960).

The

evidentiary inquiry is then relatively
easy.

But such cases are rare.

Absent

a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion
or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other
_Ll ~------

evidence."

-

IJ, S ·r..!!r.t- ( foo~~o t"s

0

~

*l'lli t> ).

---

illustrated by the recent decision in Alexander v. Louisiana

=-=.=..=.=::.'

I
\}

405 U.S. 625 (1972), where we stated:

v
Thus, in

evidence
population

a countervailing explanation."

1.)... 16.

"The Court has never announced mathematical standards for the demonstration
of 'systematic' exclusion of blacks but
has, rather, emphasized that a factual
inquiry is necessary in each case that
takes into account all possible explanatory factors.

The progressive decimation

of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed
striking here, but we do not rest our
conclusion that petitioner has demonstrated
a prima facie case of invidious racial
discrimination on statistical improbability
alone, for the selection procedures themselves were not racially neu:tral."

405

U.S., at 630.
In Alexander, the evidence showed that 21% of the

~

relevant community were Negro; the jury commission
consisted of five members "all of whom were white"

'

appointed by a white judge; the grand jury venire
included 20 persons, only one of whom was a Negro
(5%); and none of the 12 persons on the grand jury
that indicted defendant was Negro.
628.

Id., at 627,

This statistical array was - as the Court

noted - "striking".

Yet the statistics were not

sufficient to constitute a prima facie case.

~

Only after determining that the selection system

/

~

"provided a clear and easy opportunity for discrimination11 was the Court satisfied that the burden

.:f)
should shift to the State.

17.

Ibid.

Considered together, Davis, Arlington Heights, and
Alexander make clear that statistical evidence showing underrepresentation of a population group on the grand jury lists
should be considered in light of "such [other] circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available."
Arlington Heights, supra, ______ u.s., at
In this case, the following critical facts are
beyond dispute: the judge who appointed the jury commissioners
and later presided over respondent's trial was
was Mexican-American; three of the five jury
commissioners were Mexican-American; 10 of the 20

-............
members of the grand jury array were Mexican-American;
five of the 12 grand jurors who returned the indictment, including the foreman, were Mexican-American;

~ me risant

and seven of the 12 petit jurors who

18.

returned the verdict of guilt were Mexican-American.
In addition, a majority of the elected officials in
Hidalgo County were Mexican-American, as were a
majority of the judges.

That these positions of

power and influence were so held is not surprising
in a community where 80% of the population is
Mexican-American.

As was emphasized by District

Judge Garza, the able Mexican-American jurist who
presided over the habeas proceedings in the District

-

Court, this case is unique.

Every other jury

discrimination case reaching this Court has involved

Ml

a situation where the governing majority, and the
resulting power over the jury selection process,

.!I

was held by a white electorate and white officials.
The most significant fact in this case,
all but ignored in the Court's opinion, is that
a majority of the jury commissioners were MexicanAmerican.

The jury commission is the body vested

by Texas law with the authority to select grand
jurors.

Under the Texas selection system, as

noted by the Court,

~) at

____ , the jury commission

19.

has the opportunity to identify in advance those
potential jurors who have Spanish surnames.

This

means that a majority of the commission are in a
position -- if they so choose to exercise their
power -- to place only Mexican-Americans on grand
jury panels.
with greater

That they have exercised their power

restrai~arcely

ence of discriminatory intent.

justifies an infer-

To the contrary,

rational inferences from the most basic facts in
a democratic society render wholly improbable
respondent's claim of an intent to discriminate
against him and other Mexican-Americans.

As Judge

Garza observed, "If people in charge can choose
whom they want, it is unlikely they will discriminate
1~)

against themselves."

384 F. Supp. ~~ ·

That individuals are more likely to
discriminate in favor of, than against, those who

{
1

share their own identifiable attributes is the
premise that under..__lies the cases recognizing
that the criminal defendant has a personal right
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to have members

20.

of his own class excluded from jury service.
Discriminatory exclusion of members of the defendant's
class has been viewed as unfairly excluding persons
having a natural inclination to favor the defendant.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U.s. , at
309.

Were it not for that natural inclination,

in
and for its general recognition/the community,
there would be no reason to suppose that a jury
selection process that systematically a&a=Bslikczstely
excluded persons of a certain race would be the
basis of any legitimate complaint by criminal defendants of that race.

Only the individuals excluded

from jury service would have a personal right to
complain.

~

---

The likelihood that
commission

against
explain the
respondent.

established

21.

are

to show the

ory

intent.
tolerated here

selection syste

allows the

jury
to favor their group

I
384 F. Supp., at

apparently no Negro was on the jury commission and
only one of 16 was on the jury panel, the Court
emphasized the high threshold of proof required
to brand officers of the court with discriminatory
intent:
"An allegation of discriminatory
practice in selecting a grand jury
panel challenges an essential element
of proper judicial procedure - the

~

requirement of fairness on the part of
the judicial arm of the government in
dealing with persons charged with
criminal offenses.

It cannot lightly

be concluded that officers of the
court disregard this accepted standard
of justice."

22.

/

~ With all respect, I am compelled to say that ~
Rl:f vielil

the Court today has "lightly" concluded

that the grand jury commissioners of this county
have disregarded not only their duty but also
what must be their natural inclination to assure
fairness to Mexican-Americans.

It matters little in this case whether such
judicially noticeable facts as the composition of
the grand jury commission are viewed as defeating
respondent's prima facie case at the outset or as
rebutting it after it was extablished by statistical
evidence.

The significance of the prima facie case

is limited to its effect in shifting the burden of
07

~ forward

to the State.

Once the State has

"'

produced evidence -- either by presenting proof
or by calling attention to facts subject to judicial
notice -- the only question is whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to demonstrate deliberate
and systematic discrimination in the jury selection
process.

23.

Here, the State responded to respondent's
statistical showing by presenting the testimony
of the judge who appointed the grand jury commissioners.
Other facts,

5vc~

as the presence of Mexican-Americans

in a majority of the elective positions of the county,
entered the record through judicial notice.

The

testimony, together with the facts noted by the
District Court, sufficed to satisfy the State's
burden of production-- even assuming that respondent's
evidence was sufficient to give rise to such a
burden.

Accordingly, at the close of the evidence,

the question for the District Court was whether
respondent had demonstrated by a preponderance
of the evidence that the State had "deliberately
and systematically den[ied] to members of
[respondent's class] the right to participate as
jurors in the administration of justice."
supra, 405 U.S., at 628.

Alexander,

In my view the District

Court correctly found the evidence of discrimination
insufficient.
The Court labels it "inexplicable" that

24.

"the state introduced only the testimony of the
.....,-.

state trial judge.

Ante) at ~

#

J

Perhaps the state

fairly may be faulted for taking this case so
lightly.

But until today's decision one may doubt

whether many lawyers, familiar with our cases,
would have thought that respondent's statistics,
under the circumstances of this case and prevailing

establish deliberate and systematic discrimination.
There is for me a sense of unreality when

k" t asis

l ~A.
Justices here in Washington dec id e~ on t e

of

inferences from statistics that Mexican-Americans in
this remote border county who control the levers of
power are manipulating them to discriminate "against
themselves".
the state

In contrast, the judges on the scene,

•••ew•t

judge who appointed the jury
c.....~J,

commissioners ,...
respondent's

ta•

s&a&• j

trial~and

!J1•

uht>

presided over

the United States District

.,,"ft..

Judge ~ Mexican-Americans and familiar with
the community - perceived no basis for finding
the necessary invidious discrimination.

Since I

25.

share that perception, I would reinstate the
judgment of the District Court.

flltJI~

"It is clear, not only from the language of [42

§§ 224l(c)(3) and 2254(a), but

also~

from

the

common law history of the writ, that the essence
of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and
that the traditional function of the writ is to
secure release from illegal custody.

II

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).

u.s.c.]

~/

In no case cited~
~ the Court's opinion did

the Court have before it a federal habeas corpus
petitioner who,

lik~spondent

here, complained

only of discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury which indicted him.

Indeed, the only

habeas case cited by the Court is Peters v. Kif£,

~- rz%1
supra, 407 U.S. 493.

tH

Peters involved claims of discrimination

in the selection of the petit as well as the grand

...

jury. ~

-

--Y

- --

Although Bite lwleliags in Davis and Arlington Heights
~ IIQili 11 I .I

make f clear that proof of discriminatory intent is required
and that proof of impact or

L~

effect ~ s

did recogniz@ i n Arlington

not sufficient, we

Heigh~a

ogmauloa£ lesser

burden may be appropriate in the context of jury selection.
"Because of the nature of the jury selection task
we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation
even when the statistical pattern does not approach the
extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion". Id. , at -

( n :....,..1 3.
"C..

As one illustration, we cited Turner v. Fouche,
396 U.S. 346 (1970).
evidence showed that

cr

In Turner the statistical
Q.

Negro~

constituted 60 % of the

general population and 37 % of those included in the
grand jury

list~

-

The court found that the disparity

between those figures was not so "insubstantial" as
to foreclose corrective action by a federal court.
Id., at 350.

lUl'li

\Ti:8ueti in isolation.

Turner was not a criminal

case; it involved instead Georgia's peculiar system of
xeieExiHgx appointing the county board of education.
The circuit judge appointed jury commissioners, who
iPr

't!l!l"i'iil

i8lected the

~1!808 j&l!j ,

oohich , f!aally, s e l ecte d

1

in turn selected the grand jury.

The grand jury, in

turn, selected the board of education.

At every layer

of this system white citizens were in total control.
~11 •f tk4 s+vd~~ ~ 't£.1 ~ni'f Sc.~ol:s w.t)'(. Ntft"OJ ~
Even though tfieFe lii'as ~ot a ~ai~Slil wbitae seltel&Rt in.
J

-tv-(t-J w~oe f"'fi

Ih

clVI,

fi\QAS 1•rtJ ~ lsewJ.\ere J

r

a

of the members of theboard of education were

white as were all of the members of the jury commission.
The District Court had found tha1 until the suit was
instituted, "Negroes had been systematically excluded
from the grand juries through token inclusion."
at 352.

Id.,

It was against this background of pervasive

discrimination that the Court found that even a new grand

.

The Court's

~cf.tJ ~

xander

=~.;;;;;.'

ante
_
, at

,., #.f

rel~ance

__ ,

or?'.Jv n~' f,- r .{, :rei! .... -r.... •:,;

~~spe~ e£

on

~-~
tl

laced •

The "sub]" ectivity"

of the selection system cuts in favor of the State where,

as here, those who control the selection process are

members of the same class as the person claiming discrimination.

See text infra.

~

I do not suggest, of course, that the mere fact

that Mexican-Americans constitute a majority in Hildago
County is dispositive.

There are many communities in

which, by virtue of historical or other reasons, a majority
of the population may not be able at a particular time to
control or significantly influence political decisions or

Sc.t."r~r v. hwc.LL 1 1"

-

the way the system operates.
conten
hBiliil

can

that Hildago County is such a community.

aeeee.....QMJili¥RM~ --r;::

Ae "e

classic situation in which a
•

~~~ ·f44:~

"minority group" may suffer s5a&e discrimination is where
A.
it is "relegated
ness:' ae

to~a

position of political powerless -

~& ~-~t"ft£d6Bolitll•li!'
..

~~ .
.
.
1.
LllJ Ul!Lt!"J:] ?A pD 1

tl.

G8

J

District v. Rodriguez, ~ U.S.

prQtMr;...,. f£<>w the

San Antonio School

_J_, Jg (1973).

Here

the Mexican-Americans are not politically "powerless";
they

~

the majoritarian political element of the community,

with demonstrated capability to elect and protect their
own.

-

1~/ss

~The

2/15/7/

likelihood that the Mexican-American controlled

jury commission would not discriminate against MexicanAmericans does not,in itself, explain the statistical
disparity shown by respondent.

The record is essentially

\ M.AoM.Ilt,. ~ wkct!.L 'tl4 ~ CIW\,.. tsri~ J
silent as to the l •~•sefts ,... pW&8 '1!1RI:ilily 1 ?;gay i·+ j ~~ tiii:U~ ;. ~

.ifs- YWJ-/ tl}t:ifi M
'~ ~/t.t.h c f. tllf tfS
commj &Si8ft in m:B:ldag it:s SeleetiOirs.

s.t.i.u..fi·,.. S' tAM.J
t;aat lft8tioB:t:CEl

ta~

--

ii ckJ.

•

But the composition of the commission, in light of the
overall political control in the county by Mexican-Americans,
prompted the ..district judge to conclude - correctly, I
,...
-;:

-

~

~

think - that the statistics

~ ~nsuffient

requisite discriminatory intent.

to show the

"A broader range of

variation should be tolerated here because the Texas
selection system allows the governing majority [of grand
jury commissioners] to favor their group when selecting
grand jurors'!\~

..

384 F. Supp., at

9~

.

